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Summary 
 
This dissertation is, first, an examination of the coherence and consistency of 
Michel Foucault’s work with respect to its development and an examination of his 
ethos, a product of conscious self-construction. Second, this work is an exploration of 
ethical techniques. The goal of the dissertation is to discover an ethos that takes into 
account the best contemporary critical attitudes and techniques of ethical self-
construction. 
The first chapter begins with a discussion of the development of Foucault’s 
archaeological method. Discussion of some problems with structuralism, his 
genealogical method, and finally his movement towards an ethical program follows. 
The method for the dissertation will be exploratory and critical. 
The second chapter develops a line of thinking about the development of 
freedom in Kant and Foucault. Power relations are a persistent context in which self-
construction takes place. Resistance to power relations marks the beginning of 
freedom, which requires testing and moving beyond the limits of socially constructed 
selves. The Quakers display a model of structured resistance to enclosing authorities. 
John Woolman provides an example of ethical self-construction. 
The third chapter explores Foucault’s ethical project by examining ancient 
Greco-Roman and Christian technologies of the self, and relates those projects to 
ethical self-construction through writing. This exploration shows continuity in the 
product of writing from Ancient through modern writers. 
The fourth chapter develops a postmodern ethos through an examination of 
weak ontology. James Rachels’ ethical programme is a model for a postmodern 
technology of the self. The resulting technique offered provides a vulnerability to 
facticity while retaining the best ethical principles and critical reasoning. This is 
illustrated in Miroslav Volf’s The End of Memory.  
Foucault’s ethos is a clear precursor to modern technologies of the self that 
take the exploration of knowledge with humility into account. 
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Introduction 
0.1. Preliminary Remarks: 
The primary focus of this dissertation is Michel Foucault’s work, focussing 
especially on his mature work on the ethics of self-constitution. ‘For Foucault, ethics 
is not a field of rules, principles or precepts, it is the field of our self-constitution as 
subjects.’1 In the last decade of his life, Foucault attempted to discover the 
connections between power relations and ethical formation of the self by drawing out 
a genealogy of sexuality within Greco-Roman and early Christian society. Foucault’s 
critique of Modernity in the 1960s and 1970s laid the groundwork for his inquiries 
about self-formation and technologies of the self during the 1980s. I chose the term 
postmodern in my title to characterize contemporary technologies of the self first 
because of a form of critique emerging in the late twentieth century that can be 
extrapolated roughly from the critical work Foucault did in the 1960s and second, 
because of some remarks by Jean-François Lyotard about the postmodern condition.2 
Third, I chose the term postmodern, because Foucault’s work on the Enlightenment, 
freedom, and an ethos built on a historical ontology is in substantial agreement with 
some of Lyotard’s remarks. Even though the results of Foucault’s work of the 1970s 
and 1980s might not be classified as strictly postmodern on Lyotard’s grounds, they 
nonetheless presuppose and use the modes of critique present in his archaeological 
method of the 1960s.3 
The secondary focus of this dissertation is ethics. The ancient technologies of 
the self Foucault studied were ethical at their core. And qualifications for the 
possibility of knowledge were dependent on ethical self-formation. One needed to be 
a certain kind of person to qualify for the acquisition of knowledge. I wish also to 
suggest that the quest for knowledge in the modern age has inevitably led to ethical 
concerns in those who recognize the limitations inherent in the human condition. The 
postmodern technology of the self I offer as a result of this research is therefore 
                                                 
1 Timothy O’Leary, Foucault and the Art of Ethics (London: Continuum, 2002), hereafter FAE, p. 11. 
2 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. by Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), originally 
published in France as La Condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir, copyright 1979 by Les 
Editions de Minuit, hereafter PC. 
3 Foucault does not abandon Archaeological critique as is evident in an essay written in 1971, 
‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,’ Aesthetics, Methodology, and Epistemology: The Essential Works of 
Foucault, ed. by Paul Rabinow and others, trans. by Robert Hurley and others, 3 vols (New York: The 
New Press, 1998), 2, hereafter AME, p. 369. 
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ethical in character though it has consequences for knowledge acquisition of other 
kinds.  
Following traces of discussions about ethics in the latter half of the twentieth 
century shows how the ethical turn may in fact be one inevitable reaction to the 
growth of technology. It also shows that Foucault’s interest in ethics was partly a 
consequence of the times, as well as a product of his own project of self-formation. 
Christine Korsgaard aptly exposes the ethical turn of the late twentieth century:  
In recent years philosophers have welcomed the development of a widespread 
interest in philosophical ethics. In their concern about the bewildering 
questions generated by medical technology, legal practice, and the power and 
responsibility of the modern corporation, members of the professions and of 
the public have turned to philosophy. […] And so the profession [of 
philosophers] has responded with the development of courses, textbooks, and 
a vast literature on the questions of “applied ethics.”4 
Ethical issues are at the juncture of theory and practice in our age. For 
example, medical practice of the late twentieth century has been forced to reframe the 
doctor/patient relationship after over a century of treating sick persons as broken 
machines. The medical practitioners trained in the mechanical model of human 
biology had no compunction about lying ‘therapeutically’ to the patient or attempting 
to induce healing by mechanistic prodding. Though medical practice has progressed 
remarkably since the nineteenth century on this mechanistic model, there was a 
marked loss of confidence, noted by Sissela Bok, in the institution of medicine 
between 1966 and 1976 in the United States.5 This loss of confidence in the medical 
profession was evidenced by persistent challenges from and charges of unethical 
behaviour by patients who had not been consulted and were kept in the dark 
concerning their treatment. In conjunction with the unethical behaviour of the medical 
practitioners, there was a rise in the awareness of iatrogenic pathologies,6 the dangers 
of modern medicine, and the failure of public justifications for problematic research. 
Bok’s Lying is only one of the challenges targeting the ethical problems of medical 
                                                 
4 Christine Korsgaard, ‘Two Arguments Against Lying,’ in Creating the Kingdom of Ends (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), hereafter CKE, p. 335. 
5 Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life, (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), p. 
xxx. ‘From 1966 to 1976, the proportion of the public answering yes to whether they had a great deal 
of confidence in people in charge of running major institutions dropped from 73 percent to 42 percent 
for medicine; for major companies, from 55 percent to 16 percent; for law firms from 24 percent 
(1973) to 12 percent; and for advertising agencies from 21 percent to 7 percent.’ 
6 Ivan Illich, Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976). 
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treatment. Elisabeth Kübler-Ross7 challenged foundational notions of Western 
medicine which looked on death as an unnatural event whose treatment model forced 
the saving of lives, even when those individuals were long past any conscious 
awareness of life. Bok’s and Kübler-Ross’s works among others helped to re-script 
the conversation about medical treatment, redefining the doctor/patient relationship 
around mutual responsibility for the patient’s treatment and respect for the patient as a 
person. Many of the ethical parameters of this relationship have been encoded during 
the last thirty years in hospitals and universities, outlining the responsibilities of 
medical professionals and making the entire practice of medicine accountable for its 
actions.  
The emergence of a systematic worry over ethical issues is also evidenced by 
the writings of Michel Foucault who, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, began to 
query ethical dilemmas posed by the increase of social forces, the intensification of 
power which is the direct consequence of the increase in our scientific and political 
prowess,8 the increasing ability of the state to collect data on individuals and use them 
as a method to enforce written rules and unwritten expectations of compliance. After 
commenting critically and creatively on the forces composing the culture of the late 
twentieth century, Michel Foucault gravitated to the examination of ancient ethical 
writings looking for clues to problems posed within our culture as a result of the 
modern intensification of power relations. For example, technical ability to ‘watch’ 
people, to view every aspect of their lives, listen to phone conversations, read email, 
track financial transactions has increased dramatically. Not only governments, but 
businesses, and for that matter anyone who is interested, criminal or otherwise who 
can pay for the technology can gain access to essential personal data. This has forced 
a reconsideration of the issue of privacy, of the rights of people against the demands 
for national security, against the opportunity of businesses, and against the easy 
                                                 
7 Elizabeth Kübler-Ross, On Death and Dying (New York: Routledge, 1970). This and other books of 
hers and others marked a movement toward reintegrating death into the social imaginary of modern 
society. 
8 Michel Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?,’ in The Politics of Truth, ed. by Sylvère Lotringer, trans. 
by Lysa Hochroth and Catherine Porter (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007), hereafter POT, p. 116. 
‘Now the relations between the growth of capabilities and the growth of autonomy are not as simple as 
the eighteenth century may have believed. […] What is at stake, then, is this: How can the growth of 
capabilities be disconnected from the intensification of power relations?’ Intensification of power 
relations has to do with the increasing specificity that an individual may be observed, tracked, and 
known by means of the spread of surveillance technology, data mining, and communications. Also in 
Edward F. McGushin, Foucault’s Askēsis: An Introduction to the Philosophical Life (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 2007), hereafter FA, p. 18, ‘Relations of power have, then, a built-in 
strategic element that aims at complete control.’ 
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access to private information by predators. Foucault does not offer an easy solution to 
this dilemma, but rather a compelling urgency to work out these problems through an 
ethical approach to life within the scope of these powers. 
My project is an effort, neither to complete or extend Foucault’s work, that 
would be presumption, nor to force his architectures and methodologies onto a world 
that is changing so rapidly, but to examine some of the forms our ethical projects have 
taken as a singularity9 or a positivity10 from the 1950s to the turn of the twenty-first 
century, roughly into the first decade of this century. It is my intention to capture 
some of the objects of contemporary ethical problematizations and show them in 
relief as a reflection of Foucault’s project of making oneself into a work of art, as an 
aesthetic project11 instead of a putative ethics generated as the result of some 
universal truth about the constitution of man. 
Aesthetic is closest in meaning to the ancient Greek term techne, as it is used 
in expressions such as techne tou biou (‘the technique/art of life’, or in 
Foucault’s rendering, ‘the art/aesthetics of life/existence’). In this sense, to 
understand ethics as an aesthetics of the self is to understand it as a relation 
which demands a certain attitude towards the self, an attitude not unlike that of 
an artist faced with his or her material.12 
I will look at Foucault’s later work focusing on the ‘art of living’ (tekhnē tou 
biou,)13 and the ascetic principles of the ancients from Plato to the centuries following 
Christ with the intention of evaluating the generation of ethical principles within the 
practices of late twentieth-century Western culture. I will focus on how Foucault 
problematized14 social structures and practices and his resultant social commentary 
                                                 
9 POT, ‘What is Critique?’ p. 63, 64; ‘What is Revolution?’ p. 84. A singularity is a focus point, a 
group of problems and issues, a social structure, for example, madness in the classical age, with the 
social and epistemological structures surrounding it. 
10 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. by A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1972), hereafter AK, p. 125. This was originally published in France under the title 
L’Archéologie du Savoir by Éditions Gallimard. © 1969 Éditions Gallimard. Concerning the word 
positivity, ‘I have used the term positivity to designate from afar the tangled mass that I was trying to 
unravel.’ He is interested in the truth of the discourse emerging from this ‘tangled mass.’ also in 
Michel Foucault, ‘On the Archaeology of the Sciences: Response to the Epistemology Circle’ in AME, 
p. 321. ‘This four-level system which governs a discursive formation and has to explain, not its 
common elements but the play of its divergences, its interstices, its distances—in some sense its blanks 
rather than its full surfaces—that is what I propose to call its positivity.’ 
11 Luis David, ‘Michel Foucault and the epimeleia heauton’, in Budhi, 5.2, (2001), 41-65, p. 64. 
12 FAE, p. 14. 
13 Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France 1981-1982, 
ed. Frédéric Gros, tr. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), hereafter HS, p. 86. 
14 Michel Foucault uses the word ‘problematized’ as a way of sectioning off what appeared to him to 
be a problem within the scope of his discussion. Bernauer says that within Foucault’s teaching style 
problematization is an incessant interrogation in the interest of examining how an issue is cast in the 
form of a problem.’ James W. Bernauer, Force of Flight: Toward an Ethics for Thought (London: 
Humanities Press International, 1992), hereafter FOF, p. 3. Also FA, p. 15-16. ‘A problematization 
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and resistance to conservative elements in France and the United States which, on his 
account, upheld worldviews conflicting with moral claims of social and political 
equity. 
Among the central features of Foucault’s work as an intellectual, the desire for 
discovering truth characterized his personal attitudes and drove his research. 
Attempting to avoid the pitfalls of doing history, philosophy, psychology, or 
sociology along traditional lines, Foucault often launched out on studies with as yet 
undeveloped tools, relying on the notion that philosophers, sociologists, and 
historians have glossed over something essential in their research, that is, that they 
have forgotten that life, history, and reality are not formed according to ideologically 
coherent theoretical programmes. His research in the 1960s ran counter to three 
projects, three theoretical programmes, meant to render the human sciences coherent: 
phenomenology, positive science, and hermeneutics. Even with heroic attempts in the 
History of Ideas15 to formalize notions of the human sciences and render them 
systematic and coherent, the emergence of the human sciences is marked by deep and 
persistent epistemological and ethical dilemmas. In a positive way Foucault 
characterizes the constitution and genealogy of knowledge and relations of power 
within social structures, as well the discovery and emergence of man as an object of 
positive empirical study from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries. 
Foucault, following on the heels of the Frankfurt School (though initially 
without any knowledge of them), deeply influenced by Friedrich Nietzsche, develops 
two methods, archaeology and genealogy, within three domains of theory: truth, 
power, and ethics in order to study the objects of his interest. 
Foucault’s first method, archaeology, where his chief concern is to discover 
the properties of meaningful discourse through an examination of the emergence of 
the human sciences, is marked by opposition to three great themes of the history of 
ideas: genesis, continuity, and totalization.16 In the following chapter I will discuss 
Foucault’s archaeological method and how it contrasts with these three themes. In 
order to critique these themes he focuses on discursive formations (not yet 
                                                 
[…] is the process by which an aspect of reality, of one’s world, one’s experience is brought into focus 
as a problem in need of response. Through a problematization, “people begin to take care of something 
… they become anxious about this or that.”’ Also Edward McGushin, ‘Michel Foucault’s Retrieval of 
the Care of the Self in the Thought of Plato’, in Budhi, 6.2-3, (2002), 77-103, p. 85. 
15 Though Foucault and his translators often capitalise History of Ideas, for the remainder of this 
dissertation it will not be capitalised. 
16 AK, p. 138. 
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knowledge, but regularities signalling patterns that may lead to knowledge) which 
reveal the discontinuous character of emerging movements within society such as the 
treatment of madness in the Classical age, the birth of modern medicine, and the 
transition from the Classical to the Modern age. The difficulties of using the 
archaeological method, the apparatus which reveals the emergence and disappearance 
of discursive formations, trouble him,17 and after a survey of the archaeological 
method, I will discuss some critiques of that method.  
The first object of the second method, genealogy, is to comprehend the 
constitution of man in society in relation to various strategies and social structures 
which not only exercise power but also constitute knowledge.18 These relations of 
power/knowledge seem to leave less and less room for individual human freedom. 
From the concern Foucault had for freedom comes the second object of the 
genealogical method, the ethical constitution of man. His research moved from the 
almost fixed character of the power of the disciplinary society found in his book 
Discipline and Punish19 to the problems of governing populations discussed in the 
lectures from 1977 to 1979, of what he called Biopower, where the limits of 
governmental power are explored. The breadth of his genealogical research began to 
include a concern for individual freedom. That concern was more fully developed in 
his lectures of 1981-1982 titled The Hermeneutics of the Subject, and in the second 
and third volumes of The History of Sexuality. 
The result of Foucault’s work was to remove first, any sense of certainty about 
foundations in a transcendental subjectivity—of the Cartesian ego; second, to critique 
the certainties of formalized scientific practice and the human sciences; and third, to 
question the nihilistic failure to come to a ground of interpretation—‘an instance of 
what Paul Ricoeur has called the hermeneutics of suspicion’20 by locating the ground 
of interpretation in the body itself.21 This embodied critique has sparked enduring 
                                                 
17 AK, p. 135. 
18 Daniel E. Palmer, ‘Taylor and Foucault on Power, Truth, and Freedom’, in Southwest Philosophy 
Review, 25.3, (July 1996), 171-88, p. 184. ‘The connection between power and knowledge […] 
guarantees that when something, such as sex, is constituted as a problem for truth, that process will be 
thoroughly saturated with power relations.’ 
19 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish; The Birth of the Prison, trans. by Alan Sheridan (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1979), hereafter DP. Originally published in France as Surveiller et Punir; 
Naissance de la prison by Éditions Gallimard, Paris. Copyright © 1975 by Éditions Gallimard. 
20 BSH, p. xxii, ‘Heidegger claims to find that the deep truth hidden by the everyday practices is the 
unsettling groundlessness of a way of being which is, so to speak, interpretation all the way down. This 
“discovery” is an instance of what Paul Ricoeur has called the hermeneutics of suspicion.’ 
21 BSH, p. 11. 
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debates in feminist theory. Lois McNay, Cressida Heyes,22 Margaret McLaren,23 
Judith Butler, and many others examine how that embodied subjectivity is 
experienced, what its implications are for private and public selves, and how 
Foucault’s genealogies and ethics play into modern views of self-construction. 
Though feminists concerns of the sort noted have been and continue to be fruitful 
grounds to engage Foucault’s thought, the thesis of this dissertation focuses on some 
examples of self-construction whose details, in general, are not centred around strictly 
feminist concerns. 
Foucault resisted searching for the grounds of knowledge in idealized 
structures or interpretations. His observations made possible the removal of false 
confidences in theoretical structures, yet did not fall into nihilistic dismissal of human 
projects. McGushin reminds us that ‘in order to understand philosophical problems 
and the place of philosophy or the philosopher in culture and history one must grasp 
philosophy at the level of its concrete, embodied life.’24 But after the loss of this 
confidence in idealized structures or interpretations, how will people recover 
themselves? How will people recover their equilibrium without foundations? 
Foucault’s solution to this, which he left unfinished in the unpublished fourth 
volume of The History of Sexuality,25 was concerned with the project of the creation 
of the self as a work of art. I will revisit this theme later. But to understand his 
project, one must recognize that he carried out the development of his own ethical self 
both in public and private. With his auditors at the Collège de France as well as his 
close friends and associates Foucault made his life a project. This, I suspect, was the 
escape Foucault took from the intensification of social forces formed in the movement 
of the modern era toward the institution of disciplinary hierarchies.26 This was a 
recognition on his part that one could not be free from power relations. Power 
relations are all around us, infusing the apparatus of our daily lives, our 
                                                 
22 Cressida J. Heyes, Self-Transformations: Foucault, Ethics, and Normalized Bodies (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2007). 
23 Margaret A. McLaren, Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2002), hereafter FFES, p. 29, McLaren says, Foucault’s ‘shift in 
emphasis from beliefs and reason to bodies and practices may render the question of justification 
irrelevant.’ 
24 Edward McGushin, ‘Foucault and the Problem of the Subject’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 
31/5-6 (2005), 623-648, (p. 624).  
25 The proposed title of this book was Les Aveux de la chair (Confessions of the Flesh), what he called 
the ‘Christian book.’ 
26 Foucault developed these themes throughout Discipline and Punish. 
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consciousness, and forming the structures of our unconscious self.27 But, one can 
become a better person, an individual for whom freedom within the confines of these 
disciplines means the development of techniques that sidestep problematic power 
relations, rise above them. It is this exploration of what man is in his freedom that 
Foucault had only begun to elaborate when his untimely death forced the cessation of 
that exploration.  
‘Foucault’s work was profoundly intertwined with his own project of subject 
formation.’28 Didier Eribon recounts one project of Foucault’s later years: that he had 
taken on himself the project of self-improvement, finding not only solace in the works 
of the ancients, especially Seneca, but a path toward freedom.29 Yet, subsequent to his 
death, in the twenty-first century, the project of many governments around the world, 
especially in the West, has been that of surveillance of its own peoples. The scenario 
found in Discipline and Punish has become more thoroughly entrenched in 
government than, I think, Foucault could have imagined. Today, more than ever, the 
population of the world has become subject through advanced technology to scrutiny 
unimaginable in previous eras. That, along with the dramatic rise in knowledge and 
investment in communication technologies, puts man in a position unique to this era 
in terms of being subject to the ubiquitous pressures of surveillance. More than ever, 
discovering a route to freedom through technologies of the self, through disciplines 
focussed on producing an ethos as modelled in Foucault’s later life, may be the only 
escape today from the inevitable intensification of power. 
For Foucault, there is no escape downward into criminality: one becomes the 
pawn of government through the constitution of the self as delinquent. There is no 
escape in collaboration with the strategies of power: one becomes a function of 
government. There is no escape in science: one becomes a partner in developing 
strategies of subverting man to the material, instinctual, and primitive motivations 
behind the institutionalization, compartmentalization, cataloguing of man as object.30 
                                                 
27 I use the word ‘unconscious’ for convenience only, since it is an ordinary way of talking about what 
has become part of our unproblematic assumptions about our lived world. I do not intend this to mean 
that it is not capable of being examined or analysed. 
28 Daniel E. Palmer, ‘Taylor and Foucault on Power, Truth, and Freedom’, in Southwest Philosophy 
Review, 25.3, (July 1996), 171-88, p. 172. 
29 Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault, trans. by Betsy Wing (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1992), p. 331. 
30 Here is an interesting connection to C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man (New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 2001). In the third chapter titled, ‘The Abolition of Man,’ Lewis outlines the results of 
rejecting objective value. Mankind becomes enslaved to the instincts of a few under the guise of 
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There is no escape in a transcendental or totalizing logos: one becomes subject to a 
shallow and twisted ideology. The escape Foucault recognized tentatively and 
hopefully is one that leaves the responsibility for the production of life in freedom to 
the individual within the matrix of power relations as an ethical project of self-
improvement. ‘The introduction of the category of the practices of the self overcomes 
the theoretical impasse of Foucault’s earlier work, which does not explain how social 
agents operate as autonomous individuals.’31 In this I think Foucault’s work is 
prescient. 
0.2. Synopsis of the Project 
In the first chapter, I will examine Foucault’s methodology. I will examine 
Foucault’s ethical project with respect to some movements in ethical thought in the 
latter half of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Mining Foucault’s 
methodology is important, even though limited in scope. And during the sixties it is in 
a constant state of development since Foucault’s first concern was not methodology, 
but rather the objects he studied. In addition, the objects he studied forced 
transformations in his method. As a matter of temporal succession, his first formal 
work on methodology, The Archaeology of Knowledge came at the end of the 1960s 
after a period of reflection on the works that preceded it.32 After The Archaeology of 
Knowledge there is no further book on methodology, only a few short papers. This 
does not mean he was unconcerned with method, only that method was a means of 
avoiding pitfalls previous writers had fallen into, not an end in itself. The 
Archaeology gives us some insight into Foucault’s attempt to organize a body of work 
around themes that were until that point only roughly developed. An examination of 
Foucault’s method in the Archaeology gives us a rough outline of the movements of 
his theoretical enterprise, a catalogue of what he is trying to avoid doing within that 
enterprise, and a starting point for the method of this thesis.  
This discourse on Foucault’s method will clear away what I think are 
unfruitful paths of research, and suggest more fruitful ones. In general, I will not be 
                                                 
building society on a new set of values that on retrospect are only the whims of the few, the 
Conditioners. 
31 Lois McNay, Foucault and Feminism: Power, Gender and the Self (Boston, MA: Northeastern 
University Press, 1992), hereafter FAF, p. 84. 
32 Michel Foucault, ‘The Birth of a World,’ in Foucault Live, ed. by Sylvère Lotringer, trans. Lysa 
Hochroth and John Johnson (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), hereafter FL, p. 65, interview with Jean-
Michel Palmier May 3, 1969. 
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undertaking the project of an epistemology of modern ethics, or a discourse on ethical 
truth, but describing some of the ethical problems of our age regarding the 
constitution of the self in relation to the current age in order to display the complexity 
of the project of becoming ourselves as a work of art through the application of 
technologies of the self. The end result of the project is not art for itself but the 
constitution of ‘ourselves as moral agents.’33 
In chapter 2, I will examine some of the puzzles Foucault worked on 
concerning the writings of Immanuel Kant. Foucault thinks of the time of publication 
of Kant’s essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’ (Was ist Aufklärung?)34 as a moment of 
transition from the Classical to the Modern age. During his life, Foucault frequently 
re-examines Kant’s Aufklärung, finding in it issues that pertain to the self and to 
individual freedom, the relations between the self and tutelage of the self under 
powers that in freedom must be set aside. Foucault studies the problem of resistance 
to power of different sorts, of the dangers of just going along with the status quo, the 
inflexibility of systems of thought in the Classical age, and Kant’s inquiry about that 
inflexibility as a sign of modern sentiment. Foucault’s interest in Kant surfaces 
throughout his career, and later appears to be more urgent, as evidenced in the essays 
collected in the volume The Politics of Truth. Part of Foucault’s problem with Kant 
lies in a view of Kant’s ethics as absolutism, as what some have called Kant’s moral 
atomism. But reading Kant this way is not without difficulties. 
Christine Korsgaard, in her essay ‘The right to lie: Kant on dealing with 
evil,’35 makes a good case for treating Kant like a modern moral thinker—for treating 
Kant’s ethical system in the Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals only as an 
ideal case. This gives us a reading of Kant that not only allows for the possibility of 
conflicts between duties in the presence of evil, but also a way of resolving such 
conflicts. But this doesn’t mean that Kant must give up the Categorical Imperative, 
the decision procedure for discovering our duty. Rather, with Korsgaard we now have 
a decision procedure that takes into account both our duty and conflicts of duty with 
respect to moral evil in our society. This view of a more pragmatic Kant, will 
ameliorate some of the difficulties arising from the strict moral atomism found in 
                                                 
33 Michel Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?,’ in Ethics Subjectivity and Truth: The Essential Works of 
Foucault, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. by Robert Hurley and others, 3 vols (New York: The New Press, 
1997), I,  hereafter EST, p. 262. 
34 POT, p. 29. 
35 Christine Korsgaard, ‘The right to lie: Kant on dealing with evil,’ in CKE, p. 143. 
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Kant’s The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, leading to a more useful 
reading of Kant’s Was ist Aufklärung. The difficulty with a less pragmatic reading of 
Kant is that in Was ist Aufklärung there does not seem to be a mode of critique for the 
expression of freedom. I will argue that the mode of critique is that of resistance and 
transgression as one response to manifestations of power relations, one that Foucault 
sees as necessary for the expression of freedom. ‘Critique is thus a permanent 
interrogation of the limits, an escape from normalization, and a facing-up to the 
challenges of self-creation while seeking to effect changes in social structures.’36 
I will consider Foucault’s reading of the practice of transgression as a mode of 
behaviour within the expression of freedom.37 What we see in Korsgaard’s essay is a 
way of reading Kant that acknowledges the free choice to transgress the principle of 
humanity38 in certain cases, as one method of resolving a conflict between duties 
resulting from our exposure to evil. With respect to freedom, this gives us what we 
need to break away from a rule in society that we may have mutually agreed upon 
from the perspective of the principle of humanity, but now recognize the inadequacy 
of that very principle when a real conflict of duties arises. This is the difficulty with 
reading Kant strictly in terms of the Groundwork, that he doesn’t permit the 
possibility of conflicts between duties or improvement of our moral codes. 
So with the structure of this argument I develop a strategy, using the life of 
John Woolman, an eighteenth-century colonial Quaker as an example of discovering 
how the drive for freedom, a precursor to developing techniques of the self, requires 
one to live at cross purposes both with oneself, one’s associates, and society, that 
resistance at the point of conflict with power is a necessary prerequisite to the practice 
of freedom. The drive for freedom from the conscious or inchoate acknowledgment of 
our unfreedom forces transgression, and rewrites an acceptable view of the self that 
includes the desired freedom, and drives the adoption of techniques that may remain 
outside the status quo, even though these techniques may be essential to our own well 
being in freedom. It is essential that the word transgression as used here, though it 
                                                 
36 Mark Olssen, ‘Foucault and the Imperatives of Education: Critique and Self-Creation in a Non-
Foundational World’, in Studies in Philosophy and Education, 25.3, (May 2006), 245-71, p. 246. 
37 POT, ‘What is Enlightenment?,’’ p. 113; AME, ‘Introduction to Rousseau’s Dialogues,’ p. 51, and 
‘Preface to Transgression,’ p. 69-87. 
38 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, tr. by H. J. Paton (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1965), hereafter GMM, p. 96, Prussian Academy edition numbering, p. 429. The principle 
of humanity is that one should ‘Act in such a way that you always treat humanity whether in your own 
person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.’ 
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may include, from a position of social mores, the breaking of rules, should be seen 
rather as the movement in freedom toward the possible crossing over to another way 
of thinking and behaving which may not be understood or approved by the society in 
which it is performed. This discussion will segue into the third chapter, where I 
discuss the development of technologies of the self in Foucault’s writings. 
Chapter 3 will focus on Foucault’s ethical works, found in the Collège de 
France lectures, the second and third volumes of The History of Sexuality, and many 
lectures and interviews from the late 1970s to the time of his death. The first part of 
chapter three will be a survey of his writing. The second part will be an evaluation of 
some of the salient features of his work, including the theoretical problems raised by 
the ethical writing of the centuries around the beginning of the common era, roughly 
from the time of Socrates to the second or third century AD, on Greco-Roman and 
Christian technologies of the self.  
The ethical work is markedly different from Foucault’s critiques of the 
Classical age and modernity found in his archaeologies and early genealogies. The 
ethical works focus on practices of improvement of the self, on a stream of 
philosophical development in the ancient world centred on techniques of the self 
leading to living life as an art, as distinct from the stream of philosophical 
development also current in that age which took as its object knowledge of the 
ontological constitution of reality. This distinction can be seen as the contrast between 
philosophy as a therapeutic technique practiced by the Epicureans and Stoics, and 
philosophy as the objective scientific examination of reality as found in the Milesian 
school of pre-Socratics and Aristotle. I intend no strict demarcation here, merely a 
difference of emphasis. Certainly one can extract both themes from both streams of 
thought. For example, the Stoics made knowledge of the cosmos one condition for 
successfully taking care of the self, and the formation of the moral agent in Aristotle 
is dependent on the conscious application of ethical practice. As well, Foucault’s 
ethical subject matter does not signal the arrival of a new method. The method of his 
examination is still genealogical with archaeological content. 
Foucault begins his remarks about the therapeutic tradition reading Plato’s 
Alcibiades I. Plato’s concern is with the care of the self,39 a project that held great 
cultural capital in the ancient world as a primary mode of living. For Plato, and 
                                                 
39 I do not intend to suggest that Plato invented the therapeutic tradition. Foucault and others cite 
predecessors, the Pythagorean community, and others as therapeutic communities. 
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Foucault the scientific model of philosophy was secondary and dependent on 
philosophy as directed to the care of the self. 
Foucault’s last focus was not on the self as constituted by some external force 
as found in Discipline and Punish, or the control of sexuality as a public works 
project as found in volume one, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction,40 but on 
the forces one could exert on oneself to make, modify, or remake the self. For 
example, in an interview with D. Trombadori in 1978 Foucault discussed some 
reasons for his own writing. He said, ‘my problem is to construct myself, and to invite 
others to share an experience of what we are, not only our past but also our present, 
an experience of our modernity in such a way that we might come out of it 
transformed.’41 But, he does not answer the question about what direction one is to 
aim or the end result of remaking the self which reveals that ‘his whole approach 
during these years suggested a deepening perplexity about what this thing called the 
“self” actually was.’42  
Foucault writes ethics from a perspective unique for his age. He writes as a 
response to the question, ‘What must I do to promote the development of my self?’ 
Trying to compare his line of research with some traditional meta-ethical methods is 
difficult at best, and certainly it was never his intention to develop meta-ethical 
foundations. Foucault does not look at the problems of life that require an ethical 
answer in the same way as Aristotle, Augustine, Hume, Kant, or Mill would. He is not 
attempting to establish the grounds for discovering the summum bonum, the greatest 
good, an absolute truth, or the commands of God. He is not looking for first principles 
that would ground ethical thinking in reason or practice. He aims at a genealogy of 
ethics, a method of explaining our contemporary ethical problems through the 
examination of historical struggles with moral dilemmas and the adoption of 
technologies of the self. 
Ethical practice for the individual is the primary focus of Foucault’s later 
work. He modelled that ethical practice, as a method of refining, and writing the 
self.43 Foucault did not collect the answers to ancient civilization’s problems in a 
                                                 
40 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley, 3 vols (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1990), I. 
41 Michel Foucault, Power: The Essential Works of Foucault, ed. by Paul Rabinow and others, trans. by 
Robert Hurley and others, 3 vols (New York: The New Press, 2000), III, hereafter Power, p. 242. 
42 James Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 
319. 
43 FA, pp. xxvii-xxviii, and Miller, pp. 319-53 passim. 
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catalogue to be applied to today’s problems, but rather aimed at formulating a 
heuristic which might enable one to develop an ethos best suited to whatever age one 
lives in. This heuristic is marked by the avoidance of a few missteps by means of 
practices we can see in Foucault’s own behaviour. 
For example, one should avoid polemics in speech or writing as well as not 
responding to polemical speech, all in order to promote real dialogue, a dialogue 
between equals.44 Another characteristic is that one should not speak about what one 
does not know, one does not give an unstudied opinion.45 This is characteristic of his 
desire to avoid the expression of absolutes, to be more modest in one’s theorizing, to 
concentrate on the discovery of material for research, avoiding totalizing theories that 
force research to come up with a compliant answer.46 In addition to this he viewed his 
own writing with a sense of humility, not requiring those who read it to use it in any 
certain way. In fact, he was not averse to the dismantling of the structures of power in 
which his own works were constituted. 
The strategies of living well were of persistent interest throughout the last 
decade of his life, and he returns often to the questions posed by resistance to power 
and thematic development of life as art. Following this I will try to provide a fair 
evaluation of the payoff of Foucault’s methodology for examining a few current 
techniques of elaborating, of developing the self, one of which—writing—he 
examined in some detail. Writing as a practice is an example of a technique that need 
not follow ancient forms but is easily adapted to the strategy of self-construction in 
any age. Foucault speaks of the process of his own writing as a project of the 
development of himself, as a therapeutic method.47 
                                                 
44 EST, p. 111. ‘I don’t belong to a world of people who do things that way, I insist on this difference 
as something essential: a whole morality is at stake, the morality that concerns the search for the truth 
and the relation to the other.’ also see Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the 
Collège de France, 1977-1978, ed. by Michael Senellart, trans. by Graham Burchell (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), hereafter STP, p. 3-4. ‘I think this serious and fundamental relation 
between struggle and truth, the dimension in which philosophy has developed for centuries and 
centuries, only dramatizes itself, becomes emaciated, and loses its meaning and effectiveness in 
polemics within theoretical discourse. So in all of this I will therefore propose only one imperative, but 
it will be categorical and unconditional: Never engage in polemics.’ Also note 2, p. 24. 
45 EST, ‘Sexual Choice, Sexual Act,’ p. 142. 
46 FL, p. 149. 
47 AME, ‘What is an Author?,’ p. 205; also Power, ‘Interview with Michel Foucault,’ p. 242. ‘But my 
problem is not to satisfy professional historians; my problem is to construct myself, and to invite others 
to share an experience of what we are, not only our past but also our present, an experience of our 
modernity in such a way that we might come out of it transformed.’  
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I develop in Chapter 4 a view of human ontology that is first, sympathetic to 
Foucault’s desire to create a historical ontology of the self,48 and second, finds 
coherent connections with Plato’s view of the self. I discuss a trend in twentieth-
century thinking that makes a distinction between strong and weak thought leading to 
a view of the human being cautious of universalizing, totalizing claims. The 
transcendental subject does not stand aloof of the world as a Cartesian transcendental 
ego would. Rather, the subject whose consciousness is embedded within the world it 
examines, is transformed by that embeddedness and transforms the world within the 
connections underlying its own humanity. 
I discuss a parallel course within Foucault’s work comparing his methods with 
the description I will give to a weak ontology. There is a close fit between themes in 
Foucault’s work and many persistent themes within the weak ontological framework I 
discuss at the beginning. In Foucault’s discussion of Plato’s epistemology in The 
Government of the Self and Others49 Foucault brings together in one place the 
difference between studies (mathēmata) and philosophical knowledge, Plato’s 
knowledge of the thing in itself. Foucault, reading Plato’s seventh letter, manages to 
see an explicit connection between techniques of the self—leading to self-mastery—
and spiritual qualifications for knowledge, themes explicitly discussed in The 
Hermeneutics of the Subject. At this point it becomes clear that Foucault’s ethical turn 
is well grounded in the Ancients, and his rereading of the Ancient texts leads to a 
rejection of Cartesian subjectivity as qualification for knowledge.  
In James Rachels’ The Elements of Moral Philosophy,50 I found an example of 
what I call a postmodern technology of the self. I discovered in Rachels a method 
compatible with a weak ontology that was first cautious about the conditions under 
which principles could be adopted and critical of moral systems that didn’t take facts 
into account well enough. He develops a systematic approach to the discovery of 
solutions to ethical problems with the humble acknowledgment that solutions of that 
sort are not the last word. Rachels moves from theoretical ethical systems to 
techniques of deriving answers to ethical questions, all with attention to real-world 
problems that require equitable treatment of people. The techniques of ethical 
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49 Michel Foucault, The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France 1982-1983, 
ed. by Frédéric Gros, trans. by Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), hereafter 
GSO. 
50 James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy 5th edn, rev. by Stuart Rachels (Boston, MA: 
McGraw Hill, 2007), hereafter EMP. 
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deliberation Rachels provides are all dependent on a personal ethos that holds a 
tension between correct attitudes, reasoning, and attention to facts. Ethical 
deliberation, on the account I offer, could be called a technology of ethical self-
construction. A subject that makes a decision about behaviour, not only has the goal 
of deciding, but as an object of consideration, the transformation of the self in 
response to new information.   
I offer at the end of Chapter 4 a technique of self-construction that first, takes 
into account a weak ontology, and second, drawing from Foucault and Rachels, 
requires persistent attention to facts in a susceptible or porous attitude. Though we 
cannot keep the whole world in mind at one time, we must be responsive to facts 
when they impinge on our theoretical enterprises. Reductionism, a standard practice 
of knowledge acquisition in science, has gone too far in eliminating parts of human 
experience. This attitude of susceptibility, of being responsive to the facts makes it 
possible to reintegrate problematic data into a theoretical project.  
I illustrate this need for vulnerability by examining a work by Miroslav Volf, 
The End of Memory: Remembering Rightly in a Violent World.51 His experience in 
Yugoslavia in the 1980s of an unjust interrogation of his person, constituted violence 
against his person that transformed his worldview. The process of remembering 
rightly illustrates first, the inextricable nature of our self from the world, and the deep 
moral struggle with our selves as we seek to prevent memory from twisting our selves 
into an unjust posture. Through the use of Christ’s ethical innovation of loving one’s 
enemies, Volf succeeds in overcoming the deleterious effects of having been 
subjected to persistent interrogation, so that in addition to forgiving Captain G., his 
interrogator, Volf rehumanizes him in the process of restoring the facts of his 
interrogation to whatever possible clarity can be discovered. 
Chapter 5 is a summary of the work, and a review of the choices I made in 
research. Reading Foucault has awakened the possibility of research in many areas, 
but I drew a line toward the ethical constitution of the self, toward self-mastery in this 
dissertation. I left untouched many problems both with Foucault and his interlocutors 
that are of interest to me.  
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Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2006). 
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0.3. Project Scope and Constraints 
Michel Foucault in some ways forced us to confront our real world, to 
rearrange our notions about truth, social responsibility, and personal development. 
My project will attempt to provide a method for integrating the development of our 
selves as a necessary project into our wider social responsibilities by focusing on 
some ethical problems emerging in our current age. I will be focussing on Foucault’s 
ethical work, though associated material is important for constructing a viable 
understanding of his ethics. In choosing ethical problems as the focus of this thesis, I 
do not attempt to reduce ‘forms of knowledge,’ or ‘relations of power’ to the ‘modes 
of formation of the subject through practices of the self.’52 Foucault suggested that the 
problems and domains of discourse associated with forms of knowledge and relations 
of power are intimately connected to ethical problems, though not reducible to them. 
In order to evaluate Michel Foucault’s writing, I will rely on his major works, 
lectures at the Collège de France and elsewhere, as well as comments he made in 
interviews, and reviews. He persistently evaluates his own work, its deficiencies and 
strengths, comments on his own method, and contextualizes his academic effort in 
order to help the reader understand his work, even though he often resisted 
generalizing descriptions of his work. I will look at secondary materials to help 
elaborate what the academic community has taken Foucault’s work to imply for their 
particular speciality when it intersects with my work.  
I have chosen not to use the structures of other examinations of Foucault’s 
work like that of Gary Gutting’s Michel Foucault’s Archaeology of Scientific 
Reason53 because my concern is not with a detailed examination of the coherence of 
Foucault’s early work, but rather with some of the salient features of that work. That 
doesn’t mean Gutting’s critique of Foucault is incorrect, but that major features of 
Foucault’s work were sufficient on their own for the use I made of them. 
James Bernauer’s Force of Flight: Toward an Ethics for Thought is an early 
and successful attempt to make general statements about the totality of Foucault’s 
thought. But my concern in this dissertation is with the practices of self-construction. 
In addition, though I agree with Bernauer’s conclusions about Foucault’s use of bold 
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speech (parrhesia) they do not move my thesis forward substantially. In addition, the 
majority of the work in Force of Flight is taken up with the writing of the 1960s, 
which I briefly deal with in the first chapter. I did use some of the materials, also 
found in Bernauer’s and Rasmussen’s The Final Foucault concerning Foucault’s 
ecstatic thinking. It is in that material that Foucault’s drive for freedom of thought is 
explained. 
I agree with Edward McGushin who makes a good case that the 
problematization of parrhesia is central to Foucault’s thinking about the Ancients 
‘because he sees in this experience a way of isolating the dynamic interplay between 
relations of power, discursive or epistemic forms, and practices of ethical 
subjectivization.’54 But since the project of this dissertation is more concerned with 
techniques of self-construction than with their relation to the whole of Foucault’s 
oeuvre, I purposively don’t explore this avenue of thought. In the examples I give of 
self-construction, especially with respect to the life of John Woolman, the dynamic 
interplay McGushin finds with parrhesia is assumed, but not explored in any detail. 
Though I mention feminist contributions, and even use the example of Emma 
Goldman with respect to the technique of writing the self, of self-construction by 
means of correspondence, and though I appeal to the resistance to patriarchy found in 
first-wave feminism, I do not explore in any depth the discussions of Judith Butler or 
Lois McNay, or other modern feminist critics of Foucault. Some of the issues I deal 
with in chapter 4 would profit from an interaction with these writers, but I did not use 
them in this case because I wished to move in another direction, toward a more 
general problem described by weak ontology, that would encompass (even though not 
explicitly,) the embodied ethical approach of the feminist. I also did not use the 
scientific approach of Carol Gilligan’s feminism because that would have required an 
extensive elaboration of the connective tissues between her and Foucault’s project, 
even though I think they are there. I am not suggesting by this elision that the feminist 
contributions are not germane, but that their inclusion would have required more 
background than the limits of this thesis could support. 
If this is to be an original contribution, I must focus on developing an intimate 
consciousness of a limited number of contemporary problems and their consequences. 
If I am to construct a method which aims at this analysis of problems and provides a 
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subsequent recommendation about how one should advance one’s free self-
development, then I will need to be able to construct a method in terms of strategies 
for the promotion of freedom and a contemporary examination of the art of living 
(tekhnē tou biou) as the elaboration of a postmodern technology of the self. This 
dissertation will give grounds to judge our own behaviour, to know ourselves (in the 
Platonic sense of humility, knowing that we are not gods) and give us techniques to 
take care of ourselves with the goal of acquiring an embodied ground for research and 
ethical practice. 
I don’t want to elaborate the entire history of philosophical discourse around 
the objects Foucault examines, or trace the entire lineage of his thinking. For instance, 
I will not be looking closely at The Birth of the Clinic, The Order of Things, 
Discipline and Punish, or even The History of Sexuality: An Introduction. I will be 
looking specifically at the problems associated with the constitution of the self by the 
self as found in his later ethical writings, lectures, and interviews of the late 1970s 
and early 1980s that lead up to and can be characterized as his mature view. I will be 
looking specifically at Foucault’s lectures, Security, Territory, Population, The Birth 
of Biopolitics, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, and The Government of Self and 
Others as well as published lectures, correspondence, and interviews of the 1980s and 
the last two volumes of The History of Sexuality.  
I will discuss Foucault’s method in the first chapter. This will serve as a 
beginning of the thesis: My examination of The Archaeology of Knowledge should 
enforce the proposition that with Foucault, I am not aiming at genesis, continuity, or 
totalization. My aim is much more modest. I wish to pose questions about the 
construction of the ontology of free persons through a discussion of ethical problems 
in the era of Foucault’s research, as well as in the time following his death. I will use 
examples of projects of self-construction in these eras to demonstrate that Foucault’s 
desired attitude or ethos is not only a plausible direction for ethical self-construction, 
but a necessary corrective and critique of any meta-ethics. 
I stop short of thoroughly analysing the totality of Foucault’s oeuvre, the 
purpose of which would be to discover an underlying coherence in it. That project has 
been done by various authors55 with some comprehensiveness, even with respect to 
                                                 
55 For example, Edward McGushin’s Foucault’s Askēsis, Timothy O’Leary’s Foucault and the Art of 
Ethics, James Bernauer’s Michel Foucault’s Force of Flight, Lois McNay’s Foucault and Feminism, 
and many others. See Bibliography. 
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the material I examine in the following chapters. However, though they are generally 
in agreement about the details, their theses interpret Foucault with a variety of 
emphases, not altogether consistent with each other. These interpreters, some of 
whose work I have used in the chapters of this dissertation, are not to be faulted for 
getting Foucault wrong. There is enough variety in method and content within 
Foucault’s oeuvre generally to support the variety of interpretations represented. And 
the structure of their arguments is often driven by the purposes they wish to support. 
Even though I take exception to some of their generalizations,56 their work has been 
useful in creating space for my own work. 
That space is limited to the examination of techniques of the self, which for 
Foucault were instrumental in generating the necessity and qualifications for 
parrhesia, free or bold speech in the politically good sense.57 In chapter 2 I discuss 
the bold speech of John Woolman concerning the abolition of slavery which I take to 
be the outcome of a life lived within a practice of ethical self-construction. But the 
discussion of bold speech is not the purpose of my dissertation, and I do not include 
that as part of my examination of Foucault’s ethics in chapter 3, even though the 
constellation of ideas surrounding bold speech and the qualifications of being a truth 
teller are as close as one could come to Foucault’s conclusion as a result of his study 
of the Ancients. My dissertation is limited to an ontology of the acquisition of 
philosophic knowledge and the practices that contribute to its acquisition. I do not 
take Foucault’s final step in his elaboration of parrhesia. 
 
                                                 
56 For example, McGushin suggests that Foucault’s final methodology is problematization (FA, p. 
xxiii). Roger Deacon suggests that problematization is used by Foucault as a tool throughout his 
genealogical work. Roger Deacon, ‘Theory as Practice: Foucault’s Concept of Problematization’, in 
Telos, 118, (Winter 2000), 127-42. Also Foucault’s later synthesis of his work as genealogical with 
three emphases, tends to make problematization a subset of genealogy instead of a methodological 
category of its own. EST, p. 262. 
57 COT, 1 February, 1984, first hour lecture, pp. 9-12, and FS, passim. 
Douglas F. Olena 28  
Chapter 1: Methodology 
1.1. Methodology: 
In this section I will examine Foucault’s various methods and the methods I 
will use. Methodology is addressed in Foucault’s major publication The Archaeology 
of Knowledge which is explicitly dedicated to this topic. Further, Foucault also 
describes how his methods should be applied in interviews and other works 
subsequent to the publishing of his books in answer to queries about problems with 
his books that emerge as conflicts with neopositivism,1 phenomenology, and the 
philosophy of history.2 Part of what constitutes his methods and the transitions 
between those methods is generated by what he sees himself as being and becoming. 
Preferring to remain outside specific disciplines, Foucault wished to be thought of as 
an intellectual. Though his work is philosophical it is not the work of a philosopher, 
one committed to certain schools of thought. Though his domain is history, he is not a 
historian, and though his work impinges on medicine, psychotherapy, sociology, 
economics, and jurisprudence, he is not a practitioner of any of these arts.  
In an interview with Roger-Paul Droit shortly after the publication of 
Discipline and Punish, Foucault proposes an attitude, by his account, unusual in that 
age. 
I believe that today there is such a prestige attached to projects of the Freudian 
type that very often the analysis of historical texts takes as its objective the 
“non-spoken” of a discourse, the “repressed” or “unconscious” of a system. It 
is good to abandon this attitude and to be at once more modest and more of a 
rummager.3 
If I am getting this right, Foucault neither believes himself to be, nor recommends to 
others the sort of intellectual who aims at some unifying, underlying, unconscious or 
repressed thesis, but one who aims to discover the ordinary but unsuspected treasures 
of discourse that reveal the unfolding narratives within our own societies. Following 
this attitude he not only reflects that any author’s work will be used unpredictably, but 
                                                 
1 Foucault contrasts the neopositivists of the twentieth century with the positivists of nineteenth century 
science. The two projects, though related, are distinct in purpose. Roughly, the positivists 
optimistically trusted in the powers of their science to answer fundamental questions about reality, to 
give an objective truth about the real world. The neopositivists of the Vienna Circle in the twentieth 
century, sought to ground physics in an axiomatic physical language that could be extrapolated to all 
the sciences, that would ground the sciences in an objectively agreed upon language, systematically 
eliminating disputes between accounts therefore unifying the sciences. 
2 AME, ‘Theatrum Philosophicum,’ pp. 351-52. 
3 FL, ‘From Torture to Cellblock,’ interview with Roger-Paul Droit: Feb 21, 1975, p. 149. 
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that he would be happy if his own work should be used in ‘new, possible, 
unforeseen’4 ways, and that his books should be seen as 
little tool boxes. If people want to open them, use a particular sentence, idea, 
or analysis like a screwdriver or wrench in order to short-circuit, disqualify or 
break up the systems of power, including eventually the very ones from which 
my books have issued… well, all the better!5 
1.2. Foucault and Methodology 
There are a number of ways in which Foucault’s method can be classified, but 
each of these ways carries an inherent tension. The tension arises partly from the 
subject matter of Foucault’s research, and partly from the methods he used, often 
idiosyncratic tools for single subjects. However, for the purposes of this thesis, 
Foucault’s method will be split into two parts, roughly divided into archaeology, and 
genealogy which includes a modified form of archaeology as well as the tool of 
problematization. There are roughly three eras of Foucault’s writing, the early 
archaeological writings of the 1960s, generally concerned with the truth of post-
Renaissance culture and social systems; the middle period, roughly the 1970s where 
his concerns were genealogical examinations of power relations within classical and 
modern Western society; and finally the ethical research of the late 1970s and early 
1980s that included a genealogical examination of ancient Greco-Roman and 
Christian ethical culture.  
Because the ethical project describes various techniques and methods of self-
development, it shouldn’t be thought therefore that the ethical problems Foucault 
dealt with were problems of the methodology of his research. And though Foucault 
can be understood as taking on the project of his own self-creation, the methods of 
that self-creation shouldn’t be related strictly to the academic method of his research, 
even though his personal ethos and the practices resulting from it created the 
conditions under which his research took place. 
Foucault saw his own project as genealogical as well as problematizing. And 
though McGushin wants us to view problematization as a final method after 
genealogy, Roger Deacon puts problematization within the scope of genealogy. It is 
part of the genealogical method. ‘Central to [genealogy] is the concept of 
“problematization,” which is concerned with how and why, at specific times and 
under particular circumstances, certain phenomena are questioned, analyzed, 
                                                 
4 FL, p. 149. 
5 FL, p. 149. 
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classified, and regulated, while others are not.’6 In Foucault’s ethical work of the late 
1970s and early 1980s we begin to grasp that the discipline of philosophy, and hence 
the intent of his oeuvre, is embodied in the complex of exercises whose locus is the 
care of the self, leading to development of the self through spiritual practices that 
qualified the subject for truth. 
1.2.1. Archaeology and Truth 
Though Foucault eventually abandons the formal project of the archaeological 
method described in The Archaeology of Knowledge, and used in the three previously 
published major works, Madness and Civilization,7 The Birth of the Clinic,8 and The 
Order of Things,9 results drawn from that method are not absent from the practice of 
research in any of his subsequent work. Within the dimensions of archaeological 
thought—the method that evolved within his writing during the 1960s—we see a 
statement of its mature categories in The Archaeology of Knowledge. 
Archaeology is Foucault’s early method in the strictest sense, and The 
Archaeology of Knowledge is his only extended discourse on method. He describes 
the process of archaeology as a way of discovering the rules of the emergence and 
disappearance of a particular social space, practice, or singularity, what he calls 
discursive formations; specifically the rules related to the emergence of madness in 
the Classical age found in the History of Madness, the birth of modern medical 
practice found in The Birth of the Clinic, and the emergence of the human sciences in 
The Order of Things. Essential to this method is the object Foucault focuses on, the 
archive. What he intends to examine in any of his diagnostic endeavours are objects 
                                                 
6 Roger Deacon, ‘Theory as Practice: Foucault’s Concept of Problematization’, in Telos, 118, (Winter 
2000), 127-42, p. 127. 
7 Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, tr. by Richard 
Howard (New York: Vintage Books, 1988). The English translation is taken from Foucault’s abridged 
edition of Folie et Déraison: Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique, one of the projects required for his 
Doctor of Philosophy, titled Histoire de la Folie published in 1961 by Librairie Plon. This volume has 
now been republished in English as History of Madness, ed. Jean Khalfa, trans. Jonathan Murphy and 
Jean Khalfa (London: Routledge, 2006), hereafter HM. 
8 Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, tr. A. M. Sheridan 
Smith (New York: Vintage Books, 1994). This book was first published in 1963 under the title of 
Naissance de la clinique: Une archéologie du regard medical, by Presses Universitaires de France. 
9 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1994), hereafter OT. This book was first published in French in 1965 under the title of les Mots 
et les choses, translated and published in English in 1971 as The Order of Things: An Archaeology of 
the Human Sciences a title Foucault thought better suited for the book. The originally suggested 
English subtitle was An Archaeology of Structuralism, Hubert L. Dreyfus, and Paul Rabinow, Michel 
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 
hereafter BSH, p. 17. 
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of a certain sort. He names these objects variously ‘the archive,’ ‘positivities,’ 
‘discursive regularities,’ ‘singularities,’ etc. These objects under examination are 
more like rough agglomerations. They are defined as constellations of events, 
problems, evidences, behaviours, discourses, etc. They are not global syntheses and 
coherent encapsulations. In the archaeological writings he strove to avoid any facile 
unities within the disparate events emerging in human thought and society to discover 
what the underlying, unspoken truth of human practice is.  
In ‘On the Archaeology of the Sciences: Response to the Epistemology Circle’ 
Foucault described the archive, his term for the collection of evidences, as not 
exclusively a collection of documents,  
not the totality of texts that have been preserved by a civilization or the set of 
traces that could be salvaged from its downfall, but the series of rules which 
determine in a culture the appearance and disappearance of statements, their 
retention and their destruction, their pradoxical [sic] existence as events and 
things.10 
Also, in an interview with Jean-Michel Palmier he described the archive this way: 
By the archives, I mean first the mass of things spoken in a culture, presented, 
valorized, re-used, repeated and transformed. In brief, this whole verbal mass 
that has been fashioned by men, invested in their techniques and in their 
institutions and woven into their existence and their history.11 
The archive is distinguished from official documentation about events, histories, 
philosophical interpretations, and generally documents whose purpose is to establish a 
hidden unity in the events of an era. Foucault sidestepped the official story, the story 
told after the fact, in order to hear the occluded voice of the participants as they 
struggled through the project of an emerging discourse. Instead of noting after the fact 
that events have taken place within some global scheme, Foucault forced a re-
examination of the archive to view the practices and thinking leading to the 
emergence of discourse and the practices and thinking leading away from them as 
well. Foucault asked the participants what motivated the changes. He did not query 
the common person, but persons who actually took part in the production of an 
emerging (or disappearing) discursive regularity. He did not survey the entire society, 
and made no effort to find a general consensus. 
The archive itself is the collection of fundamental data for observation and it 
is not strictly textual; but an artificial, selective collection without any pretensions to 
                                                 
10 AME, ‘On the Archaeology of the Sciences: Response to the Epistemology Circle,’ p. 309. 
11 FL, ‘The Birth of a World,’ interview with Jean-Michel Palmier, 1969, p. 66. 
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universality or totality. The generation of the archive is not guided by non-discursive 
practices as ground or field of empirical experience governing the emergence and 
disappearance of discourse,12 nor by a Kuhnian paradigm.13 The archive Foucault is 
interested in lies between non-discursive practices, positivities and the first stages of 
the adoption of the practice as a science, what he calls epistemologization. 
In the Archaeology of Knowledge, in a number of interviews and short essays, 
Foucault explicitly states the scope and parameters of this type of inquiry. He wished, 
first, to contrast archaeology with the history of ideas, which aims at ‘Genesis, 
continuity, totalization: […] and that by which it is attached to a certain, now 
traditional, form of historical analysis.’14 Second, he placed the focus of the 
archaeological project at the early stages of the development of discursive 
regularities, the beginning of the constitution of a form of knowledge, when a 
positivity solidifies to the point it reaches ‘the threshold of the epistemologization’15 
when the discursive regularities are transformed into a nascent body of knowledge 
that potentially but not necessarily becomes a science with the eventual possibility of 
formalization. But no discursive regularity advances to the stage of becoming a 
science as a matter of necessity. It is as likely that the discursive formation would 
vanish as it is for it to become a science. The archaeological method is as interested in 
the disappearance of discursive regularities as it is with their emergence. Foucault 
used examples like the emergence of the psychiatric discipline in Madness and 
Civilization, or the study of natural history, grammar, and the accumulation of wealth 
in the classical age in The Order of Things to illustrate this problematic emergence of 
fields of discourse. Foucault is not interested in universal history, but in the limited, 
transient changes within very narrow epistemological spaces. He did not examine in 
depth the established, formalized sciences like mathematics, though he suggested a 
study of those things in terms of archaeology is possible. So, the study of these 
discursive formations is a project with parameters, limited to the emergence and 
transition of discursive regularities into an epistemological form, a belief system, the 
precursor of a science.  
                                                 
12 BSH, p. 79. 
13 BSH, p. 76. 
14 AK, p. 138, and FFES, p. 31, ‘I argue that Foucault employs what I call a “sceptical method” that 
allows him to reject the ahistorical, universal claims that underlie humanism and foundationalism, 
while still engaging in social criticism.’ 
15 AK, pp. 187, 90, and Foucault and Philosophy, ed. by Timothy O’Leary and Christopher Falzon, 
‘Foucault’s Theory of Knowledge’ (West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), p. 149. 
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To do this Foucault needed to clear the historical space of residues from the 
history of ideas: first, the tendency to search for the origins of an idea through the 
instrumental imposition of a continuity of thought. Second, he needed to eliminate 
privileging any genesis of a discourse, that might lead the reader to find central 
principles unifying discourse that would result in covering over problematic conflicts 
of practice and thought.  
A traditional form of historical analysis under the general rubric of the history 
of ideas relies on unifying features in numerous historical events to show, by tracing 
these features, the origin of an idea, the origin of a way of thinking and behaving. In 
order to show the origin within a history of ideas, there must be some explicit 
continuity with the past which requires an idealization of historical features. Because 
discontinuities in transmission of ideas and various mutually exclusive expressions of 
the same or similar idea in different eras and places, Foucault didn’t think that tracing 
an idea to its origin was possible. In the mature characterization of the history of 
ideas, the unifying features become fixed reductively around one object or another, 
for example in Marx around the economy, in ‘a Nietzschean metaphysic of life,’16 or 
in Freud, around the ubiquitous unconscious. The ideological force of the history of 
ideas reduces disparate events and formations in history to a single locus, a single 
explanatory logos, a single lens through which all history needs to be viewed, an 
ideological structure privileging a single totalizing idea. Foucault’s contention was 
that these tendencies warp the truth of historical formations of discourse. So, he made 
the effort to distinguish his method from a history of ideas in order to be able to 
discover the truth of these discursive regularities. He contrasted the history of ideas 
with the history of thought, an alternative construct. 
The history of thought is the analysis of the way an unproblematic field of 
experience, or a set of practices, which were accepted without question, which 
were familiar and ‘silent,’ out of discussion, becomes a problem, raises 
discussion and debate, incites new reactions, and induces a crisis in the 
previously silent behavior, habits, practices, and institutions.17 
I will first illustrate Foucault’s use of the phrase ‘history of thought’ with the 
emergence of disputes about women’s rights in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. One need not look too closely at Immanuel Kant’s Anthropology18 to 
                                                 
16 FOF, p. 18. 
17 Michel Foucault, Fearless Speech, (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2001), hereafter FS, p. 74. 
18 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, ed. and trans. by Robert B. Louden 
(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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discover his assumptions about the inferior position of women in society, assumptions 
that underlie his normally assiduous analysis. For Kant, the consideration of a 
woman’s place appears to be a constituent element of the natural moral structure of 
late eighteenth-century society. The absence of contention on the surface of this 
discourse places some practices based on the assumption of natural law, the rights of 
men, and the limited rights of women within Foucault’s ‘silent and unproblematic 
field of practices.’ The emergence of contention, for example, from Mary 
Wollstonecraft in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman19 where she contests Charles 
Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord's 1791 report to the French National Assembly in 
which the position of women in French society was construed more narrowly than 
that of the French man is illustrative. What appears then is that Foucault’s analysis of 
the history of thought gives place to an examination of the emergence of events and 
issues, like feminist resistance in Enlightenment Europe, that point out problems and 
induce crises within assumed structures of society. The history of ideas, rather, 
attempts to smooth over the problems and silence the alarms over supposed crises, 
suggesting that there is some deeper reason, explained by some law of nature or 
transcendental causality, a form of natural determinism that drives natural progress 
teleologically toward future perfection. It is against this teleological continuity that 
Foucault frames the history of thought in the 1960s, primarily because the history of 
ideas forces a misrepresentation of the actual archive, and later in the 1970s because 
the teleological reinterpretation of the archive implants, embeds and reinforces 
asymmetrical power relations. 
I discuss Foucault’s reading of the history of ideas and the elements within it 
that force a misreading of history. I will give a brief synopsis of his work in The 
Archaeology, and afterward look more carefully into the use of the terms Foucault 
used to define the history of ideas. The first project of the history of ideas is that of, 
discovering an origin, a foundational event, idea, text, or practice, from which the 
entire fountain of ideas, beliefs, and practices spring; some origin which, without 
equivocation, marks the beginning or original emergence of a practice or idea. 
Second, with respect to continuity, Foucault pointed to an analysis of 
discourse within the history of ideas which makes the attempt to unify discursive 
formations under ‘an ideal, continuous, smooth text that runs beneath the multiplicity 
                                                 
19 Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman: with Strictures on Political and Moral 
Subjects (Boston: Thomas and Andrews, 1792). 
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of contradictions,’20 to suggest that divergence and eruption in thought do not exist, or 
if they do exist, that at some layer beneath the contradiction there is a ‘calm unity of 
coherent thought.’21 Examining the science of natural history, Foucault discovered a 
fundamental thesis that assumes the continuity of nature. This continuity is the text, 
the assumption that lends the history of ideas its concrete unity. Within the history of 
ideas any data, theory, or idea which conflicts with this assumption is either massaged 
to fit, or discarded. 
Third, with respect to totalization, Foucault explained that the tendency to 
universalize—for example, in rationalism, economics, positive science, or 
phenomenology—their explanations as guided by central principles, foundations, and 
mechanisms is misleading because it hides the discontinuities of real-world events in 
the emergence of theory and practice. Foucault’s attempt to build the edifice of 
archaeology as opposed to the history of ideas is the attempt to avoid falling into 
habits of thought that explain events and structures in society by means of totalizing 
principles instead of reference to the emergence of discursive formations, which he 
takes to be the real objects of historical discourse. 
Archaeology is not the attempt to reveal the hidden ‘thoughts, representations, 
images, themes, preoccupations’22 behind the discourse. Discourse itself doesn’t have 
the motivations attributed to it by the history of ideas. There is no subtext to the 
development of the discourse. It just is what it is. Archaeology does not read between 
the lines of discourse to find some hidden meaning. Rather, ‘it is concerned with 
discourse in its own volume, as a monument.’23 Discourse, as an object, with all its 
characteristic flaws, missteps, and problematic assertions is to be interpreted on its 
own terms as it stands without some thematic presentiment. Archaeology ‘does not 
proceed, in slow progression, from the confused field of opinion to the uniqueness of 
the system or the definitive stability of science; […] but a differential analysis of the 
modalities of discourse.’24 The suggestion that every discourse moves inexorably 
toward the refinement of a science is belayed by the examination of the archive. The 
archive betrays no such movement toward systematization. Foucault rather asked 
about the possibilities of the flourishing or diminishment of a discourse and the rules 
                                                 
20 AK, p. 155. 
21 AK, p. 155. 
22 AK, p. 138. 
23 AK, p. 138-39. 
24 AK, p. 139. 
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that underlay that change. So archaeology is not history per se, but rather discovery of 
rules governing the appearance and disappearance of discourse within social 
structures. Archaeology is not a search for discontinuity, but a recognition of it in 
discourse. One searches the archive to discover the possibilities of the elaboration of 
discourse. Archaeology doesn’t ignore or diminish the conflict inherent in the 
discourse by appealing to an underlying unity as does the history of ideas. 
Archaeology does not try to reconstruct the intention of the writer. It is not 
discovery of the oeuvre or of a subject, the author, to whom that oeuvre is attributed, 
but a recognition that there are driving forces for the emergence of discourse that are 
discontinuous with the subject, and exercise influence over the subject. The writer or 
framer of the discourse is under the influence of the same social pressures that are 
driving the emergence of a discourse. So the discovery of the oeuvre or the subject to 
whom the oeuvre is attributed is incidental and so, not revealing. It is not the subject 
that is of interest here but the elaboration of the pressures driving the emergence of 
discourse. ‘It is not a return to the innermost secret of the origin; it is the systematic 
description of the discourse-object.’25 Again, Foucault steered us clear of the 
problematic search for a hidden unity within a discourse, in this case the oeuvre of a 
writer or the writer as subject. 
In Part 4, Chapters 2-5 of The Archaeology of Knowledge,26 Foucault outlines 
four differences between the history of ideas and the Archaeological method. ‘They 
concern the attribution of innovation, the analysis of contradictions, comparative 
descriptions, and the mapping of transformations.’27 Following, I will summarize 
these four areas and elaborate what Foucault saw as the advantages of archaeological 
analysis. Foucault wished to sidestep the problem of the origin, the continuity of 
rationality, and the problematic assumption of some totalizing principle, rule, or 
ideology. 
First, for Foucault, the attribution of innovation28 is problematic. He discounts 
this attribution as irrelevant to the process of noting the emergence of a discursive 
regularity. The need for defining the original statement as opposed to the regular, or 
ordinary, is driven by the need to assign to some person the origin of thought, the 
rupture that signals the emergence of a new idea. In the history of ideas, it is 
                                                 
25 AK, p. 140. 
26 AK, pp. 141-177.  
27 AK, p. 138. 
28 AK, p. 141. 
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important to know the origin so that one might trace the lineage and succession of 
ideas and develop a logical and coherent progression, securing the assumption of 
progress. Contrarily, for example, what archaeology ‘seeks in the texts of Linneaus or 
Buffon, Petty or Ricardo, Pinel or Bichat, is not to draw up a list of founding saints; it 
is to uncover the regularity of a discursive practice.’29 The first time something is said 
is no different in Foucault’s view than ‘imitative statements’ of it.30 They are all part 
of the same emergence of a specific discursive regularity. He is not denying that the 
first annunciation of a thesis, or some historical timeline of the discussion around that 
thesis exists, only that it is merely part of the emerging discursive regularity. 
Developing a systematic explanation of the progress of thought through a 
logical and coherent progression of ideas suggests that the development reveals some 
underlying undemonstrable axioms or fundamental themes.31 ‘The archaeological 
order is neither that of systematicities, nor that of chronological successions.’32 
Developing a linear chronology from the origin of the emergence of the idea gives no 
special access to the truth of the discursive formation. It misleads by generating a 
continuity misread as an underlying theme of the discovery. But this does not mean 
that the account of the archaeological order will differ substantially from the 
systematic treatment or chronological order found in other historical accounts, only 
that it doesn’t appeal to an underlying continuity of a natural progression. 
Second, with respect to the analysis of contradictions,33 mankind sees 
coherence where there is none. ‘The history of ideas usually credits the discourse that 
it analyses with coherence.’34 If puzzles remain in the discourse ‘then it regards it as 
its duty to find, at a deeper level, a principle of cohesion that organizes the discourse 
and restores it to its hidden unity.’35 Archaeology refuses to gloss over the 
inconsistencies of discourse. ‘By taking contradictions as objects to be described, 
archaeological analysis does not try to discover in their place a common form or 
theme, it tries to determine the extent and form of the gap that separates them.’36 
More simply stated, the archaeologist, like a good scientist, doesn’t throw away or 
                                                 
29 AK, pp. 144-45. 
30 AK, pp. 144-45. 
31 AK, pp. 147-48. 
32 AK, p. 148. 
33 AK, p. 149. 
34 AK, p. 149. 
35 AK, p. 149. 
36 AK, p. 152. 
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adjust data either when it disagrees with the hypothesis that generates the experiment, 
or when it contradicts data generated in some other experimental regime. Though the 
scope of archaeology is limited, it is not therefore reductionistic. 
 ‘For archaeological analysis, contradictions are neither appearances to be 
overcome, nor secret principles to be uncovered.’37 Instead of hunting for agreement 
and continuity, a way of harmonizing disparate views, archaeology makes room for 
disputes.38 An archaeological contradiction is not something that requires a simple 
adjustment to fix, and is not explained by foundational principles or cause and effect 
mechanisms. The contradictions arise within the discourse. ‘It is a complex 
phenomenon that is distributed over different levels of the discursive formation.’39 
The purpose of archaeology is not to resolve the tension set up by disputes within the 
space of the discourse. 
For example, in The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault discussed the 
emergence of a model of change within the study of natural history.40 The traditional 
or fixist model of Linnaeus observed a static biosphere, and its science was relegated 
to the taxonomy of species. The origin of each plant and animal form as it now 
appears is placed in some historical epoch. The evolutionary model of ‘Buffon, 
Diderot, Bordeu, Maillet and many others’41 though it shares with the fixist model the 
concepts of species and genera, allows the mutation of forms and eventually in the 
nineteenth century, in Darwin, an explanation for the generation of new species. 
Some elements, the organization of organisms around organs and skeletal structure 
are shared, but some, such as the conflict over the transmutation of species are in 
stark contrast and conflict. What Foucault wanted us to recognize here is that 
Darwinian theory is not the logical outcome of Linnaean natural history even though 
it shares some elements. Darwinian theory is a break from traditional fixist theory. 
The aim of archaeology is not to point to a theory of everything. It is not to 
collect all theoretical entities under a single logos, a single unifying theme. ‘Its 
purpose is to maintain discourse in all its many irregularities; and consequently to 
suppress the theme of a contradiction uniformly lost and rediscovered, resolved and 
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forever rising again, in the undifferentiated element of the Logos.’42 Within the 
history of ideas there is a tendency to attempt to resolve conflicts and contradiction, 
but this only works for a while. In the scientific drive toward a better description of 
the real world, theories only lose their hold on our imagination when phenomena 
unexplained by the theory forces a re-examination of the data and fresh theorizing. A 
Copernicus resolves deep conflicts with a Ptolemaic planetary system, but does not 
solve the entire riddle in one stroke of genius. Much remains that Galileo and Kepler, 
then Newton will resolve, then Einstein. And theoretical physics has not solved all the 
puzzles of reality yet. Even the best attempts are marred by problematic speculation, 
no matter how well the internal conflicts are masked by a seeming consistency within 
the theoretical landscape. Archaeology will not optimistically gloss over the disputes, 
contradictions, irregularities and inconsistencies of some singularity like cosmology. 
Its use is, rather—by allowing all problems to remain on the surface—to observe the 
transformation, the emergence and disappearance of discursive regularities. 
Third, with respect to comparative descriptions,43 archaeology, instead of 
revealing general forms, ‘is always limited and regional.’44 It compares discursive 
formations and contrasts them with ‘non-discursive practices that surround them and 
serve’45 as a context for them. Archaeological analysis is limited, and purposefully so. 
In the Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault, cited possible objections to his project in 
The Order of Things that suggest he has omitted fruitful and well-developed ideas. 
But this omission is in keeping with the avoidance of universalizing and totalizing 
claims.46 Where a possible critic might see incoherence, Foucault acknowledges his 
intention to use archaeology to show that the history of ideas covers over a factual 
lack of coherence in real historical data. What, for the critic, ‘is a lacuna, an omission, 
an error is, for me [Foucault], a deliberate, methodical exclusion.’47 The data 
themselves do not contain the requisite glue required to prove the claims of the 
history of ideas. 
The horizon of archaeology […] is not a science, a rationality, a mentality, a 
culture; it is a tangle of interpositivies whose limits and points of intersection 
cannot be fixed in a single operation. Archaeology is a comparative analysis 
that is not intended to reduce the diversity of discourses, and to outline the 
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unity that must totalize them, but is intended to divide up their diversity into 
different figures. Archaeological comparison does not have a unifying, but a 
diversifying, effect.48 
Archaeology is not an attempt to reveal the causal sequence whereby different 
discursive regularities may be linked. Yet there are linkages, interdiscursive networks 
of overlapping positivities that need not be described by some ideal formation driven 
by a real ‘total historical independence’ of discourses.49 Rather, these networks could 
be characterized as the normal confluence of streams of thought, facts of research, 
crosscurrents of theoretical speculation within larger educated communities linked by 
commerce, education, political hegemonies, the expansion of police influence within 
the state, and ordinary travel between states and nations. These listed opportunities for 
the spread of discourse do not exhaust the possibilities for the transfer of ideas, plans, 
and strategies—the development of new knowledge—but noting them should remove 
the tendency to read discourses as ideologically isolated from one another. In the 
study of ancient literatures, for example, in some streams of Christian Biblical 
interpretation, there is a tendency to treat the literature as isolated from external 
influence. 
The unspoken presumption underlying that sort of research is that all the 
explanations necessary for understanding the literature is contained, first, within the 
literature itself. Though much can be understood this way, what emerges is a 
collection of problems with the text that do not resolve simply within the artificial 
logical interpretative matrix of interconnected references. A drive to retain the purity 
of the text for interpretation forces this isolation. Second, to resolve these problems of 
interpretation, the interpreters access the local culture that produced the text, even 
though, for modern Christian interpreters, this often involves the necessary 
abandonment of ancient prejudices against the rabbinic traditions within which 
Christianity was birthed. This accession to culture is immediately fruitful, rendering 
entire passages comprehensible, even though it introduces ideological conflict with 
the purported origin of Christian dogma citing the early church fathers of the second 
through the fifth centuries AD. But comprehending this confluence between the text 
in its purity with the text in its historicity as a necessary historical ground of 
interpretation doesn’t answer all the difficulties of interpretation. Better 
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comprehension of the text requires the inclusion of a broader world, a world 
populated with Greeks, Romans, Egyptians, Babylonians, Indians, Phoenicians, etc., 
the entire cosmopolitan world with whom and against whom the text was written. 
Affirmations and proscriptions are so deeply embedded within the matrix of culture 
that the crosscurrents of thought and practice cannot be entirely disentangled from the 
text.  
In a study such as this, Foucault wished to avoid the attribution of some 
transcendentally purposive connection privileged by the observing subject, where 
independent discourses show surprisingly coherent connections to one another. In the 
history of ideas, one need not necessarily comprehend the historicity of any emerging 
discourse but rather glean from a comparative study of various discourses the 
ideologically driven teleology of natural historical progress. For example, in the study 
of the Christian scriptures, one notes the startling similarity between the use of the 
concept of logos in Heraclitus and John the Apostle without also needing to suggest 
that the Jews of John’s day knew anything of the Greeks at all. For John, as for 
Heraclitus, followed by Aristotle, and the Stoics, and subsequently by Philo and 
others, the historical connection becomes immediately suspect because for some it 
would call into question the revelatory character of the text supposed to be 
ideologically pure and separate from the taint of worldly collusion. Though there 
seems to be a plausible historical and theoretical connection between Heraclitus’ and 
John the Apostle’s writings, there need be no necessary transcendental purpose 
driving the connection. 
For an archaeological examination of the logos, one need not trace the origin 
of the concept to discover a confluence of ideas within the ancient world, an 
intercultural association of independent but culturally apt practitioners of their 
singular arts, whether they be materialist philosophers or scribes in a theistic 
autocracy. One need not show some continuity between thinkers, or argue for a 
coherent universal concept to show the emergence of discourse of a certain kind 
within disparate cultures. One need not appeal to a totalizing universal concept of the 
logos to describe the similarities between expressions of that concept. A comparative 
description, though limited in focus, does not falsify the historicities of various 
expressions of a concept, which would happen if one tried to find the origin, 
continuity, or totalization of the concept.  
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Fourth, with respect to the mapping of transformations,50 Foucault admitted 
that ‘Archaeology […] seems to treat history only to freeze it.’51 Seeming is the 
operative word here. It ignores temporal relations and ‘seeks general rules that will be 
uniformly valid, in the same way, and at every point in time.’52 In this way it seems to 
force a sense that the ‘slow and imperceptible movement’53 of the development of 
discursive formations under examination can be seen as synchronous. It seems to 
deny the passage of time within the description of discourse itself, only showing the 
emergence and disappearance of it. It is the atemporal focus of archaeology itself that 
gives this image of a universalizing thesis. As Foucault admits later, this is a 
weakness of his thinking54 that if taken to its logical conclusion could be as totalizing 
as that which he seeks to replace. But, this image of a universalizing thesis is 
misleading or at least incomplete. 
Archaeology does not set out to treat as simultaneous what is given as 
successive; it does not try to freeze time and to substitute for its flux of events 
correlations that outline a motionless figure. What it suspends is the theme 
that succession is an absolute: a primary, indissociable sequence to which 
discourse is subjected.55 
In a series of remarks in The Archaeology of Knowledge56 concerning The 
Order of Things Foucault explained that what archaeology does is note atemporally 
the formation of the discourses on grammar and natural history, where, sometimes, a 
more mature formulation of a thesis arrives earlier in time than one less mature. 
Foucault suggested that this seeming incongruity in temporal succession leaves a 
problem for any claim about continuity in the development of a thesis, while for 
archaeology, though temporal succession is absent, the conglomeration of 
developments are all participants in the emergence and persistence of that discourse. 
There is no attempt to list the emergence of the formulations of ideas in terms 
of a succession of events. For Foucault, as I stated before with respect to the 
attribution of innovation, there is no difference in priority between the first 
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enumeration of an idea and the subsequent imitations of that idea. The first instance is 
not some notable eruption, but only signals the emergence, with all its imitations, of a 
new way of thinking about something, the emergence of a discursive formation. 
Since the aim of archaeology is not history per se, but the discovery of rules of 
formation for collections of statements within the archive—a way to signal the 
emergence of and disappearance of discursive regularities—it doesn’t aim at 
developing a succession of events. However with each emergence and each 
disappearance a sequence of events unfolds. What Foucault wished to avoid is the 
sense that one object of discourse is the cause of the next or that there is some 
coherent necessity driving the succession of discourses, an underlying continuity 
smoothing the rough historicity of the archive, that the succession of discursive events 
may be explained by appeal to an abstract relationship between them. So, even though 
archaeology may seem to treat history only to freeze it, it is not ‘indifferent to 
succession, archaeology maps the temporal vectors of derivation.’57 It follows the 
direction of the emergence of discourse without forcing it to obey an underlying rule. 
What is simultaneous, archaeology does not characterize as succession—nor what is 
succession as simultaneous. Foucault wished to retain the historicity of the discourse. 
‘What it suspends is the theme that succession is an absolute: a primary, indissociable 
sequence to which discourse is subjected.’58 Foucault wished to avoid the sense that 
discourse self-consciously drives its own progress. Discourse, being limited and 
finite, without a God’s-eye view, cannot, when events are unfolding, adjust the shape 
of its emergence, sustain a linear development, moving it toward an ideal, coherent, 
continuous expression which underlies the project of the history of ideas smoothing 
and rendering coherent the ‘project’ of history lending inevitability to our current 
state of affairs. 
For the truth of change and transformations in history, however, Foucault 
reiterated the persistence of discontinuity, of irruption, fault, and surprise as the norm. 
Archaeology takes differences seriously, does not attempt to reduce their effect, or 
unify discontinuous discourse. It therefore has claim to a more truthful recounting of 
events than history explained under the auspices of the history of ideas, even though 
the events it recounts are not strictly history, but a selection of historical events in the 
form of the emergence and disappearance of discursive regularities. In his subsequent 
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work in the 1970s and 1980s Foucault did not ignore results of the archaeological 
method. His focus changes, but his search for emerging discourses, transformations of 
social consciousness, his avoidance of universalising, totalizing flaws in any history 
of ideas, and search for truth within properly historicised discursive spaces does not.  
From remarks found within the last book of the 1960s, The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, it is fairly clear that Foucault found the structures of the archaeological 
method unwieldy, its limitations problematic, its future as a method, short, and that 
without an enormous effort to retrieve it, the method had become a dead end. What 
emerges from the archaeological method at the end of the 1960s is a tool that disrupts 
confidence in some history of philosophy or history of ideas, which anachronistically 
places itself as the product of the inevitable movement of history toward the ideal, 
resulting in the contemporary status quo. It is a critical instrument that levels the 
playing field for truth to emerge from the background noise of the many voices within 
our own histories. 
For example, Foucault suggested in an interview with Jean-Jacques Brochier 
in 1969 with respect to his purpose in writing The Order of Things that man was to be 
cast aside, that the Cartesian ego, the transcendental subject is problematic. ‘At 
present this whole philosophy, which since Descartes has given primacy to the 
subject, is falling apart before our eyes.’59 The strategies of philosophy and history 
that take as their origin the transcendental Cartesian ego persist. But Descartes’ 
dualistic view of man makes less and less sense as a substantial answer to the 
question of human constitution. The truth of what humans are, the factual residue of 
research is slowly emerging from the noise of multiple discourses, as the prominence 
of some discourses wane and others emerge to take their place.  
Though the shout of early twentieth-century monistic materialistic science was 
not enough to dislodge the transcendental self, the emergence of data from 
contemporary thinking about human and artificial intelligence, as well as 
neuroscientific data may be doing so. The emergent structure of whatever constitutes 
consciousness is overthrowing the last vestiges of the certainty Descartes struggled to 
achieve. Though we know enough to dispense with the Cartesian transcendental self, 
we are left with deeply perplexing puzzles about the self that we are only beginning to 
understand. 
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For Foucault persons are constituted in their own age as part of that age. For 
him, there is no foundational concept of man or structure titled human nature that 
constitutes persons. There is no essence of persons in general one can point to. Any 
putative concept of man emerges as a function of man as an object of history, then 
disappears. The concept of man as homo sapiens (wise man) emerged from the 
discourse on natural history, and from the time Nietzsche’s Übermensch (overman) 
burst onto the scene competitors have lined up to replace homo sapiens: Homo 
noeticus (man of knowledge), Homo neuroticus (neurotic man), Foucault’s homo 
œconomicus, etc. Each of these labels function as descriptions of what we appear to 
be or wish ourselves to be. But they also function as our best guess of our place in the 
universe, our place in history, about our functions as persons. On this account these 
titles with all they imply within the milieu they emerge from serve as a symbol of that 
milieu, no more. To argue for the retention of a label like this as if it points 
definitively to some human essence is to argue for the entire body of knowledge that 
birthed it and not a discovery of the substance that symbol supposedly points to. This 
is all that Foucault intends by posing the disappearance of man. ‘Experience has 
shown that in their development the human sciences led to the disappearance of man 
rather than his apotheosis.’60 This emergence and development of the human sciences, 
the subject of his archaeological works, is an exposition of the dethronement of man. 
Instead of becoming gods man has disappeared. But not only is man’s disappearance 
to be reckoned with, there must as well be an account of his death. 
The death of man is nothing to get particularly excited about. It’s one of the 
visible forms of a much more general disease, if you like, I don’t mean by it 
the death of god but the death of the subject, of the Subject in capital letters, of 
the subject as origin and foundation of Knowledge (savoir), of Freedom, of 
Language and History.61 
It is particularly this transcendental subject—this absolute origin of what we 
call truth—that he opposes. ‘Perhaps we have to recognize the birth of a world where 
the subject is not one but split, not sovereign but dependent, not an absolute origin but 
a function ceaselessly modified.’62 Obviously, Foucault is not talking about the 
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disappearance of the biological entity that gives intelligibility to the continuity of 
recorded history. But this continuity is only a marker. It tells us nothing about what 
we consist of or what we consider ourselves to be in whatever age we exist. 
Archaeology points to the fallacy of defining our essence by any terms whatsoever. 
Foucault’s work of the 1960s pointed to the emergence of the human sciences that 
transform our view of ourselves, and leave us without recourse to adequate historical 
models, in effect, transforming ourselves, reconstituting ourselves endlessly as our 
discoveries warrant. 
It may be that man, selves, and souls are patterns, writing and being written 
on, modifying and being modified, subject to powers and powers in their own right, 
self-referentially modifying the self. In archaeology Foucault exposes the frangibility 
of any view of man which places man at the centre or origin of his own world, his 
own existence. 
This dethronement of man is the truth that emerges and persists through the 
archaeological examination of positivities within the history of the discursive 
regularities Foucault examines. It is this truth that persists in both the genealogical 
examination of our present and the ethical constitution of our selves. The dictum 
‘know thyself,’ has been taken variously to mean something like: We should intensify 
the project of acquiring scientific data about ourselves, generally, an Aristotelian 
stream of philosophical and scientific inquiry. The temper of the last few dialogues of 
Socrates’ life recounted by Plato, however, does not drive the reader to this 
conclusion. What Socrates moved toward is, rather, that one should have a sober 
estimation of oneself. One should know that one is not a god. From this view, 
Foucault’s archaeology forces a humility on our estimation of our place in the scheme 
of things.63 
Now, what was lost when Foucault’s method moved towards genealogy was 
the demarcation of the epistemological space taken up by discursive regularities,64 
which were for the most part an effort to reject the global continuities of the history of 
ideas as the ground of our interpretation of history. What remained, even to the end of 
his life and writing, was the drive to discover the truth of the historical events and 
transformations he selected for study, even though he does ‘replace’ archaeology with 
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genealogy as a formal method. Retained as well is the denial of the hermeneutics of 
suspicion,65 the phenomenological essence of man, and certainty66 arising from the 
product of positive science. 
Though the archaeological method served his purposes for the examination of 
various singularities, it suffered weaknesses which Foucault recounts in a dialogue, 
the conclusion to The Archaeology of Knowledge. Though there are no notes to this 
chapter, it appears that the objections stated are perhaps not the voice of an 
interlocutor, but a synthesis of objections taken from various discussions with people 
before and during the time of writing the book.67 I will list the objections first, then, 
elaborate on them with a discussion of Foucault’s responses.  
First, Foucault was accused of not quite dodging the attribution of being a 
structuralist.68 Second, how can one discuss the emergence of the sciences free ‘from 
all taint of subjectivity?’69 I answer these first two objections together below, and the 
following objections after that. Third, is there any ground for archaeological 
discourse?70 Fourth, what is archaeology?71 Fifth, does archaeology fail to apply to 
itself the rules it imposes on others? Foucault answers some of these objections 
incompletely. His critics and interlocutors subsequent to publication were not 
convinced that his answers were compelling in every case.72 
First let us look at the charge that Foucault is a structuralist. It is the most 
enduring criticism which also provides an interesting insight into Foucault’s own 
view of his work. It is telling that so many individuals raised the question of 
Foucault’s relation to structuralism. The critic of this dialogue in the Conclusion to 
the Archeology charges Foucault with making a number of mistakes. First, the critic 
asks whether Foucault avoids the tools of structuralism because the domain that he 
tried to deal with is not susceptible to an analysis of that kind.73 The critic answers his 
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own question by challenging the tools Foucault invented such as ‘formations, 
positivities, knowledge, discursive practices,’74 suggesting they are derivative of the 
weakest themes of structuralism. So, if Foucault wants to avoid structuralism, why 
did he invent tools that resembled the tools of the structuralist? Then the critic accuses 
Foucault of reducing the domain of discourse to avoid the problems of trying to apply 
a structuralist theory to it, that Foucault dispensed ‘with the speaking subject’ and 
treated discourse ‘as if it had never been formulated by anyone, as if it had not come 
about in particular circumstances, as if it were not imbued with representations, as if it 
were addressed to no one,’75 criticisms that could be levelled at structuralism as well. 
For example, the universal deep grammar of Claude Lévi-Strauss assumes universal 
structures of the human mind, so taking individuals out of the equation. The critic 
finishes his first set of remarks by accusing Foucault of taking the discourse out of its 
historical setting, treating discourse ahistorically. 
Foucault answers the last set of charges first, and replies that the critic is right, 
saying, ‘I misunderstood the transcendence of discourse; in describing it, I refused to 
refer it to a subjectivity; I did not give primary consideration […] to its diachronic 
character,’76 then explains that his intention was not to study the speakers of a 
discourse: ‘it was not to discover laws of construction or forms that could be applied 
in the same way by all speaking subjects, nor was it to give voice to the great 
universal discourse that is common to all men at a particular period,’77 a project that 
could be classified as structuralist, but, rather, to show irruptions and discontinuities 
in discourse. Foucault rejected ‘a uniform model of temporalization, in order to 
describe’78 the characteristics of discourse itself without being required to force that 
description into an unsuitable temporal form. Foucault finishes his response by 
dismissing the seriousness of the structuralist enterprise: ‘This particular controversy, 
which might have been so fruitful is now acted out only by mimes and tumblers.’79 
In this spirit Foucault, when queried whether he is a structuralist during 
subsequent interviews or when the topic must be discussed during lectures, responds 
that he is not a structuralist, has never been one, and that ‘structuralism is a category 
that exists for others, for those who are not structuralists. It is from the outside that 
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one can say that so and so are structuralists.’80 Foucault also gives a list of some 
people Jean-Paul Sartre thinks are structuralists, which includes Foucault himself. In 
1972, Foucault said that ‘no one agrees with anyone else what structuralism is.’81  
To be fair to the criticisms, Foucault mentions structure in a discussion of the 
nature of consciousness,82 and in a lecture given in Kyoto in 1970, after dismissing 
the label of structuralist he said that ‘structuralism is only a means of analysis,’ then 
added that ‘I merely make use of the structuralist method to analyze’83 the changes in 
the lives of madmen from the time of the middle ages. He mentions in a number of 
places that human character and languages have structure. But he does not subscribe 
to some structuralist manifesto. ‘Unlike those who are labelled “structuralists,” I’m 
not really interested in the formal possibilities afforded by a system such as 
language.’84 In the first of five lectures delivered in Rio de Janeiro in 1973 Foucault 
says, 
Neither Deleuze, nor Jean-François Lyotard, nor Guattari, nor I ever do 
structural analyses; we are absolutely not “structuralists.” If I were asked what 
I do and what others do better, I would say that we don’t study structures; 
indulging in wordplay, I would say that we study dynasties.85 
In the mid-seventies it would appear that Foucault had shrugged off, at least to 
his own satisfaction, the appellation of structuralist. In late 1978 in an interview with 
D. Trombadori,86 Foucault explains what he took the structuralist problem to be and 
what his position was. First Foucault dismisses the ‘whole series of polemical 
outbursts’87 of his critics then begins to ask what was so problematic about 
structuralism. He suggests that  
In the mid-sixties the term “structuralist” was applied to individuals who had 
made studies that were completely different from each other but presented one 
common element: they tried to put an end to, or circumvent, a form of 
                                                 
80 FL, ‘Foucault Responds to Sartre,’ March 1-15, 1969: interview with Jean-Pierre El Kabbach, p. 53.  
81 AME, ‘Return to History,’ February, 1972, p. 419. 
82 FL, ‘An Historian of Culture,’ Sept-Dec, 1972: interview with Giulio Preti, p. 99. ‘Thus if I now 
speak of structure and the unconscious I do so from a completely external standpoint; nor do I consider 
myself bound by the answer that I give. Anyway I am quite incompetent in this field. I will say that it 
seems to me that in recent years (I am speaking as an historian of culture) an unexpected discovery has 
occurred: I mean the discovery of the existence of formal relationships, which can indeed be called 
structures, exactly in areas that appear in all respects under the control of consciousness.’ 
83 AME, ‘Madness and Society,’ September 27, 1970, lecture at the Franco-Japanese Institute in Kyoto, 
tr. Robert Hurley, p. 341. 
84 AME, ‘On the Ways of Writing History,’ June 15-21, 1967: interview with Raymond Bellour, p. 
289. 
85 Power, ‘Truth and Juridical Forms,’ May 1973, p. 17. 
86 Power, ‘Interview with Michel Foucault,’ p. 261-66, 272. 
87 Power, p. 261. 
Douglas F. Olena 50  
philosophy, of reflection and analysis, centered essentially on an assertion of 
the primacy of the subject.88 
French Marxists took up this line of criticism against him. But, Foucault thinks there 
is something deeper than this, a history that could explain the facts better. The French 
of the 1960s did not discover structuralism. Rather it was a Russian invention that 
became a ‘great cultural victim of Stalinism, a possibility that Marxism hadn’t been 
able to face.’89 Foucault asked why people insisted ‘on defining as structuralists a 
group of intellectuals who weren’t structuralists, or at least who rejected that label?’90 
What follows is an explanation of Foucault’s reflections on this issue.  
Foucault suggested that structuralism was a cultural tradition of the Russians 
of the early twentieth century that was associated with the October revolution.91 Stalin 
distanced himself from this theme, even made it dangerous to adhere to the theory. 
When Stalin died, many intellectuals92 embraced some form of structuralism, a 
prestigious non-Western theory. Foucault thinks that the French Marxists of the 1960s 
inherited from the diehard Stalinists a tension about the resurgence of this tradition, 
leading them to denounce French structuralism. Foucault recounts the story of a 
lecture he was to give on structuralism in Hungary. His hosts accepted the topic he 
proposed, which included structuralism, but when he arrived to give the lectures, they 
put the lecture in the rector’s office, preventing the lectures from being heard by a 
wide audience. Eventually he understood that they were not permitted to speak of 
structuralism at the university. ‘I was taken aback,’ Foucault recounts. ‘It made me 
understand that the heated and confused debates that took place in France on this 
theme were only the repercussion, poorly understood by everybody, of a much more 
serious and harsh struggle conducted in the countries of the East.’93 It appeared that 
Foucault, with this explanation set aside the problem of structuralism.  
However, in 1982 Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow in Michel Foucault: 
Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics raise the spectre of structuralism from an 
analysis of Foucault’s archaeological period. They classify structuralism into two 
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types. The first was atomistic structuralism, ‘one positing structures determined by 
inductive generalization’94 from which Foucault specifically distinguishes his 
thinking. The second form, holistic structuralism, ‘i.e. one positing structures, 
deductively determined, which exceed empirical instantiations,’95 suggest Dreyfus 
and Rabinow, seems akin to what Foucault was doing in The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, and therefore becomes the subject of their criticism.  
Dreyfus and Rabinow first gave some general characterizations of 
structuralism: ‘The structuralist approach attempts to dispense with both meaning and 
the subject by finding objective laws which govern all human activity,’ and 
‘structuralists attempt to treat human activity scientifically by finding basic elements 
(concepts, actions, classes of words) and the rules or laws by which they are 
combined.’96 Foucault did attempt to dispense with meaning and the subject in his 
discussion of the emergence of discursive regularities. But he did not do it by trying 
to find any positive objective laws governing human activity, neither was he 
attempting to treat human activity scientifically. Trying to find objective laws or 
produce a positive science was not in the scope of Foucault’s work. Though, 
according to Dreyfus and Rabinow, in his early work Foucault does try to specify ‘the 
structural rules governing discourse alone,’97 and in the first section of their book they 
analyze Foucault’s ‘attempt to divorce discourse as far as possible from its social 
setting and to discover the rules of its self-regulation.’98 
The questions that have to be answered for Dreyfus and Rabinow are whether 
Foucault’s views amount to structuralism, strictly speaking, and whether these views  
undermine his archaeological project. The answer to the first question is that though 
there are similarities to structuralism in Foucault’s archaeologies, and he appeals to 
structure repeatedly in the latter part of The Order of Things, that he was not 
modelling structuralism, or some sort of methodological formalism,99 that though 
there are analogies with structuralism, concerning the avoidance of the subject and 
meaning, Foucault never had in mind a totalizing project meant to give universal rules 
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to human behaviour. Gary Gutting suggests ‘like structuralist work on language, 
culture, and the unconscious, archaeology displaces man from his privileged 
position,’100 but that Foucault’s archaeology, though it ‘works “alongside” 
structuralism,’101 is not itself structuralist.  
Foucault, however, states that he was looking for rules governing the 
emergence of discursive regularities and Dreyfus and Rabinow correctly point out 
that Foucault is not consistent with respect to his search for rules. To remain 
consistent, say Dreyfus and Rabinow, these rules must be merely descriptive rather 
than prescriptive. There must not be an appeal to some universal source of the 
emergence of discursive regularities. Yet Foucault suggests that if there is a unity ‘it 
resides, well anterior to their formation, in the system that makes possible and 
governs that formation.’102 On Dreyfus and Rabinow’s account, ‘The rules, it seems, 
actually operate on the phenomena.’103 Dreyfus and Rabinow make a fair case against 
Foucault’s thinking on this issue.  
Foucault’s difficulty stems in part from the fact that he is rightly convinced 
that the productive and rarefying principles he has discovered are not merely 
descriptive, although he also sees that their mode of operation cannot be 
accounted for by either objective laws or subjective rules.104 
Dreyfus and Rabinow conclude that since ‘the archaeologist is committed to  
the reductionist project of explaining meaning in terms of “discourse-objects”105 no 
explanation’106 which relies on external foundations, such as that of Heidegger’s 
‘horizons of intelligibility’107 shaped by non-discursive elements is available to 
Foucault. His only option, according to Dreyfus and Rabinow is to appeal to some 
form of structuralism. If Foucault wished then, to retain rules governing the formation 
of discursive regularities, those rules must reside unconsciously within the individual. 
But that won’t do either. Since Foucault was committed to history he rejected the 
possibility that there are either some universal, empirically observable, biological, 
atemporal, cross-cultural rules that ‘govern’ discourse of the sort Chomsky and Lévi-
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Strauss appeal to, or some descriptive approximations that sustain and perpetuate 
norms that Heidegger and Wittgenstein might appeal to.108  
Next, Dreyfus and Rabinow suggest that what is left for Foucault is a 
recursive formalism wherein the rules that sustain the existence of a practice, that are 
constitutive of it, also generate the practice.109 Lastly, Dreyfus and Rabinow 
characterize Foucault’s error that is not an appeal to hermeneutics, phenomenology, 
positive science, structuralism or formalism: ‘In his account of the causal power of 
the rules of discursive formations, Foucault illegitimately hypostasized the observed 
formal regularities which describe discursive formations into conditions of these 
formations’ existence.’110 Their suggestion is that Foucault should not have raised the 
problem of the ‘causal efficacy’ of rules, that the project should have limited itself to 
a descriptive analysis.111 This conclusion is also part of the answer to the second 
question I posed above, about whether archaeology fails if Dreyfus and Rabinow’s 
criticism holds. Though there are similarities between structuralism and archaeology, 
the rough association with structuralism is not the weakness of archaeology. The 
weakness of archaeology, abandoned later, lay in Foucault’s goal of finding the rules 
of formation. This weakness raised both the spectre of structuralism as well an 
inconsistency trying to avoid universalizing historical ideas.  
Following, I will look at Dreyfus and Rabinow’s final criticisms of The 
Archaeology of Knowledge. There are internal difficulties in the archaeological 
project Foucault produced. Dreyfus and Rabinow, given the fourteen years since the 
writing of the Archaeology, fairly model Foucault’s own reservations about the 
project, his own concerns that motivated the abandonment of any explicitly 
archaeological method. It is telling as well that much of Dreyfus and Rabinow’s 
criticism emerged as a product of discussions with Foucault, criticism that Foucault 
did not disagree with, or at any rate did not publish any evidence of disagreement 
with. 
Though Dreyfus and Rabinow finally characterize archaeology as having been 
‘able to achieve the rigor of structuralist theory [… that the] oscillation between 
description and prescription [noted above] has revealed an even deeper instability.’112 
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The instability they point to involves a problem Foucault attempted to avoid 
concerning two of four ‘doubles’ the archaeological critique seeks to dissolve. The 
four doubles Foucault concerns himself with are listed by Dreyfus and Rabinow as 
the retreat and return, the thought and unthought, the empirical and transcendental, 
and finally what belongs to the order of positivity and what belongs to the order of 
foundations.113 A double is described as a pair of poles of thought considered to be 
the only logical choices that interact problematically as long as they are considered 
the only alternatives. Foucault advances the archaeological method to resolve them. 
For example, when considering the empirical/transcendental double, we are 
talking about the origin, justification, and finally certification of knowledge. When we 
ask the question of the origin and pose empiricism as the absolute source, we run into 
difficulties because empiricism is incapable of organizing observations without an 
appeal to the subject doing the observation. It can’t of itself produce knowledge. 
When asked to identify the contribution of the subject without requiring some 
objective distance and rationality, a requirement forced by the weakness of a purely 
empirical appeal, empiricism fails. Similarly, when appealing to a transcendental 
subject as the origin, a priori, of rationality, and the justification of knowledge, we 
find it impossible to construct the real world without appeal to observation of that real 
world. Foucault attempts to dissolve this double by posing a historical a priori that 
limits any recourse to absolutes, to certainties, and forbids appealing to either a purely 
empirical or transcendental origin for knowledge. Forgive this oversimplification of 
the issue. It illustrates, nonetheless, that the two poles in discussion are deeply 
entangled, and it is precisely this entanglement that Dreyfus and Rabinow mark as 
Foucault’s difficulty in advancing the archaeological method. 
Dreyfus and Rabinow disagree that Foucault’s archaeological resolution of the 
doubles actually works, and that he remains entangled in the complex of issues within 
the transcendental/empirical double and the cogito/unthought double. In addition 
‘archaeology has not arrived at the problems which give rise to the return and retreat 
of the origin.’114  
So, Dreyfus and Rabinow conclude that though archaeology has achieved the 
rigor of structuralism it is not structuralism and that its difficulties are tied to the self-
referential character of the rules of the constitution of discursive regularities, that 
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Foucault should have stuck to a descriptive project instead of requiring archaeology to 
characterize some prescriptive rules of formation.  
The third objection raised by the critic: ‘Is there any ground for archaeological 
discourse?’ specifically, whether the writings of the 1960s are history or philosophy 
elicits embarrassment from Foucault, acknowledging that he has failed to appeal to 
what could ground the project of archaeology. So, as a critical enterprise, archaeology 
‘is trying to operate a decentring that leaves no privilege to any centre.’115 There 
could therefore be no stated foundations, and any putative foundation could be the 
object itself of the same critique. Foucault states in this critique that there is no 
subtext to the discourses he studies, no global underlying ideas. The task of 
archaeology ‘is to make differences: to constitute them as objects, to analyse them, 
and to define their concept. […] it is continually making differentiations it is a 
diagnosis.’116 Philosophy as diagnosis is consistent with his later writings.117 But 
when Foucault is queried about whether the Archaeology is philosophy, the critic has 
something else in mind. According to Foucault the critic points to philosophy as ‘a 
memory or a return of the origin’118 concepts explicitly rejected as part of the 
archaeological analysis.  
To recapitulate: I answered the first objection about whether Foucault was a 
structuralist by showing that he avoided for the most part the criticisms that pointed to 
structuralist elements in his work, and that even where there were similarities, the 
resemblance ended there. The second objection, whether Foucault could successfully 
discuss the emergence of the sciences without reference to the subjective element is 
more difficult. But Foucault agrees with this criticism. Third, in response to whether  
there is any ground for archaeology, Foucault responds that there is no foundation for 
archaeology, nor should one look for it. The point to archaeology is to avoid 
privileging any feature of the discourse. 
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The fourth objection of the critic in the Conclusion of the Archaeology, I 
suggested was a query about what archaeology actually was. I think Foucault’s 
answer is satisfactory, and though the following quote only gives the general outline, 
I think it is sufficient as a response to the objection: 
The word archaeology […] indicates a possible line of attack for the analysis 
of verbal performances: the specification of a level—that of a domain—the 
enunciative regularities, the positivities; the application of such concepts as 
rules of formation, archaeological derivation, and historical a priori.119 
The fifth objection is double: does archaeology fail to apply to itself the rules 
it imposes on others, and isn’t man capable of changing his course.120 The first 
problem, Foucault answers adequately in 1975 in an interview with Roger-Paul Droit. 
Foucault allows that his works are as much a product of the same kinds of forces in 
this age as the works he examined in the 1960s are of their own age, deeply enmeshed 
with the power structures of that era. And, he allows that his own works may be as 
much subject to the sorts of analysis he himself did.121 The second problem, Foucault 
answers by decentring the subject and placing that subject in the frame of rules that he 
himself does not control, the rules for the emergence of discourse. This assertion by 
Foucault, of course, raises Dreyfus and Rabinow’s previously noted objections about 
the causality problem of rules being both the cause and the structure of discourse, and 
their suggestion that Foucault should have stuck to a descriptive project. 
This analysis doesn’t exhaust the controversy or discussions awakened by 
Foucault’s archaeological writing. But it does help to place that writing in the frame 
of the 1960s as a participant in its debates and concerns, what he reacted against, what 
he proposed as an answer both during the time of his writing as well as his and others’ 
later considerations of the archaeological work. He considered the difficulties of 
commenting on the current times, and the kinds of resolution to the problems of an 
era which become possible once one is removed in time from it. There is a 
progression in his reactions to his critics from the vociferous objections during the 
1960s toward acknowledgement of the difficulties addressed during the 1970s with 
better perspective and finally in the 1980s at a distance from the concerns of that era, 
a certain calm. Foucault’s genealogical research of the 1970s is marked by a more 
mature perspective than the turbulent work of the sixties. Its breadth, forcing a less 
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strident tone and with a measured cadence, marks his growing awareness of the deep 
complexities of our social interactions. 
1.2.2. Genealogy and Power 
The genealogical works of the early to mid 1970s: Discipline and Punish, and 
The History of Sexuality, an Introduction as well as the lectures delivered at the 
Collège de France during that time describe the emergence of problems in 
seventeenth through nineteenth century Western society, the strategies used to resolve 
them, and take into account not only the discourse surrounding whatever problem is 
being examined but the increasing complexity of a world being thrown into the 
modern era. Genealogy is a method that, like archaeology, does not look for ‘genesis, 
continuity, [and] totalization,’122 and while including the archive, the object of 
archaeology, does not confine itself to that archive, or merely to the emergent 
properties within a civilization that generate discursive regularities. The scope of 
genealogy is larger, taking into account not only the explicitly archaeological work 
but also the problems of power as well as ethics,123 creating an account of society at 
once more general, as well as more supple and inclusive.  
Foucault does not see genealogy as a method designed to supersede 
archaeology but as ‘contemporaneous dimensions in the same analysis,’124 and that 
the project he engaged in ‘is genealogical in its design and archaeological in its 
method.’125 Archaeology and genealogy have different functions within this account 
of history. Archaeological research within the archive provides the ground for an 
accurate portrayal of history, while genealogy explains the movements within 
relations of power. While archaeology sorts through the archive, genealogy makes the 
connections between society and that archive. If elements of the archive force a re-
evaluation of the genealogy, well and good; truth demands at least that. Archaeology 
uncovers the factual points of contention with theory while genealogy attempts to 
describe plausible historical transformations within society. 
Genealogy becomes the overarching method for the rest of his work, the 
method he uses to refine and categorize all previous and subsequent scholarly efforts. 
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It is less controversial than archaeology because, as a response to criticism in the late 
1960s, Foucault begins to take seriously the relations between discourse, the focus of 
archaeology, and the social framework in which it resides. In general, all Foucault’s 
writings can be understood as being part of a genealogical project, at least that is, on 
retrospect, what he thought of it, but it would be a mistake to think that a reduction of 
Foucault’s work to genealogy would represent his oeuvre adequately. In many works, 
Foucault discouraged his readers and listeners from thinking in universalizing terms, 
and in many works he explicitly minimized any focus on the oeuvre as a useful 
explanatory category. Nevertheless, Foucault thought it useful to think of his work as 
genealogical.  
Foucault told us in this clear statement of intent in 1972 that ‘I speak to you as 
a historian, even if my goal is to be a historian of the present.’126 In the following 
passage, Foucault specified this both positively and negatively and set the 
genealogical project apart from some of the explicit claims of an archaeology such as 
the need to define the rules of the emergence and disappearance of discursive 
regularities. Early in Discipline and Punish Foucault outlined the project of genealogy 
with respect to a study of the prison system: 
I would like to write the history of this prison, with all the political 
investments of the body that it gathers together in its closed architecture. 
Why? Simply because I am interested in the past? No, if one means by that 
writing a history of the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one means writing 
the history of the present.127  
Foucault wished to characterize rightly the relations of power affecting the 
political constitution of the soul through discipline of the body. The prison with all its 
characteristic pressures and asymmetrical forces is the extreme form of a nearly 
universal political discipline found in the military, schools, business, even the family, 
that trains the body to be its own watcher, to consider that it is being observed, under 
surveillance, that the body is under pressure to perform the rituals demanded by that 
discipline or suffer repercussions, even if, in fact no one is actually watching. The 
prison is constituted to form the soul with the implicit gaze of external power, and can 
do this because the inmates, or ‘patients’ are under constant pressure from the guard’s 
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gaze, the pressure of physical and mental discipline, an unendurably long, crushing 
force that cannot be escaped. To endure, the prisoner must learn to think of himself as 
constantly under that force, and thereby to learn behaviours that will ensure he will 
escape notice. In other words, he will learn to behave, to fit the expectation of his 
watchers. With the prison as a model, Foucault wished to convey that the entire 
society is completely invested with discipline as a strategy of consolidating and 
elaborating power relations. 
So, rhetorically, in the above quotation, Foucault asked why he is doing this. 
Why didn’t he use the tools of his own contemporary society to look at history? The 
answer is, negatively, that he wished to avoid an anachronistic view of historical 
social structures.  
An anachronistic view that reads the history of the past in terms of the present 
is mistaken because it assumes structures and methods as yet invisible and 
unknowable to the society of that earlier era. There can be no premonition within the 
nineteenth century of the twentieth-century state. For example, in The Order of 
Things, Foucault recognized the problem of thinking anachronistically when he 
considered forms of thinking in the Classical age. ‘The men of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries do not think of wealth, nature, or languages in […] forms that 
presaged what was soon to be discovered.’128 The concept of eras defined by what 
people were able to think is firmly entrenched in Foucault’s method. Thinking of the 
past in terms of present theoretical structures is a mistake. 
Positively, genealogical research moves a step farther by suggesting that what 
people think is defined by and defines the strategies of power developing in their 
society, that knowledge and power imply each other, that the present becomes 
comprehensible when one understands the relationship between our present and the 
history that leads to it. Each acquisition of knowledge implies a new strategy of 
power, and each new power acquired constitutes a domain of knowledge. This is the 
advantage of genealogy over archaeology, and Foucault’s response to his critics. 
Genealogy allows one to trace cause and effect relations leading to the establishment 
of power relations, institutional structures, strategies of governing in society, and in 
the case of his book, Discipline and Punish, the establishment of an ubiquitous 
system of incarceration, that the discourses within an archaeology cannot.  
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Writing a history of the present in genealogical terms means for Foucault, that 
within the history of our culture lies the power relations in social structures that will 
explain the existence of some of the social structures active in the present. How is this 
different from the archaeological works of the 1960s? What distinguishes these two 
intellectual enterprises? 
Archaeology defines a history of systems of thought. The genealogical work 
of the mid 1970s defines temporally transient structures and strategies of power. It is 
not that Foucault does not or cannot describe transitions and movements in terms of 
the emergence and disappearance of discursive regularities within archaeology. 
However, temporal causal relations are difficult to describe within an archaeological 
discourse that makes no reference to the social structures they are embedded in. 
The genealogical history of the present, then, gives us a lineage of the 
relations of power leading to our current state of affairs. But Foucault would argue 
that we are far from completely conscious of the implications of these relations of 
power. There is much that is unsolved, much waiting for the generation of a possible 
future where the problems of our era can be seen clearly in retrospect. 
1.2.3. Ethics and the Care of the Self 
Ethics as a category of Foucault’s writing could not correctly be called a 
methodology; rather, following the procedures of a genealogy using archaeology, 
Foucault’s aim is to offer a genealogy of the development of the ethical self, of the 
production of the self as a work of art. Instead of being a methodology, Foucault’s 
ethical project generates a drive toward the free development of the self, though there 
is no necessary end product of this development. The sort of product he envisions is 
that people would become responsible for the constitution of themselves as moral 
agents.129 This belies the impression that the end result of Foucault’s ethical strategy 
is to produce a sort of modern dandyism, a purely aesthetic product, without reference 
to any socially responsible self. 
The constitution of ourselves as moral agents is bound up with the problem of 
freedom, but not freedom as a given constituent of being human which one finds in 
Sartre’s phenomenology. The freedom Foucault envisions is one that we struggle for, 
that we create in and for ourselves. It is not an axiom of being, but the relentless drive 
of the un-free self embedded within a power matrix, toward self determination—to be 
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released as stated in Kant’s terminology, from its self-incurred tutelage. In addition, 
Foucault’s struggle toward freedom involves the dismantling of internal proscriptions 
and external political and ideological structures that bar discovery of the truth. The 
difficulty of the struggle toward freedom is that within the scope of the examination 
of constraints on freedom there is no objective view of ourselves aloof from those 
constraints. Humans are embedded within the socio-political structures of their age. 
What humans are and what they appear to themselves as being is defined by those 
constraints. This is why Foucault appeals to Kant’s Was ist Aufklärung. In Kant’s 
view our state of being unfree is due, at least partially, to the acceptance of socially 
approved boundaries.  
Foucault suggests that the work of an author, to make any headway, to go 
beyond accepted practices and norms, to be original, must make a ‘breakthrough 
[franchissement]’ which he equates with ‘a pure transgression.’130 An author cannot 
be considered mad in producing work that moves beyond the expected boundaries, for 
to produce work precludes madness.131 This transgression or breakthrough should not 
be considered a form of ‘sin’ or missing the mark [hamartia] but rather an expansion 
of the limits of possible freedom within the constraints of the socio-political matrix, 
even though it might be considered sin by society. Foucault demonstrated that it is not 
possible to be entirely free of the power relations that define us as described in 
Discipline and Punish. Foucault’s point is that the expression of freedom cannot be 
elaborated theoretically within some history of ideas which draw absolute limits, but 
rather within a practical critique which suggests the need to cross over to unexplored 
territory.132 To understand this practical critique it will be instructive to look at the 
movement of Foucault’s writings from his works concerned with power to the ethical 
works. 
To require that Foucault’s explicitly ethical books define his approach to the 
ethical constitution of the self would oversimplify his thinking and restrict discussion 
to those books alone. Instead, the development of Foucault’s thinking during the 
1970s through his lectures and essays shows us, in some fashion, how he arrived at 
the last two books in the History of Sexuality. From the publication of the first volume 
of the series, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction which is similar in style to his 
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previous works whose objects are located within the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, to the second volume in the series, The History of Sexuality: The Use of 
Pleasure,133 an examination of ancient Greek ethical writing, is a span of eight years.  
Within this period, between the writing of the Introduction and The Use of 
Pleasure his lectures move toward the recognition of the complex interaction between 
the constitution of raison d’État [reason of state] as justification for the expansion of 
governmental strategies to consolidate power and the expression of distaste with 
being governed in certain ways. In Security, Territory, Population, the lectures of 
1977-1978 Foucault describes the interplay of power and resistance resulting in the 
formation of counter-conduct within cultural enclaves that promoted ways of life that 
sought to escape the forces of governmentality by the mode of strict self-rule. In the 
next year’s lecture Biopower, Foucault describes the interplay of the economy with 
the state which modified the expansion of the powers of the state. What is interesting 
here is the description of the emergence of the liberal state as being not so much an 
offshoot of natural law theories found in the Enlightenment, but as an intervention in 
the free-market economy limiting the expansion of capitalism to provide the best 
opportunity for generalized growth of the whole economy. In both series of lectures, 
Security, Territory, Population and Biopower, Foucault moves away from ineluctable 
power structures as described in Discipline and Punish toward the cooperative 
limitation of government forces in a theory of governmentality134 defined by 
government concern for populations in contrast to a concern for the control of 
territory.135 The lesson of these lectures is that power is not unilateral, that individuals 
and their social being are not only important elements in any description of the state, 
but that the freedom of individuals and groups is a feature of society that modifies 
possible expressions of governmental power. 
In the lectures of 1980-81 The Hermeneutics of the Subject Foucault, who had 
been thinking about the issues concerning the self and freedom, began an extended 
research project into ancient Western questions about the care of the self, about the 
constitution of the self, about the technologies of the self the ancients employed to 
constitute themselves as moral agents. From this research on ancient discourses about 
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ethical practices and attitudes, Foucault began to formulate the final three books in 
The History of Sexuality, only two of which were published in 1984. The third, 
Confessions of the Flesh a book on Christian techniques of the self, was as yet 
unpublished in 1984, and because of a stipulation in his estate that no unpublished 
works would be allowed to be published subsequently, remains unavailable to the 
public. 
Foucault enumerates the history of ethics within the Greco-Roman ancient 
world in the lecture series The Hermeneutics of the Subject, and the final two 
published books of The History of Sexuality: The Use of Pleasure, and The Care of 
the Self.136 Foucault does not think these descriptions of the answer to ethical 
dilemmas the ancients provided are any sort of solution to our current dilemmas.137 
Instead, he traces the formation of ethical solutions to problems of the ancient era 
through the literature of the Greeks, Romans, and Christians to a form of power 
relation—pastoral power within the Christian Church—a precedent for forms of 
power which emerge within the medieval and later eras. In Security, Territory, 
Population138 Foucault shows the connections between pastoral power and the 
elaboration of governmentality in the emergence of raison d’État.  
For Foucault, the problem of forming an ethic is not the process of deriving 
necessary behaviour from universal principles. This is the lesson of the ancients: 
whatever had become problematic in behaviour either for individuals or society 
became the subject of a discourse whose aim was that of managing the behaviour. 
The abundance of discourse on a topic was, for Foucault, not a sign that the problem 
was adequately managed, but rather a sign that it continued to be a problem. The 
discussion of diet, marriage, and pederasty in The Use of Pleasure signals this 
characteristic of Greco-Roman ethics in Foucault’s thinking. But, again, this 
elaboration of ancient moral sensibilities is not designed to be a list of prescriptions 
proposed for our own adoption, even though Foucault finds evidence that the ancients 
themselves borrowed not only ideas, but illustrations of correct moral deportment 
from their predecessors. It is rather an effort whose guiding principle is that one 
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should see ethical dilemmas in terms of what is dangerous.139 So in Foucault’s 
process of creating a genealogy of problems, one must look at behaviour in terms of 
the risks involved in performing it, and ‘the ethico-political choice we have to make 
every day is to determine which is the main danger.’140 Benda Hofmeyr suggests that  
our immersion in and the all-pervasiveness of power do not give cause for 
fatalism. Because power relations are unstable, they are subject to change; and 
because there is power everywhere, there is also freedom and the possibility of 
resistance everywhere.141 
In his ethical writing, Foucault traces the behaviour centred on the care of the 
self from Plato to the ancient Church, describing its transformations from the implicit 
Greek suggestion that we are responsible for our own development, to techniques of 
discipline within the Christian monastic societies. ‘The precept of the “care of the 
self” [souci de soi] was, for the Greeks, one of the main principles of cities, one of the 
main rules for social and personal conduct and for the art of life. For us now, this 
notion is rather obscure and faded.’142 
In the first few lectures in The Hermeneutics of the Subject and in the essay 
‘Technologies of the Self,’ Foucault discusses how the West misplaced the concept of 
the care of the self and put in its place a mistaken reading of the Delphic principle 
‘know thyself.’ This Greek recognition of our humble estate, that we are not gods, is 
transformed within the Christian Church to become a project whose goal is the 
deciphering of one’s own heart, analogous to a project of self-knowledge. However, 
‘the Dephic principle was not an abstract one concerning life; it was technical advice, 
a rule to be observed for one questioning the oracle. “Know yourself” meant “Do not 
suppose yourself to be a god.”’143 It was not detached, according to Foucault, from 
the care of the self in Greek or Roman literature. The adoption of self-knowledge as 
the primary centre is subsequent to the original admonition. This movement away 
from the care of the self to knowledge of the self in the West implies a transformation 
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of attitudes toward the self and a change in the perception of the constitution of the 
self. 
The chief mistake Foucault points out in this move is that society in the West 
moved away from an ethical concern to an epistemological one. He gives two reasons 
why the West moved toward an epistemological reading of this phrase, ‘know 
thyself.’ Foucault says that: 
We find it difficult to base rigorous morality […] on the precept that we 
should give more care to ourselves than to anything else in the world. […] We 
inherit the tradition of Christian morality which makes self-renunciation the 
condition for salvation. To know oneself was, paradoxically, a means of self-
renunciation. […] “Know thyself” has obscured “Take care of yourself” 
because our morality, a morality of asceticism, insists that the self is that 
which one can reject.144 
The second reason Foucault gives is that from Descartes to Husserl, the 
thinking subject, the locus of knowledge, is the primary ground of being, and ethical 
theory, within the objective knowledge of the self, unsuccessfully groped within this 
mode for foundations of practice.145 
Foucault’s discovery of the ancients’ focus on the care of the self avoids the 
technical arguments about first principles in ethical discourse which led inevitably 
within modern positivism to emotivism expressed as a denial of the meaningfulness 
of ethical prescriptions. Foucault’s discovery also avoids the Christian transposition 
of the care of the self, requiring decipherment of the self, which led finally to denial 
of the self within a tradition of pastoral power. Though Foucault gives no prescription 
for ethical behaviour, he does elaborate avenues of research leading to comprehension 
of the individual’s responsibility for the self as well as an examination of practices the 
ancients found valuable. First, Foucault refocused contemporary sensibility on the 
need for self-care and self-elaboration as responsible persons within society. Second, 
Foucault’s discourse on ethics is embedded within his discourse on freedom and the 
expansion and elaboration of individual moral personhood especially as found in his 
essay ‘What is Enlightenment.’  
I am going to examine ‘What is Enlightenment’ in the second chapter of this 
dissertation, first, by treating it as part of an organic whole with all its divergent 
themes, seeming and real contradictions, transformations of language, and 
problematic cul de sacs; read it as a work in progress without tying it to some 
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supposed telos. Second, I want to use this essay because many of the threads of 
Foucault’s writing are woven together there. ‘What is Enlightenment,’ along with 
Kant’s Was ist Aufklärung, provide a route for the examination of moral 
responsibility in terms of responsibility for the care of the self within an historical 
socio-political context. Part of the project of chapter 2 will be an examination of one 
branch of counter-conduct through the study of the life of the seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century Quakers, and especially the eighteenth-century Quaker, John 
Woolman. 
1.2.4. Genealogies 
I am suggesting we read Foucault in a way that permits reading his work on 
truth in the archaeologies, power in the genealogies, and constitution of moral agents 
in ethics without requiring a unity in his oeuvre. Foucault problematizes the use of an 
oeuvre to interpret a writer.146 However, he recognizes retrospectively a unity of 
purpose in his methods that doesn’t require a unity of history or the discovery of an 
underlying unity in ideas. 
It doesn’t help reading Foucault that after writing, he often finds connections 
in his texts and reasons for writing that were not part of his original intention, but 
subsequently become part of his own interpretative matrix of those texts. For example 
with respect to archaeology, in 1969 he gave an interview with Jean-Michel Palmier 
entitled The Birth of a World.147 In it Palmier asks what unites Madness and 
Civilization, The Order of Things, and The Archaeology of Knowledge. Foucault 
reflects on this while writing The Order of Things. 
The three books that precede this last one [The Archaeology of Knowledge]—
Madness and Civilization, The Order of Things, and The Birth of the Clinic—I 
wrote in a state of happy semi-consciousness, […] At the last moment, while 
editing The Order of Things, I realized that these three series of studies were 
not unrelated and that, moreover, they raised a large number of problems and 
difficulties.148 
It is at this point that Foucault began to formulate a response to these 
‘problems and difficulties’ by writing The Archaeology of Knowledge. This certainly 
suggests a self-reflective development, but it only gives us a clue to reading 
Foucault’s work if we are aware of it before we read. Problematically, there seems to 
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be no good place to start reading Foucault. However, the following cautionary tale 
can prepare the reader to abandon hopes of a simple explanatory interpretative matrix. 
Readings that proceed in the following fashion will at least guard the reader from 
making any premature judgments, and allow Foucault’s readings to speak for 
themselves on their own terms. 
There are at least two modes of reading Foucault, development and dispersion. 
Since the first, development is useful only once one has read all of Foucault’s work, 
whether in order or not, it is perhaps trivial, even though informative. It is trivial 
because its form is more of a biography than an analysis of his ideas. It is informative 
because a biography reveals essential tensions in the work as part of a personal 
struggle for freedom within the structures of everyday life. The second, dispersion, is 
characterized, for example among many others, by Gary Gutting,149 and Dreyfus and 
Rabinow.150 In this sort of reading there is no central method with Foucault. He uses 
whatever method he needs to in order to examine whatever historical object is under 
observation. There is no unifying theme carried on throughout the multiplicity of 
works from the 1950s to the 1980s. It is senseless to try to force some unity on his 
oeuvre. Foucault’s own remarks about the author and the oeuvre, in addition, belie 
any attempt to unify his discourse. Gutting says that Foucault’s theories ‘are 
temporary scaffoldings, erected for a specific purpose, that Foucault is happy to 
abandon to whomever might find them useful, once he has finished his job.’151 But, 
even though Foucault’s changing view of his own writings leaves the reader at odds 
with any unifying project, he did give us a few clues about his general project.  
As with any thinker, Foucault’s project was a work in progress. It is 
transparently easy to show Foucault’s writings as being in the process of 
development. What is more difficult to show, and perhaps not possible given his early 
death, is that his work drove in any particular direction. I will not attempt to force a 
reading that interprets his oeuvre as the inevitable result of some teleological drive.152 
But the clues Foucault left in an interview with Dreyfus and Rabinow in April, 
1983153 are more than merely suggestive. Foucault tells us that he considered many of 
his books to be genealogical. 
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Foucault suggests that we look at his historical work, not including The 
Archaeology of Knowledge this way: 
Three domains of genealogy are possible. First, a historical ontology of 
ourselves in relation to truth through which we constitute ourselves as subjects 
of knowledge; second, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to a field 
of power through which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others; 
third, a historical ontology in relation to ethics through which we constitute 
ourselves as moral agents.154 
Foucault outlines how he categorizes his books with respect to this structure, 
and further outlines how the second and third books of The History of Sexuality fit 
in.155 There are three things to note here. First, Foucault equates genealogies with 
historical ontologies of ourselves. Second, the three fields of research have to do with 
the constitution of our selves as subjects. Third, our relation to truth, power, and 
ethics is a matter of our own purposeful engagement with them. We must will to 
engage ourselves, will to form ourselves as subjects within the matrix of our relations. 
What is a historical ontology? Foucault, throughout his work avoids the 
attribution of any essential nature of human being.156 There is no universally 
applicable characteristic of socially constituted human nature. This is no remark about 
human genetics. What humans are and what humans become, is constituted within 
any particular historical framework. A historical ontology becomes necessary, not so 
that humans become predictable, but that however man is constituted, in whatever age 
man is constituted, he can only be understood as tied historically to that age. So in 
relation to truth, power, and ethics it is unlikely that any universal principles of 
human constitution or human essence will be forthcoming. The truths available are 
historical truths. Constructing a history of the present, then becomes possible as we 
trace the movements of truth, power, and moral constitution into the present 
genealogically. 
What is important about the subject, about subjectivity in Foucault is that the 
subject is both constituted by the historical matrix as well as responsible for 
constituting itself within that matrix. This paradoxical self-referential production 
within a historical milieu shows both transient forms of rationality, the emergence of 
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a perception of relations of power, as well as a drive toward the creative elaboration 
of freedom to become responsible for the self, a production of one’s own ethical 
domain by the constitution of ‘ourselves as moral agents.’157 
Though Gutting recapitulates Foucault’s changing views about his work, 
saying first in 1969 that his work is about ‘analyzing discursive formations,’ then in 
1977 that his work concerns power, then in 1982, that ‘the subject […] is the general 
theme of my research,’158 this does not mean that Foucault’s remark in 1983159 about 
the genealogical method is suspect of being another thematic disjunct. It means that 
Foucault found a useful way of generalizing various modes of his work. However, it 
would be counterproductive to try to wrestle all his oeuvre into the themes of truth, 
power and ethics under the guidance of genealogy, to force the exposure of his views 
about the subject, or even about himself, even though many books, lectures, articles, 
and interviews refer, if even obliquely, to those themes. 
1.3. Concluding remarks on Foucault’s method 
Though Gary Gutting offers insight into the whole of Foucault’s work by 
dividing it into histories, theories, and myths, I find it more useful to treat Foucault’s 
work as Clare O’Farrell does by calling it, in general, culture studies.160 Doing this 
offers the scope for interpreting any of Foucault’s works on its own terms and avoids 
the forbidding territory of giving a united general account of his work, something 
which writers like Dreyfus and Rabinow,161 and Gutting,162 have, of necessity, shied 
away from. Gutting does this by suggesting that Foucault’s works are independently 
to be considered intellectual artefacts, that one shouldn’t try to see them as falling into 
one or an other general categories.163 
In the most general terms Foucault preferred to be thought of as an intellectual 
with all the social responsibility that that appellation carried in France, disclaiming 
variously the attribution of philosopher, historian, Marxist, structuralist, etc., about 
which his interlocutors queried him. Nevertheless, he often referred to himself as a 
philosopher, with the caveat that he was not a philosopher of this or that sort. 
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Foucault is also considered by some as a postmodern thinker.164 However, 
though he mentions a postmodern era,165 he says this to dismiss such time-bound 
categories as inflexible, incapable of fairly defining or answering the problems he 
addresses, instead turning the reader to the idea that modernity is an attitude or an 
ethos.166 Further, in The Order of Things, he even dismisses the terms ‘Classical age’ 
and ‘modernity’ as being unimportant.167 But to say that Foucault is, on this account, 
a postmodern thinker, is an outsider’s view, a label he did not accept. However, the 
generation of the category of thinker called ‘postmodern’ is often attributed to ideas 
central to Foucault’s archaeological method, and Foucault’s early writing is cited. 
What marks him as postmodern is the incorporation of properly historicized readings 
of history under ‘perspectives that interpret power as dispersed, indeterminate, 
heteromorphous, subjectless and productive, constituting individuals’ bodies and 
identities.’168 It is clear that Foucault’s thinking in the seventies could not be 
categorized precisely this way, especially since he details with some precision the 
characteristics of the relations of power and the body, and the relation of power with 
resistance, though some themes as the ones stated above persist in Foucault’s writings 
and the literature surrounding those writings. 
Jean-François Lyotard presented a more subtle expression of the postmodern 
category, one that Foucault, I think, could have assented to. Postmodernism is first, a 
critique of the Enlightenment, a critique ‘on the idea of a unitary end of history and of 
a subject’169 construed as being a Cartesian subject. Second, the postmodern ‘is 
undoubtedly a part of the modern. All that has been received, if only yesterday […], 
must be suspected.’170 Postmodernism became, on Lyotard’s account, the leading 
edge of modernism. It is ‘not modernism at its end but in the nascent state, and this 
state is constant.’171 Postmodernism is then modernism breaking through its limits. It 
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is, even as Foucault might have said about Lyotard’s characterization that ‘this 
philosophical ethos may be characterized as a limit-attitude.’172 
Third, Lyotard describes how the work of the artist or writer ‘are not in 
principle governed by pre-established rules, and they cannot be judged according to a 
determining judgment, by applying familiar categories […] to the work.’173 This 
passage is reminiscent of Foucault’s discussion of Rousseau’s work. A 
postmodernism of this sort can be construed as a sensibility of being in the present, 
yet stretching the habitation for work beyond ordinary limits, a fair description of 
Foucault’s treatment of freedom as an aspect of enlightenment, of the production of a 
philosophical ethos through the creation of a historical ontology. The tension within 
postmodernism characterizes Foucault’s attitude toward the future.  
However, it might be useful to mark these themes in Foucault to note 
convergence in ideas concerning fields other than the ones he was interested in, and in 
this way make application of his methods to our contemporary period that in many 
ways he was neither interested in nor considered to be important. He was not 
interested in elaborating any possible future. It smacked of utopian thinking. For him, 
it led to the institution of problematic directions and the worst legal structures for 
society. This is not merely a theoretical concern, but one history bears out: 
In fact we know from experience that the claim to escape from the system of 
contemporary reality so as to produce the overall programs of another society, 
of another way of thinking, another culture, another vision of the world, has 
led only to the return of the most dangerous traditions.174 
But now that his near future is past, and having become present to us, especially in 
this time of dramatic and swift technological change, Foucault’s future is fair game 
for examination.  
My method will be largely drawn from Foucault’s mature view of his own 
method. I think it will be, fairly, a ‘genealogy of the present,’175 ‘a historical ontology 
in relation to ethics through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents.’176 
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Chapter 2: Resistance and Enlightenment 
2.1. Introduction 
In order to examine techniques of the self in practice, I will follow a line of 
argument that first seeks to find a confluence between the work of Immanuel Kant 
and Michel Foucault, roughly along the lines of Foucault’s discussion of Kant’s 
examination of the question of the Enlightenment. Foucault questions Kant’s reading 
of the Enlightenment because of concerns with a universalizing rationality that 
originates from individual transcendental reason. I argue with Christine Korsgaard, 
concerning practical issues that one need not dispense with Kant’s moral absolutism, 
which requires the construction of universal moral axioms, but treat it as a special 
case for living in ideal circumstances. Using Kant’s own writing, Korsgaard broadens 
the scope of individual responsibility to concerns for the community when faced with 
either individual or socially widespread evil. This broadening of scope will require a 
re-evaluation of Kant’s insistence that there can be no conflict of duties. It is at this 
level of conflict between duties that Foucault’s histories of Western society force a 
broadening social consciousness of relations of power and the rationalization of those 
relations of power. Subsequently, Foucault suggests, those who dispute those 
rationales form societies of counter-conduct around formalized rules of resistance 
such as is found in the Society of Friends (Quakers) during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.  
I will examine the formation and elaboration of Quaker society as emerging in 
response to English government, the Anglican Church, and as a counterpoint to the 
Puritan movement. Subsequently, I will look at the life of one individual, the 
eighteenth-century North-American Quaker, John Woolman. My reasons for 
examining Woolman are first, that the resistance to power which engenders the 
formation of societies of counter-conduct is not sufficient to complete the task of the 
production of the ethical self, and second, that there is a rough isomorphism between 
the formation of the ethical self within the society of counter-conduct and the 
formation of the society of counter-conduct within the broader society. Individual 
moral development is capable of refinement even in a subgroup that makes some fair 
claim to having an enlightened polity. 
My examination of John Woolman will first focus on the techniques he used 
to advance his own ethical development within the Society of Friends. Second, it will 
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show that the methods of development of Woolman’s ethical self can be described, 
along the lines Foucault sketches, as technologies of the self, which develop roughly 
as follows. Within the practice of resistance are found the seeds for enlightenment 
that require personal discipline centred on the care of the self, resistance to self-
incurred tutelage, to social forces as well as acts and practices of resistance to being 
governed. ‘This task requires work on our limits, that is, a patient labor giving form to 
our impatience for liberty.’1 That form, in Foucault, is the constitution of the self by 
the self as a work of art, an aesthetic project, the development of ‘a philosophical 
ethos consisting in a critique of what we are saying, thinking, and doing, through a 
historical ontology of ourselves,’2 I will demonstrate how John Woolman’s life 
typifies this ethos, in both personal disciplines and social reform. Woolman’s life as a 
historical ontology is chronicled in the form of his autobiographical journal.3 ‘Such a 
project is […] an investigation of how we have been fashioned as ethical subjects. 
While the domain of such a study is ethics, its aim is to sustain a form of resistance to 
newly recognized political forces.’4 
In answer to some immediate objections that might be raised by the spectre of 
an aesthetic project of the construction of the self, I suggest that the aesthetic nature 
of the project doesn’t imply that it is trivially constituted as an artistic project, as 
merely the work of a fertile imagination, or the artistic production under the influence 
of a muse. Instead, first, the project resists codification. It can’t be non-reductively 
characterized as a formalism. Second, the project concerns the ethical formation of 
the self, and requires the engagement of the will in relation to enclosing power 
relations in a critique that may not have an analogous predecessor. Judith Butler 
suggests that ‘there can be no ethics, and no politics, without recourse to this singular 
sense of poeisis,’5 where poeisis of the subject is both the crafted self and the process 
of crafting that self. 
Tied to the problem of being governed, Foucault characterizes critique as ‘the 
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art of not being governed quite so much.’6 He frames this art of critique as resistance 
against raison d’État, a rationality framed within the production of state power arising 
in the fifteenth century. However resistance plays out within this critique, it is part of 
the acquisition and production of reasons to support the production of a free self and 
free communities within the state, reasons that cannot be justified over against the 
state apparatus. The Quakers of the late seventeenth century found a way of resisting 
the government of England and eventually being given room to practice their form of 
life.7 
Aesthetics is not a category of knowledge as might be found in something like 
Kant’s Critique of Judgment even though Foucault views aesthetic works as a source 
of truth equal to that of the sciences.8 This work on ourselves is aesthetic, negatively, 
in part because it is critical of the assumption of the superiority of formalized 
declarations of truth within analytic categories that see the possibility of knowledge 
only as constituted separately from the relations of power—that knowledge is 
legitimate only where it is untainted by an association with power.9 Positively, the 
liberty of an aesthetic work pushes against and breaks through the boundaries of the 
developments of axiomatic systems of thought, against totalizing movements within 
the history of ideas. The aesthetic of Foucault is also not to be associated with a 
formal critique of art. The aesthetic Foucault describes is based on an experimental 
and productive technology of self-mastery. When it is successful, it is productive of 
an ethos that fairly guides the self within a social framework. 
That the project Foucault encourages is aesthetic doesn’t imply that Foucault 
was irresponsible with histories of the objects he examined. Foucault’s own method 
relied as much on an accurate depiction of the historical archive as those 
historiographies of which he was critical. He asserted that his historical research was 
as capable of being checked against the facts as the historiography of those who 
criticized his work. ‘There is nothing original in what I do. From this standpoint, what 
I say in my books can be verified or invalidated in the same way as any other book of 
                                                 
6 POT, p. 45, emphasis mine. 
7 With respect to the doctrine of toleration in England, the Quaker lifestyle became legally permitted. 
8 Power, p. 242-43. The relationship between truth and experience is a complicated set of problems. In 
this text, during an interview with D. Trombadori, Foucault suggests that truth is a construction, a 
fiction. Yet, though something is a fiction doesn’t mean it is false. 
9 FL, ‘Schizo-Culture: Infantile Sexuality,’ 1975, pp. 159, 162. This is just one quote of many relevant 
ones found throughout his works of the seventies. 
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history.’10 And, even though the account Foucault gives of some historical figures has 
been questioned,11 and even soundly criticized in J. G, Merquior’s Foucault, it would 
be unfair to think he would not have corrected his account when better data became 
available. In addition, though, some of the approximations Foucault gave for some 
broad swathes of history are difficult to verify, and some generalizations he used, 
though not substantially accurate, are nonetheless explainable without requiring a 
rewrite of history.12 Barry Allen suggests that ‘professional historians who read 
Foucault may sometimes find his arguments overbold, but none thinks he was just 
incompetent.’13 
Foucault frames the lesson of the Enlightenment not in terms of a formal 
elaboration of the history of ideas that have sprung from it, but rather as an 
examination of the history of what it means to examine the present in which one lives. 
Foucault suggests that Kant is one of a number in that era to pose a particular sort of 
question, that is, ‘What, then, is this event that is called the Aufklärung and that has 
determined, at least in part, what we are, what we think, and what we do today?’14 
Foucault takes Kant’s view of the problem of enlightenment as indicative of a 
constellation of prescient themes that persist in a long stream of writers through the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. ‘The specific features of Kant’s answer to this 
question are not important to Foucault; his aim is not to “reactivate” the concept of 
maturity, or to define the relative domains of the use of public and private reason.’15 
Foucault is interested, instead, on the problem of attitudes toward the present that 
Kant thinks about. The next section will proceed as a review of some problems in the 
discourse on the Enlightenment by examining Foucault’s and Kant’s essays both 
titled ‘What is Enlightenment?’ 
                                                 
10 Power, ‘Interview with Michel Foucault,’ D. Trombadori, interlocutor, p. 242. 
11 CCF, p. 15. Gutting, for example, criticizes Foucault’s treatment of the history of Tuke’s asylum, but 
suggests that this weakness in historiography does not detract from the thesis in History of Madness 
‘about modern psychiatry’s lack of moral neutrality.’  
12 For example, a figure Foucault gives for the British penal code, ‘for more than three hundred kinds 
of offense one could be hung,’ (Power, p. 62) is difficult to verify. Histories of the same era attempt  
more exact figures: approximately 220 offenses, or 222 offenses. It is difficult in the passage quoted to 
determine the exact era in the eighteenth century about which Foucault is talking. And with the 
unpredictable and unsettled character of British government of that era, it is additionally difficult to pin 
down which regime Foucault is discussing. Strangely, reliable figures are hard to come by. I found 
figures of under 200 laws for the eighteenth century, but for 1815 I found figures of from 220 to 288 
laws. Foucault’s remark may have been a throwaway, or perhaps the statutes encompassed numerous 
acts of a certain kind, making his figure roughly correct.  
13 Foucault and Philosophy, p. 153. 
14 POT, p. 97. 
15 FAE, p. 166. 
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2.2. What is Enlightenment? 
I want to trace a confluence in the work of Immanuel Kant and Michel 
Foucault moving along the lines of autonomy and resistance, the elaboration of 
freedom and its necessity, of breaking through, crossing over, and of transgression.  
I will first examine the question asked by Immanuel Kant and Michel 
Foucault: What is Enlightenment? My aim is to frame their answers within Foucault’s 
project of developing a historical ontology of ourselves, to position ourselves in the 
matrix of power relations of the ordinary world so that the means to the expression of 
our freedom and the development of our ability to resist the incursions of government 
power over individual freedom is established. To do this, I will examine Foucault’s 
treatment of the problem of resistance to power that will lead eventually to the 
necessity of development of techniques within the technologies of the self16 leading to 
the elaboration of one’s life as the project of developing our selves as moral agents.  
Immanuel Kant wrote an essay in response to the question ‘Was ist 
Aufklärung?’17 in the Berlin newspaper, Berlinische Monatschrift in November 1784. 
What troubles Kant in his answer to the question and subsequently Foucault in his 
own essay titled ‘Qu'est-ce que les lumières?’18 published in 1984, are the relations of 
power between populations of individuals and the ruling structures of society.19 The 
individual’s move toward enlightenment, one that both Kant and Foucault see as 
desirable, is accompanied by a struggle with those structures marked first by 
resistance and transgression, leading ultimately to self-reliance; from heteronomy to 
autonomy.20 Many distinctions can be drawn both between the content and purpose of 
the two essays, as well as the historical context. But for my purposes the historical 
problems are peripheral.  
                                                 
16 Foucault makes a distinction between technologies of the self as ways of life within society and 
specific techniques, such as listening, reading, writing, and speaking used as exercises whose general 
goal is self-mastery. One might speak then of a Stoic or Christian technology of the self as the form of 
techniques possible within that social ethos. 
17 POT, pp. 29-38. 
18 POT, pp. 97-119. I will also be comparing some of the amended translations within the edition found 
in EST. 
19 The literature on this topic is extensive, and I will not be surveying it. The point I wish to make here, 
though not distinct from this literature, is focused on resistance and transgression. 
20 Neither Kant nor Foucault think that one can escape power, but Kant sees power as a formal 
structure whereas Foucault sees it as an ubiquitous inescapable context, including formal structures. 
Freedom for Kant means liberation from the rule of others, liberation to autonomy while freedom for 
Foucault does not require liberation from the context of external power. FAF, p. 89, ‘It is important to 
note that Foucault sees this exploration of the self not as a liberation of a true or essential inner nature, 
but rather as an obligation, on the part of the individual, to face the endless task of reinventing him or 
herself.’ 
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2.2.1. Limits and Freedom in Kant and Foucault 
For Foucault the project of becoming autonomous is that of elaborating our 
freedom, experimentally.21 What interested Foucault was the process of elaborating 
that freedom from a self-incurred tutelage under heteronomous control by means of 
taking control of the process of becoming one’s own person, of constructing the self, 
of taking on the project of the care of the self instead of leaving the production of the 
self to the forces and disciplines inherent in the social structures into which one is 
born and raised. 
Like Foucault, Kant considers the mature individual to be one who takes care 
of the self. Kant argues that when a state prosecutes a war, no support exists for 
education, hence no support for the project of training ‘good men who can improve 
and take care of themselves.’22 This does not imply that Kant’s view of the self or 
what is required to take care of the self is the same as Foucault’s, or what Foucault 
describes the Ancients as having. I am suggesting that the project of enlightenment in 
both writers requires the refocus of attention on the care of the self. What this means 
in Kant’s moral theory is that one should discover one’s duty and perform it within a 
society of likeminded individuals.23 
Besides the quotation above from Kant’s ‘An Old Question…’ the expression, 
care of the self, occurs infrequently in Kant’s writings and shouldn’t be taken as a 
signal that Kant’s ethical work considered, except peripherally, the ancient thinkers 
Foucault concerned himself with. The connection I am making between the two 
writers is more generally through the lens of Kant’s Was Ist Aufklärung? and Kant’s 
principle of autonomy from the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. For moral 
rules to be developed in Kant’s view, one must independently discover them through 
reason. This requires a certain solicitude about one’s own condition. It is not likely 
that one would take on the project of developing and becoming responsible for a 
properly universalized moral duty under conditions that are unlike those the ancients 
made for themselves in the effort to master themselves. To take on the project of 
caring for oneself in the ancients required that they be convinced of its necessity, and 
                                                 
21 POT, ‘What is Enlightenment?’ p. 114. 
22 Immanuel Kant, ‘An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?,’ in 
Kant on History, ed. Lewis White Beck, trans. by Lewis White Beck and others (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill Educational Publishing, 1980), hereafter KH, p. 151, emphasis mine. 
23 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 
Inc.), trans H. J. Paton, hereafter GMM, p. 100. I am referring to Kant’s formula for the Kingdom, or 
Commonwealth of ends. 
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that necessity could be framed as duty in Kantian terms. 
Take two of the examples of duties Kant gives in the Groundwork.24 In the 
first example Kant concludes that it is a perfect duty of self love not to commit 
suicide after experiencing ‘a series of misfortunes that has mounted to despair.’25 This 
is in contrast to some Stoic justifications for suicide,26 but not contrary to the general 
principle that committing suicide against Kant’s rule is clearly a case of not caring for 
the self. In the second example Kant concludes that it is an imperfect duty for one to 
promote their own self improvement,27 what Kant calls a ‘contingent (meritorious) 
duty to oneself.’28 Here we find a very close relation to the problem of the stultus as 
Foucault outlines the position of the Ancients. The description Foucault gives of the 
stultus,29 paraphrasing Seneca, almost entirely follows Kant’s characterization of the 
person who does not will their own self improvement.30  
The move to equate Kantian duty to the self with the Ancients’ concept of the 
care of the self is straightforward when one realizes the goal for Kantian duty, (at 
least with respect to the self.) The goal of the care of the self in the Ancients is 
identical, to engage the individual in the project of their own self improvement, for 
Kant the formation of a good will, and the Ancients, self-mastery. 
The context for care of the self, in both Kant and the Ancients, is a 
community. As Kant describes in the Groundwork, it is the kingdom or 
commonwealth of ends, an ideal community of individuals who associate themselves 
with each other through mutually individual formulation of duty using Kant’s 
Categorical Imperative. For the Stoics, Epicureans, Cynics, and early Christians the 
formulation of the rules of self-care is passed down from their predecessors, those 
who have already mastered the art of living. In the Ancients there is a visible master, 
teacher, or guide, while for Kant, heteronomy is not the condition of enlightenment or 
of following one’s duty. Nonetheless, let us help Kant concede that the state, in 
whatever form, say, the school, is responsible for setting up the possibility of an 
enlightened autonomy within the individual, eventually in the race as a whole. 
                                                 
24 GMM, pp. 89, 90. 
25 GMM, p. 89. 
26 Michael Cholbi, ‘Suicide’ in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/suicide/> section 2.1 Ancient and Classical Views of Suicide 
[accessed 27 November, 2009]. 
27 GMM, p. 90. 
28 GMM, p. 97. 
29 HS, p. 132. 
30 GMM, p. 90. 
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For Kant, at least part of the responsibility for creating the conditions for the 
possibility of enlightened behaviour is placed on the state. The first thing required for 
enlightenment is that freedom be given to people; he says that ‘men work themselves 
gradually out of barbarity if only intentional artifices are not made to hold them in 
it.’31 This implies that the conditions for enlightenment rest first with the state, and 
after those conditions are met, people would move, by natural necessity, ineluctably 
toward enlightenment. This does not imply that no effort will be required by newly 
freed citizens, but that unfettered individuals by nature seek to improve their own 
conditions. 
For Foucault, there is no commonwealth of ends to participate in, and no 
absolute duties necessitated by and generated from a natural law32 derived, albeit 
imperfectly, through the application of reason.  
There is also the problem of power. For Foucault, power relations are 
ubiquitous, ever present in any and every society at every level. Society does not set 
up the conditions under which the citizen can seek enlightenment. The tension set up 
between purposes of state and the projects of individuals will never be eliminated, and 
so if enlightenment is to take place, it will have to take place within the context of 
those power relations. This conflict between individuals and the state is aptly 
illustrated by Bernard Williams33 where he shows how the state apparatus cannot 
count the projects of individuals as important when it decides how that individual, as 
a resource, should be deployed.34 
In contrast to reasons of state, living freely within the inevitability of power 
relations through specific techniques of the care of the self in Foucault is not 
altogether rational. The techniques are often disciplines, methods, and strategies that 
do not exclude transgression of socially persistent mores and reasons in an effort to 
define the truth of one’s being, in an effort to recreate oneself in freedom. Further 
problematic in this comparison is that Kant and Foucault have different ideas of what 
constitutes the self, and the society in which that self is embedded. 
                                                 
31 POT, ‘Was ist Aufklärung?,’ p. 36. 
32 Though Kant is not strictly part of the natural law tradition, he does suggest that the moral law has 
the same provenance as the natural law we approach through science. GMM, p. 104. 
33 Bernard Williams, ‘Against Utilitarianism,’ in Ethics: The Big Questions, ed. by James P. Sterba 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), p. 133. 
34 Foucault thinks Bentham is the key figure with respect to the era of social control, and a utilitarian 
rationality in the form of the Panopticon, a model for the central tool of social control. (Power, pp. 57-
59.) 
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The self in Kant is transcendental. It is capable of deciding what is right, a 
priori, without needing corroborating statistical evidence, all within the framework of 
a possible good will that energizes the right motivation and right thinking of a person 
within the society. It is within this context that Kant believed one could formulate the 
conditions of freedom free from the restrictions of heteronomous control. Foucault, 
however, does not recognize any transcendental ego. The self is purely material 
within the confines of society and has no transcendental foundation for reasoning. 
Reasoning is always embedded within a social context. Foucault rejects the 
assumption that a transcendental Cartesian rationality can serve as a foundation for 
the Enlightenment and all its offshoots, including positive science. But even if they 
are foundational, Enlightenment rationality and reasons of state cannot be exempt 
from critique. So, even though both essays titled ‘What is Enlightenment?’ foster the 
discovery and use of freedom for the reason of being responsible for, and taking care 
of the self, what actually constitutes the practice of taking care of the self for Kant 
and Foucault are different. 
Even though Kant writes that an individual should ‘dare to know,’ that one 
should ‘have courage to use your reason,’ and that this is the ‘motto of 
enlightenment,’35 he also wrote that the citizens had made it the project of the state to 
guide the students toward enlightenment.36 For Kant, enlightenment is not only the 
process of freeing oneself from self-incurred tutelage; it is the product of that effort 
that can be handed down to succeeding generations. Kant argues in the Second Thesis 
of the ‘Idea for a Universal History From a Cosmopolitan Point of View’ that ‘those 
natural capacities which are directed to the use of his reason are to be fully developed 
only in the race, not in the individual.’37 But, for the individual as well as the society 
as a whole, ‘through continued enlightenment the beginnings are laid for a way of 
thought which can in time convert the coarse, natural disposition for moral 
discrimination into definite practical principles.’38 
Contrarily, Foucault places the entire responsibility for individual 
enlightenment on the individual. It is, therefore, no one else’s project, and no one else 
is responsible for the results of this effort of caring for the self. Foucault does not 
                                                 
35 POT, ‘Was ist Aufklärung?’, p. 29. 
36 KH, ‘Idea for a Universal History From a Cosmopolitan Point of View,’ p. 21, 23, and ‘An Old 
Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?’ p. 152. 
37 KH, ‘Idea for a Universal History From a Cosmopolitan Point of View,’ p. 13. 
38 KH, p. 15. 
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blame the state as Kant does, either for the failed project of training people to care for 
themselves, or for the project of advancing enlightenment in the race.39  
For Kant, the state must remove restrictions to the public expression of 
reason40 for enlightenment to take place. For Foucault, the presence of the state 
implies the existence of an ubiquitous relationship of power over individuals the 
elimination of which cannot be seen as the condition of enlightenment. An 
enlightened society for Kant would allow free discourse, but require obedience to the 
law.41 For Foucault, the possibility of transgression for setting up the conditions of 
enlightenment cannot be eliminated. Freedom doesn’t require transgression, but 
cannot deny its possibility. The problem of power and the resistance that defines it is 
a central feature of Foucault’s treatment of enlightenment.  
It will be instructive to look at Foucault’s view of the necessity for 
transgression as breaking through or crossing over limits. In order to do that one must 
first examine the problem of reason as the ground of justifications, and rationalities as 
justifications for the application of power in the face of resistance. 
2.2.2. Reason, Unreason, and Rationalities 
The problem of power and resistance is also a problem of reason and 
rationality. One of the features of Foucault’s thinking is that historically, there is not 
just one rationality.42 It is important to recognize the mystification generated by some 
streams of modern thought that required a single, linear, exhaustive, and progressive 
movement toward the truth through logic and a comprehensive systematization and 
formalization of thinking. John Rajchman suggests this trend toward ‘a single or 
unified sort of rationality appropriate to each domain’43 comes under criticism during 
the latter part of the twentieth century. Foucault, in order to demystify this 
formalism,44 implies a multiplicity of rationalities, a multiplicity of Wittgensteinian 
                                                 
39 Foucault, as I remarked in the first chapter dispensed with the concept of human progress along a 
teleological trajectory. 
40 POT, ‘Was ist Aufklärung,’ p. 31. 
41 POT, p. 31. 
42 John Rajchman, The Freedom of Philosophy, p. 108. 
43 Post-Analytic Philosophy, ed. by John Rajchman and Cornel West (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1985), p. xiii. From Rajchman’s introduction. 
44 A formalism can be defined as a coherent theory where the axioms and rules of inference together 
rigorously encompass their domain. For example, in mathematics, Russell and Whitehead attempted to 
formalize all of mathematics in their Principia Mathematica. Even though PM was the archetype of 
formal theories for the time, Kurt Gödel demonstrated its incompleteness. 
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forms of life.45 His rejection of formalism is not born out of logical necessity—though 
it can be understood in that form after the fact—but rather is born out of historical 
observation. If, historically, knowledge is a construction born of the clash between 
instincts, and ‘knowledge has no affinity with the world to be known,’46 then the 
structure of knowledge cannot be teleologically driven toward a single, absolute, 
unified characterization within some necessary progress of mankind. Knowledge 
remains a construct and as such can and will be deconstructed and reconstructed by 
further conflicts between our instincts. A short survey of the history of modern 
science47 tells us this is true and admits the puzzles we currently face. 
 In an interview Foucault gave in 1978, he tells us that rationality cannot be 
considered an:  
anthropological invariant. I don’t believe one can speak of an intrinsic notion 
of “rationalization” without, on the one hand, positing an absolute value 
inherent in reason, and on the other taking the risk of applying the term 
empirically in a completely arbitrary way. I think one must restrict one’s use 
of this word to an instrumental and relative meaning. […] One isn’t assessing 
things in terms of an absolute against which they could be evaluated as 
constituting more or less perfect forms of rationality, but rather examining 
how forms of rationality inscribe themselves in practices or systems of 
practices, and what role they play within them.48 
Reason has been considered the sine qua non of the difference between 
humans and animals. I don’t think Foucault disputed this, though for him the capacity 
                                                 
45 Anat Biletzki, and Anat Matar, ‘Wittgenstein’, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/#Pri> [accessed 29 June, 2009] ‘Forms of life can be 
understood as changing and contingent, dependent on culture, context, history, etc; this appeal to forms 
of life grounds a relativistic reading of Wittgenstein.’ Though this is only one reading of Forms of Life, 
in Wittgenstein, it captures the sense that knowledge [savoir] in Foucault is the ground of 
interpretation, though it itself remains uninterpreted. 
46 Power, pp. 7-9. ‘Knowledge was invented, then. To say that it was invented is to say that it had no 
origin. More precisely, it is to say, however paradoxical this may be, that knowledge is absolutely not 
inscribed in human nature. Knowledge doesn’t constitute man’s oldest instinct; and, conversely, in 
human behavior, the human appetite, the human instinct, there is no such thing as the seed of 
knowledge. […] Knowledge is a result of the instincts; it is like a stroke of luck, or like the outcome of 
a protracted compromise. It is also, Nietzsche says, like “a spark between two swords,” but not a thing 
made of their metal. […] Knowledge—a surface effect, something prefigured in human nature—plays 
its game in the presence of the instincts, above them, among them; it curbs them, it expresses a certain 
state of tension or appeasement between the instincts. But knowledge cannot be deduced analytically, 
according to a kind of natural derivation. It cannot be deduced in a necessary way from the instincts 
themselves. Knowledge doesn’t really form part of human nature. Conflict, combat, the outcome of the 
combat, and, consequently, risk and chance are what gives rise to knowledge. Knowledge is not 
instinctive, it is counterinstinctive; just as it is not natural, but counternatural.’ 
47 One need only look at the extensive literature born in the late twentieth century around works like 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions to be convinced that theories of progress in science are 
historically dubious. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edn International 
Encyclopaedia of Unified Science, 2 vols (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), II. 
Originally published in 1962. 
48 FL, ‘The Impossible Prison’ p. 279-80. 
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for reason is probably a matter of degree instead of essence.49 Rationality is both the 
structure and context of our reasoning but also the result of that reasoning. Kantian 
rationality, both as context and result assumes correspondence with the world. 
Foucault reminds us that Kant stated, ‘explicitly that the conditions of experience and 
those of the object of experience were identical.’50 Kant’s rationality born out of and 
developed from Newton’s discoveries forms the context under which truth emerges as 
a necessary feature of continued reasoning about the world.  
This is one place Foucault diverged from Kant, and it is empirical history that 
drives the divide. Foucault has told us that privileging any rationality, as Kant does, 
perpetuates the theme that reason and knowledge can only thrive where power doesn’t 
exist. But truth on Foucault’s account will be intimately co-dependent with the 
rationality within the genealogy of power that spawned it. The genealogies of 
historical rationalities as Foucault delivered them tell us that power both produces 
forms of rationality and that forms of rationality produce power. Avoiding the cul de 
sac of defending one privileged rationality over others and hence incommensurable 
truths emerging from them is part of Foucault’s intent.  
Foucault steered the reader away from this negative consequence of the 
Enlightenment toward a way of living, a philosophical ethos that he characterizes ‘as 
a limit-attitude,’ a criticism consisting ‘of analyzing and reflecting upon limits.’51 
This ethos forces an evaluation of the necessary and arbitrary elements in the 
structure of our lives. ‘The point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the 
form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible 
transgression [franchissement],’52 a critique of the limits of what we are permitted to 
do into an exploration of what we might be able to do. The French word 
franchissement translated by Catherine Porter53 as ‘transgression’ is translated 
elsewhere54 as a ‘possible crossing-over.’ But Foucault equates crossing over 
[franchissement] to transgression in another essay,55 where he is discussing some 
differences between madness and the work of an author. Foucault says that ‘the 
                                                 
49 This follows from his rejection of an essential humanity. 
50 Power, p. 9. 
51 POT, p. 113. 
52 POT, p. 113. 
53 POT, ‘What is Enlightenment,’ p. 113. 
54 EST, ‘What is Enlightenment?,’ p. 315. This translation is amended, to reflect the common usage of 
the word franchissement, though on my account not necessarily the best translation. 
55 AME, p. 33. 
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categories of the normal and the pathological, of madness and delirium, cannot be 
applied to this language [of the author]; for [that language] is a primary breakthrough 
[franchissement], a pure transgression,’56 where pure transgression is an unmodified 
cognate of the English word transgression. 
Let us disassociate the concept of transgression as necessarily connected to a 
formal catalogue of sins in a list as it might be associated with some absolute moral 
anthropology, but rather treat it as the breaking of social mores and expectations, the 
breaking of standard credal statements and methods, of ingrained moral and social 
structures.  
In the context of the ‘Introduction to Rousseau’s dialogues,’ Foucault believed 
he needed to defend Rousseau against the charge of madness. But, posing as the 
arbiter of truth, an accusation of irrationality against Rousseau is tantamount to 
suggesting his work is outside a rational worldview. But, if one wishes to be known 
as enlightened, then one avoids the appearance of irrationality. Yet, the force of this 
remark is that even though rationality is constituted, not as some absolute, but as the 
product of a certain line of socially appropriate reasoning, it masquerades as an 
absolute. One could then look at creatively breaking through or crossing over as a 
transgression, but categorizing it as such acknowledges the work as bearing the 
purposive intent of the author, a movement in freedom, something that madness 
precludes. Foucault conveys a sense that creativity carries with it the possibility of 
intentional transgression, that the creative construction of the self through a historical 
ontology is both a crossing over, a breaking through as well as a socially—and for 
some an internally—constituted transgression. Moral development on this account is 
experimental. It goes beyond structured boundaries into unknown, or at least 
undefined social and moral spaces. 
For Kant, the process of attaining Enlightenment begins, not with 
transgression, but daring to think for oneself. What Foucault has done is to analyse 
that process of thinking for oneself within a consciousness of ubiquitous power 
relations while at the same time discounting any moral or rational obligation to the 
authority of government. Foucault elaborated the actual process of what Kant’s dare 
really costs. We see here the beginning of a divide between Kant and Foucault, 
                                                 
56 AME, p. 50-51. 
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between the privileging of the transcendental subject and the promotion of an ethos as 
routes to enlightenment. 
2.2.2.1. Ego and ethos 
Kant’s program in his three critiques57 can be seen schematically as using and 
defending a scientific rationality, though God, freedom, and the moral law are beyond 
the capability of scientific proof. This rationality, marking the limits of human reason, 
is built up systematically from rational propositions and joined with practical reason 
showing what is necessarily outside the domain of reason only by what can’t be 
conceived without it. The ground for these judgments, and the thing that distinguishes 
Kant’s view of the self from Foucault’s is the assumption of a transcendental ego, the 
‘I,’ the subjective self which stands above the world of observation. This Cartesian 
ego is the foundation of our certainty, the ground of our judgments, the assurance that 
we’ve gotten it right, the irreducible centre and source for reason and rationality. 
Foucault, however, found no transcendental self, no self which stands above 
its embeddedness in the world. The self is formed by the ordinary forces of training 
within the context of its society. The process of reasoning about the world takes place 
at every stage of physical, mental, and moral development under the pressures, 
tensions, and expectations that are the context of life. Self-formation, the decision to 
act for oneself, begins with resistance to those pressures, tensions, and expectations. 
Foucault avoids the dualistic Cartesian transcendental view of the self by pointing to 
deep ambiguities in the forms of ideal knowledge which could unify all our empirical 
collections of data. There is more than one rationality which is the product of 
reasoning, and claims to the pre-eminence of any one rationality over another are 
mistaken, or at least inconsistent with other candidates. When one recognizes that 
self-formation takes place by resistance to a cultural expectation, one is released from 
a Cartesian project of doubt in order to gain a privileged view of reality, what 
Descartes does in his Meditations. 
Instead of choosing the Cartesian transcendental ego as a starting point for 
enlightenment, Foucault aims rather at the development of a philosophical ethos, not 
an essence but an attitude: 
I have been seeking to stress that the thread that may connect us with the 
Enlightenment is not faithfulness to doctrinal elements, but rather the 
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permanent reactivation of an attitude—that is, of a philosophical ethos that 
could be described as a permanent critique of our historical era.58 
This ethos implies two things for Foucault, ‘first, the refusal of what [he likes] 
to call the “blackmail” of the enlightenment,’59 which I will discuss in the following 
section. Second, it is a test of limits, though ‘always limited and determined’60 by our 
engagement within culture without a transcendental fixed point of reference.61 In the 
1970s, Foucault argued that the development of society and development of the self 
are deeply entangled. What Foucault tried to avoid is the notion that our elusive social 
self can be examined without the entanglements of relations of power with which the 
individual coexists and interacts. There is no way to separate out non-reductively the 
objects of human life without doing damage to them. So, any examination of this 
ethos, any practice associated with freedom and the test of limits it implies, must take 
place within the limits and determinations that constitute ordinary human experience. 
The self is never free of the strictures of social engagement. 
Foucault considered that in this philosophical ethos, we can avoid a stultifying 
dogma, and test the limits of freedom. To make matters even more difficult, this ethos 
implies that ‘we are always in a position of beginning again,’62 always recognizing 
the limits of our views and interpretations; not only expanding our horizons, but 
waking to a day when our interpretative lenses are recognized to have misguided the 
search and must be abandoned for new ones. The world is never uninterpreted,63 and 
we are never able to find an absolute beginning.  
From one of Foucault’s essays written in the last year of his life, we see not a 
return to old themes, but the persistence of themes he developed, retained, and used 
all his academic career. What this ethos implies is that interpretation, though not 
objective, or certain, is nonetheless useful, and should not be rejected without 
evidence and good reasons. Foucault is not intending a Pyrrhic scepticism, but rather 
a cautionary note about the limits of interpretation. That we cannot find the original, 
the first, the beginnings of our ideas or practices is part of the problem of both social 
entanglement of our knowledge and the fact of interpretation. When we attempt to 
trace the origins of a practice or idea, the absolute beginning may not be found 
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because we can trace no more than the interpretations of interpretations, all made 
within contexts that are socially entangled.64 Foucault thinks we can reconnect to the 
best parts of the Enlightenment, but what that will require is the avoidance of some 
negative residue of the Enlightenment and the adoption of a positive philosophical 
ethos.  
Now that we have a rough idea of what enlightenment is for Foucault, we 
should look at what enlightenment is not, and two clarifications must be made before 
further discussion can take place. These clarifications have to do with definitions of 
the Enlightenment and Modernity. First, Foucault usually leaves eras undefined by 
date. When he speaks of the Renaissance, the Classical era, the Enlightenment, or the 
Modern era, they are characterized primarily by their difference, whether in art, 
literature, medicine, or government from the preceding and following eras. There are, 
however, a number of places in Foucault’s work where he marks an era by date. But 
these dates are always couched in terms that are flexible and rely for their definition 
on the discourse constitutive of that age. In this spirit he marked the beginning of the 
Enlightenment era at around the end of the eighteenth century,65 the time Kant wrote 
Was ist Aufklärung?, a time when people began to ask questions and pose questions 
about their own era that differed from their predecessors; also the time of the French 
Revolution.  
In 1967 in an interview with Raymond Bellour titled ‘The Discourse of 
History’ in response to some questions about the structure of The Order of Things, 
Foucault  marks out roughly the late eighteenth century (from 1790) until 1950, as the 
modern period,66  that is, a period when people who were participants in the 
Enlightenment were asked what it was. But on Foucault’s account, this doesn’t 
answer the question about what the Enlightenment is, unless of course we look to a 
philosophical ethos emerging during this time. In addition, Foucault insists that late 
twentieth century philosophy has not fully grasped either the problem of the 
Enlightenment or answered the question of what it is. By calling enlightenment an 
ethos Foucault sidesteps the requirement of a specific definition with attendant 
critiques and places the onus of our inquiry on grounds that require us to specify the 
attitudes and events that mark it. 
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Second, attitudes of the modern period can be seen as modes  
of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; 
in the end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too of acting and behaving 
that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself 
as a task. A bit, no doubt, like what the Greeks called an ethos.67 
And as an attitude, an ethos does not need to be confined to a chronological era. Thus, 
one may find expressions of the modern ethos in other historical periods. With such a 
perspective, one may say that a person expresses a modern attitude. 
In order to analyse some modern attitudes, Foucault suggests that we look at 
Baudelaire, for whom ‘Modernity is not a phenomenon of sensitivity to the fleeting 
present; it is the will to “heroize” the present.’68 The man of Modernity  
“makes it his business to extract from fashion whatever element it may contain 
of poetry within history.” […] Baudelairean modernity is an exercise in which 
extreme attention to what is real is confronted with the practice of a liberty 
that simultaneously respects this reality and violates it.69 
 It is not only a relation to the present that interests Baudelaire, but also a concern for 
the process of what it means ‘to take oneself as object of a complex and difficult 
elaboration.’70 The Modern individual is the one ‘who tries to invent himself,’71 not 
the one who tries to discover himself as if there were an essential self. On this 
account, Kant’s encouragement to ‘have courage to use your own reason’ is perfectly 
germane. Kant did not require a particular outcome, except the expansion of freedom 
by taking responsibility for the self. Kant recognized well enough that humans as 
individuals have not perfected themselves, and the species as a whole has not 
perfected itself, and so required that ‘An age cannot bind itself and ordain to put the 
succeeding one to such a condition that it cannot extend its […] knowledge, purify 
itself of errors, and progress in general enlightenment.’72 
Baudelaire’s reaction to the Enlightenment is just one example that 
characterizes the complexity of attitudes found within modernity. Within the body of 
Foucault’s work many instances of the attitudes of modernity can be found. If one 
looks at the History of Madness it is not difficult to see the emerging respect for the 
rationality of persons, respect for the human ability to reason one’s way out of 
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madness found in the structures of both Tuke and Pinel’s asylums73 as a method of 
returning the mad, healed, back to society. If one looks at The Birth of the Clinic, one 
sees the skill gained through the observation of persons, the medical gaze, to turn 
persons into objects of scientific examination. This objectification of man, which 
marked positive science, is also one of the attitudes born out of the Enlightenment. 
The same attitude can be found in Discipline and Punish. Or one could observe the 
push and pull of political power and resistance found throughout Foucault’s work that 
resolves itself piecemeal in economic theory beginning with Adam Smith’s invisible 
hand as described in the lecture series in The Birth of Biopolitics with the recognition 
that human behaviour follows patterns of resistance.74 The dilemma for political 
power in the Biopower lectures is how to set up the circumstance where people do 
what the government wants them to because they themselves desire to do it. Or one 
could trace the projects in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries designed to 
formalize parts of our scientific enterprise, for instance mathematics and logic in 
Russell and Whitehead, and the language of observation in the Vienna Circle, with 
the resultant failures at the limits of their respective formalizations. Foucault is not 
giving some complete description of a single attitude of modernity by looking at 
Baudelaire but rather problematizes the complex relationship we have with the 
historical fact of the Enlightenment and all the projects that could claim to be 
following its dictums. 
2.2.2.2. Blackmail and Humanism 
Foucault, who took Kant’s Aufklärung as one starting point for the complex 
social phenomenon called the Enlightenment, warned against what he calls the 
‘blackmail of the enlightenment.’75 Foucault wished to 
stress that the thread that may connect us with the Enlightenment is not 
faithfulness to doctrinal elements, but rather the permanent reactivation of an 
attitude—that is, of a philosophical ethos that could be described as a 
permanent critique of our historical era.76  
So, it is not the theoretical or practical content of a philosophy, science, ethic, 
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or political system emerging from the Enlightenment, but critique itself that should be 
revived and retained. His sense is that critique was profligately productive of domains 
of knowledge characteristic of enlightenment, and the domains of knowledge 
themselves have critique to thank for it. Knowledge is the product of the critique 
found in enlightenment, not the cause. 
Hence, the blackmail he wants to avoid is that of choosing to either adopt or 
oppose the Enlightenment with its form of rationality, or to believe that we must 
embrace or escape the dogmas that supposedly arose from it. For example Foucault 
suggests in an interview: ‘Couldn’t it be concluded that the Enlightenment’s promise 
of attaining freedom through the exercise of reason has been turned upside down, 
resulting in a domination by reason itself, which increasingly usurps the place of 
freedom?’77 Reason has been raised, like a judgment, over those who do not abide by 
its rules, even when the ability of reason itself has been formed by the same culture it 
resides over. In addition, ‘One has often tried to blackmail all criticism of reason and 
every critical test of the history of rationality so that one either recognizes reason or 
casts it into irrationalism.’78 The ability to reason along prescribed lines within the 
form of the current rationality has forbidden critique. What a person learns to fear is 
not being unproductive, but being accused of irrationality, because it would result in 
their being set aside from the rest of society. Instead of being coerced by this 
blackmail we must see that we are in some form historically determined by the 
Enlightenment, and that a fruitful study of it will free us from those elements within it 
which are no longer necessary ‘for the constitution of ourselves as autonomous 
subjects.’79  
Rationality, for Foucault, emerges as a response to some problem in society. 
No rationality is either universal or complete. The answers that any one rationality 
offers are limited to the problem the rationality purports to solve, the domain it 
addresses. Reason and historical rationalities split, break, bifurcate in ‘an endless 
prolific division.’80  
In the mid-1980s, Joseph Margolis of Temple University said during a class 
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discussion, ‘he who controls the distinctions wins the argument.’81 The one who 
successfully defines what constitutes rationality, places their opponent in a position of 
defending his or her own rationality. It is this standoff between reason and its 
competitors—unreason and irrationality—that Foucault thinks of as blackmail. One 
co-opts the authority of reason and reasonableness, and of rationality, turning the 
authority of their opponent’s reasonableness against them. For instance, when 
Foucault defends Rousseau against the charge of madness, he is suggesting that a 
body of work is proof against madness, because madness precludes work.82 Though 
Rousseau steps outside the ordinary boundaries of the contemporary literature of his 
age in writing the Dialogues, that does not imply that Rousseau is somehow 
irrational, unreasonable, or mad. 
Some use the above strategy to delegitimize the coherence of Foucault’s 
morphing oeuvre, suggesting that, either the oeuvre is internally consistent, or it is 
inconsistent. If inconsistent, it cannot be defended as reasonable or rational. Therefore 
it appears as unreason. It is this same attitude that interprets some portion of 
Foucault’s work and labels it postmodern,83 structuralist,84 poststructuralist,85 and 
labels him a political philosopher, a historian, and ethicist, etc., without considering 
the various domains and qualifications of the variety of his work. 
It is also blackmail that requires a coherent transmission of Enlightenment 
dogma to the current age, by whoever is claiming to have resolved the questions Kant 
asks. Their form of critique, say, the neo-positivist critique of metaphysics within the 
Vienna Circle, delegitimizes any discipline that doesn’t take as a matter of fact the 
neo-positivist constitution of facts in protocol sentences as the groundwork of any 
universal, empirical science. Only when Thomas Kuhn writes The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions in the early 1960s does the project of the unity of science 
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envisioned by the founders of the Vienna Circle lose its footing. As soon as science 
itself is seen to be a social phenomenon—a transitory, non-cumulative project of 
knowledge that advances not by a slow, steady, systematic accretion of facts but by 
irruptions and discontinuities of theory, exemplars, and practices within science—the 
neo-positivist claim to being heirs of the Enlightenment is seen to be false. The neo-
positivist has fallen for the blackmail. It is almost as if in Kuhn’s Structure, the neo-
positivist community is faced with the problem that there has been no laying on of 
hands in some direct lineage of rationality from the Enlightenment to themselves.  
The curious effect of the sociology of science is that the very reasonableness 
of the neo-positivist project is called into question without challenging the rationale 
for the construction of the unity of science program about which it was engaged. 
Kuhn’s examination, rather, challenged the sustainability of the unity of science 
project in the face of a history that is critical of some of the founding premises of the 
project, such as the theme of progress. 
In addition to freeing ‘ourselves from the intellectual blackmail […] we must 
also escape from the historical and moral confusionism that mixes the theme of 
humanism with the question of Enlightenment.’86 Humanism, in its many varied and 
opposing forms, has been misused and misdiagnosed so frequently as to render it 
conceptually unreliable, shifting, and problematic.87 Enlightenment, on Foucault’s 
account, as a collection of ideas or an attitude does not require an ideological 
commitment to humanism. Foucault suggests in an interview with Rux Martin in 
1982, that  
Through these different practices—psychological, medical, penitential, 
educational—a certain idea or model of humanity was developed, and now 
this idea of man has become normative, self evident, and is supposed to be 
universal.88  
Foucault is noting a problem with a category of claims that distinguish themselves by 
reference to ideals that can be roughly categorized as humanist. There is a vast 
literature, both historical and contemporary in a humanist tradition; the persistent 
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contention between its adherents about who can, in fact, claim to be humanist is one 
of its most remarkable features.89 Even so, a serviceable definition of humanism turns 
out to be simple, that is, ‘any philosophy which recognizes the value or dignity of 
man and makes him the measure of all things or somehow takes human nature, its 
limits, or its interests as its theme.’90 This definition is satisfied by the systems that 
lay claim to it but are often at odds with each other. These systems are constructed on 
different underlying anthropologies which gives rise to differences in the forms of 
humanism they sustain. These various anthropologies, themselves, are a matter of 
contention, and the source of disputes. 
Humanism derived from human science, politics, and religion is based on a 
notion of anthropology. Foucault suggested that humanism must be mistaken first 
because it is based on human practices which are changeable, and second because it 
makes claims to being universal. Foucault worried that humanism ‘presents a certain 
form of our ethics as a universal model for any kind of freedom.’91 All of the varieties 
of humanism dogmatically limit the range of possible freedoms, and humans do not 
fit any of the anthropological models of humanity being offered as universal. The 
tendency to foster moral demands on the basis of what an essential humanity is or 
must become perpetuates the mistake Foucault wished to avoid. What enlightenment 
requires for Foucault, on the contrary, is an experimental movement toward freedom 
as found in a technology of the self that centres on self-care. This implies no 
particular anthropology, or essence of human being. 
The themes of humanism have always been ‘tied to value judgments,’ and 
have ‘served as a critical principle of differentiation.’92 Humanisms have variously 
served as a critique of Christianity, as Christian humanism opposed to a theocentric 
humanism, a humanism hostile to science, a Marxist humanism, a National Socialist 
humanism, and a Stalinist one.93 These thematics which depend on humanism for 
justification and support, ‘can be opposed by the principle of critique and a permanent 
creation of ourselves in our autonomy.’94 Foucault considered the character of the 
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Enlightenment to consist in this opposing principle and attitude.95 
The defence of some ideology on the basis of its ‘humanist’ temper or value is 
prone to inconsistency because it is used to defend widely divergent, even 
contradictory, claims.96 For example, one could note the differences between a 
Marxist and Christian anthropology that lead to contradictory moral forms, 
contradictory forms of life, while both claim that their position is humanist.  
The anthropology Marx constructs totalizes human character around an 
economic form.97 Marx claims that a change in economic conditions toward a 
communist state will repair the breach between classes caused by Capitalism, but this 
is too simple a solution to encompass the complexity of social history. The humanism 
he espoused is clearly contrary to dominant Western culture when he suggests in the 
Manifesto the abolition of morals and universal truths.98 Humanity in Marx is now 
narrowly defined as homo economicus, universalizing human character around the 
axis of economic life. Economic freedom becomes the sole model for human 
flourishing, and this is accomplished by wiping culture clean of any bourgeois 
remnants; it is in this sense that Marxism is a humanism. What Marx doesn’t realize is 
that he has created a new anthropology that crudely generalizes human persons, and 
limits freedom in a morality that is only free of bourgeois morals. 
Christian humanism has gone through numerous transformations through 
interactions with non-Christian philosophies and moral systems. However, while 
continuing to satisfy the definition mentioned above, it has retained throughout, an 
emphasis on the pre-eminence of the dignity of man over secular and religious 
government. Thinkers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries like Erasmus held to the 
Catholic tradition of human free will against some Protestant views of predestination. 
This Christian anthropology contends that man is made in the image of God and is 
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therefore worthy of bearing the rights of such an association; hence free will is one of 
the attributes of man. 
What is common to both forms of humanism mentioned above is that man is 
in a position to do something about his lost state. In Marxism, revolution provides the 
venue for social transformation, and in Christianity, appeal to the grace of God 
provides individual salvation. But the anthropologies of Marxism and Christianity are 
at polar extremes of those claiming to be humanist in the West. They exemplify the 
problem Foucault is concerned with. Both propose an anthropology or essential 
human character. Both limit human freedom in principled ways. So Foucault 
concludes that humanism cannot further our understanding of the Enlightenment 
because it doesn’t expand the possibility of freedom. The chiaroscuro humanism 
presents is deceptive in that it purports to solve the mystery of moral responsibility 
without having resolved the problem of anthropology. 
Foucault explained the justification given for punishment by the juridical 
reformers in Discipline and Punish:  
It is as if the eighteenth century had opened up the crisis of this economy and, 
in order to resolve it, proposed the fundamental law that punishment must 
have “humanity” as its “measure”, without any definitive meaning being given 
to this principle, which nevertheless is regarded as insuperable.99  
Two things happen here. First, humanity is raised to a universal principle and, second, 
humanity, as a principle is privileged without further justification. The appeal to 
humanism is made to be its own justification without puzzling out the tougher 
questions about human nature. However, Foucault’s view is that enlightenment not 
only does not require an anthropology in order to function as a critique, but principled 
humanisms are opposed to the attitude of enlightenment which permits the creation 
and exploration of our selves in freedom. Foucault offers, distinct from the 
requirements of a humanist anthropology, morality, and structure—technologies of 
the self as a way of exploring the possibilities of freedom. 
2.2.3. Enlightenment 
So, we can conclude from Foucault’s remarks that the Enlightenment cannot 
best be described as a set of ideologies or dogmas, and neither requires the rejection 
of humanism nor its adoption, nor the appeal to a rationality of any particular kind. 
By suggesting that what can be retrieved from the Enlightenment is an ethos or 
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attitude, Foucault has sidestepped some problems inherent in any project attempting 
to formalize a dogma, that is, the need to fragment and divide the work of diverse 
groups into opposing camps, each claiming the imprimatur of the Enlightenment. This 
ethos grants the possibility of freedom and the right to critique—the possibility of 
self-elaboration and moral development. These goals are perfectly compatible with 
Kant’s writing on the Enlightenment. It is Foucault’s contention that techniques of 
self-elaboration and moral development function within power structures, that power 
relations are ubiquitous, and that the ideal conditions for enlightenment Kant required 
have not been available in any age historically and so may not be available at all. 
The philosophical ethos in Foucault’s description of enlightenment is 
characterized by an experimental attitude,100 ‘We have to move beyond the outside-
inside alternative, we have to be at the frontiers.’101 Foucault wished to dispense with 
the negative aspects of our Enlightenment heritage and move toward the discovery of 
freedom.102 This implies both the critique of our limits and a rejection of any 
universalizing tendency while moving toward an ‘archaeological—and not 
transcendental’103 apparatus. The goal of Kant’s critiques was to provide a universal 
grasp of principles, and the foundation for those critiques was the discovery of 
transcendental grounds outside the limits for reason, practice, and perception. The 
goal of Foucault’s critique was the discovery of limits without a metaphysical or 
empirical foundation. Rather, Foucault wished to have a comprehensive archaeology, 
a rigorous catalogue of discourses on historical events within a genealogy that sets up 
the conditions of possibility for us to be, do, and think differently than we do now,104 
to set up the conditions for the exploration of our freedom. It is not, however, 
adherence to the catalogue that marks definitively the path of enlightenment, as if any 
particular catalogue contains within it a comprehensive diagnosis of its own time.105  
Unlike Kant, Foucault does ‘not know whether we will ever reach mature 
adulthood,’106 and he said that even after the Enlightenment, we have not attained it. 
But Foucault also suggests that Kant’s form of reflecting about the Enlightenment 
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‘has not been without its importance or effectiveness during the last two centuries.’107 
This reflection on the Enlightenment has one purpose in this paper, that is, to 
set up the conditions within which a discussion of the complex problem of power and 
resistance can take place. The relations of power and resistance from which Foucault 
constructs the archaeologies for a variety of his works suggest that there is, in the 
movement of historical events, a way of tracing the emergence of social systems 
arising from conflicts inherent in the exercise of power over resistant populations. 
From the emergence of social systems described by a complex set of practices, 
individuals who take these practices to their logical limits exercise themselves within 
their milieu using techniques that further extend, elaborate, and refine, within that 
milieu, what they take to be the intent of the original practices, while laying aside 
practices that are detrimental to that elaboration. I am looking for techniques to decide 
which practices to adopt and which ones to reject. And Foucault’s intent for a 
historical ontology of ourselves gives us a clue about how to discover these 
techniques that guide the adoption or rejection of practices. To this end I will first 
discuss Foucault’s view of relations of power and how resistance and power are two 
necessary poles of the same phenomena. 
2.3. Resistance and Counter-conduct 
The coexistence of resistance and its practical results in dissidence, refusal, 
desertion, counter-conduct, and even revolution are coextensive with the expressions 
of power used to control and suppress that resistance. For Foucault, resistance  
is coextensive with [power] and absolutely its contemporary. […] As soon as 
there is a power relation, there is the possibility of resistance. We are never 
trapped by power: we can always modify its grip in determinate conditions 
and according to a precise strategy.108 
Foucault rejected any notion of power described merely in terms of the law, 
institutions, interdictions, or the military.109 ‘I think that resistance is a part of this 
strategic relationship of which power consists. Resistance really always relies upon 
the situation against which it struggles.’110 When there is no resistance, when there is 
only obedience, power doesn’t exist. There is also no responsibility. If injustice is 
codified and established as a practice, resistance demonstrates that power is required 
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to keep the codification in place.  
For example—the slave/master relation is only the most explicit form of this 
relation—when a slave resists the demands of a master, the slave asserts the right to 
personhood, identity, self. The master who has codified the asymmetry under the 
consideration that the slave lacks these rights asserts a will to pressure the slave into 
submission. If the slave never resists, there is no need either for the codification of 
slaveholder privileges or the need to assert pressure to prevent the slave from 
exercising rights. If both parties take the relationship as a proper expression of social 
function, there will be no resistance on the part of the slave, nor any exercise of power 
by the slaveholder.  
Foucault’s most frequent specimens are far more subtle. He usually examines 
broad sweeps of culture and the institutions that structure it; it isn’t until the late 
1970s that he intensifies his focus on individuals when he starts thinking about 
technologies of the self. But the example of slavery is germane because resistance is 
individual and only becomes generalized socially after it expresses itself individually. 
For our concerns here, the level of the individual is important because it is at this 
level that Kant’s moral theory has bearing. 
It is at this juxtaposition between power and resistance where Kant’s view 
which promotes an ideal moral system becomes limiting. This is where Christine 
Korsgaard revisits Kant’s moral decision procedure and takes into account some 
differences between two versions of his Categorical Imperative. Korsgaard’s critique 
of Kant’s work effectively changes Kant’s procedure guiding his method of 
determining duty. This shows the advantages of a critique of the ideologically strict 
formalism to which Kant confined himself. Kant’s explicit but difficult method in the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals gets a new lease on life within Korsgaard’s 
critique because it reflects better the probable intentions of Kant’s overall thinking 
about duty than one finds in the Groundwork alone. In addition, Korsgaard’s revision 
better portrays Kant’s engagement with his milieu and his reflections on that milieu, 
themes which reflect Foucault’s engagement with Kant on enlightenment. 
As a result of Korsgaard’s revision of Kant’s procedure, I will elaborate a 
view of Kant’s work that leads to a dynamic view of rational persons in resistance to 
being governed in some particular fashion as a result of following Kant’s strategy for 
determining universal laws of morality. Resistance on this account becomes a natural 
characteristic of following Kant’s procedure.  
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Finally, I will trace the development of counter-conduct within the Quaker 
community of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Britain with the purpose of setting 
up a context for the development of a technology of the self guiding the decision 
procedures of the eighteenth-century Colonial-American Quaker, John Woolman. 
Woolman will serve as an example of how individual techniques are used to elaborate 
a consistent strategy for the development of the self as a moral agent. There are two 
interesting things in Woolman’s decision procedures that suggest his inclusion in this 
thesis. Woolman’s techniques anticipate a practice of the development of the moral 
self Korsgaard’s modifications of Kant’s Groundwork might have addressed. Two, 
Woolman is deeply conscious of the practical difficulties of change within his society 
that required resistance to both political and religious traditions, themes which 
Foucault aptly elaborates.  
2.3.1. Korsgaard on Kant 
Foucault’s description of state control of individuals as justified by reason of 
state within police science111 shows the weakness of Kant’s decision procedure as 
described in the Groundwork. That decision procedure requires first that people be 
free to use their reason to develop their moral selves, and second the state to lift its 
restrictions on freedom so that people will move toward enlightenment, a social 
condition that on Foucault’s view never has nor ever will be the case. Christine 
Korsgaard offers us in Creating the Kingdom of Ends a subtle reading of Kant that 
with the help of some modern ethicists, and a broader reading of Kant ameliorates the 
strictness of Kant’s Groundwork. For our purposes here, it also broadens the 
confluence of Foucault’s and Kant’s thinking around the problem of resistance, and 
the actions resulting from that resistance. 
Necessarily, my treatment of Korsgaard will be limited to some central themes 
in her reconstruction of Kant’s account. My argument will centre around the 
justifications she gives for permitting some behaviour on one account of Kant’s moral 
decision procedure and not permitting that same behaviour on Kant’s further 
refinement of that account. I discuss her analysis of the reasons for this conflict 
between those two accounts, and finally her justification for overriding Kant’s 
refinement in instances where its strictness implies intuitively incorrect procedures. 
Within the limited space of this inquiry I will not offer complete justifications for 
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Kant’s views in the Groundwork and Korsgaard’s account of Kant’s writing in the 
Groundwork. In the chapter ‘The right to lie: Kant on dealing with evil,’112 I will 
favour Korsgaard’s solution to a conflict between duties to ourselves and others, a 
conflict that Kant doesn’t admit. 
In this essay, Korsgaard uses the problem of lying for at least two reasons: 
first, Kant thought telling the truth to be one of the most obvious duties to 
ourselves.113 Second, it is Kant’s view on telling the truth that has driven some writers 
to discount his decision procedure as being too inflexible to deal with ordinary moral 
quandaries,114 and in so doing, attributing to Kant a form of moral absolutism. My 
strategy in reading Korsgaard will be first, to examine how in fact she characterizes 
the conflict of duties in Kant, second, to look at the puzzle this generates for Kant in 
the Groundwork, and third, to explain Korsgaard’s resolution of this conflict using the 
resources of the Kantian tradition by an appeal to Rawls’ proposal of a distinction in 
moral philosophy between ideal and non-ideal theory. This will demonstrate my 
suggestion that resistance to power is the mode by which one rejects heteronomy and 
embarks on the road to enlightenment. Resistance is the entry to enlightenment, not 
one’s choice made freely once power has been moved aside through just governance 
as Kant requires in the Aufklärung. 
Korsgaard first considers Kant’s statements about the duty not to lie and 
whether one should tell a lie when faced with a moral dilemma: 
Kant seems to endorse the following pair of claims about this duty: first, one 
must never under any circumstances or for any purpose tell a lie; second, if 
one does tell a lie one is responsible for all the consequences that ensue, even 
if they were completely unforeseeable.115 
Unsympathetic readers of Kant, like Sissela Bok, suggest that these claims 
lead to unacceptable consequences and that Kant’s ethics must be, on that account, 
poorly suited as a decision procedure for moral quandaries. Sympathetic readers of 
Kant like Korsgaard are of the opinion that Kant’s ethics can be redeemed from this 
conflict by appealing to the extended corpus of Kant’s own writings.116 Both sorts of 
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readers, says Korsgaard, ‘have focused their attention on the implications of the first 
formulation of the categorical imperative, the Formula of Universal Law.’117 
Korsgaard reminds us that there is more to the Groundwork than is contained in this 
formula. 
Korsgaard’s treatment of this issue revolves around an illustration Kant used. 
The exact scenario is unimportant, but it concerns the quandary of whether to lie 
about the whereabouts of a friend who has hidden in your house to escape a murderer 
who is pursuing him. You’ve been warned that a murderer will arrive later and wishes 
to kill your friend. The murderer comes to your door and asks where your friend is. 
You must choose between lying and telling the truth. 
Kant draws out the problem this way: If you lie by telling the murderer that 
your friend is not present, and the murderer goes away, it may be the case that your 
friend has left the house without your knowing it and your lie turns out to be the truth. 
If the murderer then finds your friend and kills him, Kant says that you, who have lied 
are culpable for that lie even though not for the murder. If you told the truth, that your 
friend was in the house and the murderer forced his way into the house and searched 
there for his prey, then your friend may have had time to get away. By telling the 
truth according to Kant, you have fulfilled your duty; you are blameless. But if your 
friend is still in the house, your truth-telling turns out to be a death warrant for your 
friend when the murderer kills him. But still on Kant’s account you are blameless for 
telling the truth. It is the murderer who killed your friend, not you. 
The two scenarios, one—where you lie and become culpable for that lie, and 
are implicated indirectly in your friend’s death, and two—where you tell the truth and 
are blameless for your friend’s death, are where our intuition rejects Kant’s solution. 
This is where Korsgaard steps in to suggest that it is possible to universalise a lie to 
the murderer on the grounds of Kant’s Formula of the Universal Law which states: 
‘Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should 
become a universal law.’118 A maxim is simply a proposed rule of action, and in this 
case Korsgaard defends lying to the murderer for two reasons: ‘First, we have a duty 
of mutual aid. This is an imperfect duty of virtue, […] This duty gives us a reason to 
                                                 
117 CKE, p. 134. The Formula of the Universal Law is: ‘Act only on that maxim through which you can 
at the same time will that it should become a universal law.’ GMM. p. 52. 
118 GMM. p. 52. 
Douglas F. Olena 102  
tell the lie.’119 Whether the lie is imperative or not depends on the circumstances, and 
‘If the lie is permissible, this duty will provide a reason, whether or not an imperative 
one, to tell the lie.’120 Second, Korsgaard reminds us that we have a duty of self-
respect. ‘The murderer wants to make you a tool of evil; he regards your integrity as a 
useful sort of predictability. […] You owe it to humanity in your own person not to 
allow your honesty to be used as a resource for evil.’121 Korsgaard considers this to be 
a perfect duty of virtue, and quotes Kant in the Metaphysical Principles of Virtue122 
saying, ‘Do not suffer your rights to be trampled underfoot by others with 
impunity.’123 To answer this threat of the loss of rights requires autonomy leading to  
resistance to avoid the misuse of our reason or the possibility of bodily harm. 
The lie to the murderer at the door, on this account, is permissible. The 
conflict as Korsgaard sees it, arises from considering Kant’s formula of Humanity 
which states: ‘Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own 
person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same 
time as an end.’124 Using anyone as a means is forbidden by the formula of Humanity. 
If you allow the murderer, who assumes that you don’t know his intentions, to use 
you as a means, you betray your own autonomy. While if you lie, you are using the 
murderer’s humanity as a means. The puzzle125 is caused by the apparent possibility 
of treating people as an end as required by the formula of Humanity. The conflict lies 
therefore between Kant’s formula of Universal Law which permits the justification of 
a lie to the murderer at the door and Kant’s formula of Humanity which gives rise to a 
conflict of duties with regard to the same lie. 
Korsgaard thinks this puzzle is a real one and suggests that it cannot be 
resolved within the Groundwork alone. She appeals to John Rawls’ ‘division of moral 
philosophy into ideal and non-ideal theory.’126 Ideal theory assumes ‘that everyone 
will act justly,’ and that ‘historical, economic, and natural conditions are such that 
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realization of the ideal is feasible.’127 There are other plausible conditions Rawls 
draws out for an ideal theory, but those stated should suffice to explain the notion of 
an ideal theory; Kant’s high expectations for compliance with his theory certainly fit 
the conditions for an ideal theory. Rawls’ non-ideal theory, as Korsgaard understands 
it, modifies the terms of justice to redress historical inequity by temporarily 
unbalancing equal distribution of goods and services. For example, the Civil Rights 
movement in the United States in the 1960s uncovered racial injustice. Rawls non-
ideal theory would justify temporary strategies to assist blacks in achieving social and 
economic parity, because of the historical maltreatment of blacks by whites. 
However, Korsgaard is not interested in replicating Rawls’ use of a non-ideal theory, 
but she recognizes it to modify Kant’s absolutism in the Groundwork. 
Korsgaard contrasts her proposed two-level theory with two single-level 
theories, utilitarianism and Kantian theory. Utilitarianism ‘does not distinguish 
between ideal and non-ideal conditions. […] but simply between better and worse 
states of affairs.’128 Utilitarianism, on this account, in the effort to provide the greatest 
good for the greatest number, ‘may lead to violations of what we would ordinarily 
think of as integrity’129 by forcing compliance to collective goals which are 
detrimental to an individual’s projects. On the contrary,  
A Kantian approach, by defining a determinate ideal of conduct to live up to 
rather than setting a goal of action to strive for, solves the problem about 
integrity, but with a high price. […] The trouble is that in cases such as that of 
the murderer at the door it seems grotesque simply to say that I have done my 
part by telling the truth and the bad results are not my responsibility.130 
A two-level theory, in contrast, gives us both guidance for ordinary behaviour 
under ideal circumstances, and a decision procedure for when an ideal answer will not 
suffice. This leaves us with some problems such as the difficulty about when a non-
ideal solution is called for, but it avoids a utilitarian slippery-slope and retains a 
model for best practices.  
At this point Korsgaard reminds us of the moral price one must pay for 
appealing to a non-ideal theory, that of regret for having to do something even though 
it was the right thing to do. 
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We will regret having to depart from the ideal standard of conduct, for we 
identify with this standard and think of our autonomy in terms of it. Regret for 
an action we would not do under ideal circumstances seems appropriate even 
if we have done what is clearly the right thing.131 
At this point Korsgaard engages her previous analysis of Kant’s formula of 
Universal Law as a method for deriving non-ideal solutions to moral dilemmas. ‘The 
Formula of Universal Law clearly allows for the category of the permissible.’132 It is 
within the bounds of the permissible for us to adopt the maxim that it is universally 
acceptable to lie to the murderer at the door to prevent ourselves from being used as a 
means to the murderer’s evil ends. So the formula of Universal Law provides room to 
perform acts that, though they are individually regrettable, nevertheless address the 
requirements of a non-ideal theory. The formula of Humanity on the other hand 
strictly forbids those actions ‘and gives implausible answers when we are dealing 
with the misconduct of others and the recalcitrance of nature.’133 It is nonetheless 
applicable as an ideal theory that can serve to ‘define a goal toward which we are 
working.’134  
So Korsgaard concludes that though the formula of Universal Law gives 
permission to perform acts that would not pass the formula of Humanity, it does not 
also allow the adoption of maxims that are self-contradictory such as making a false 
promise to obtain a loan, or self-serving maxims, such as a justification for the 
promotion of our self-interest under conditions where there is no threat.135 Lying to a 
liar cannot be justified, even though lying can be justified universally in the case of 
lying to prevent the murderer from using you as a means. 
Korsgaard also suggests an analogy between Kant’s own view on the morality 
of the conduct of nations and about individual conduct. A nation that wishes to be at 
peace with an aggressive neighbour does not unilaterally disarm thereby setting itself 
up for conquest.  
Peace functions not as an uncompromising ideal to be lived up to in the 
present, but as a long-range goal which guides our conduct even when war is 
necessary. […] If this is right, the task of Kantian moral philosophy is to draw 
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up for individuals something analogous to Kant’s laws of war: special 
principles to use when dealing with evil.136 
Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kant’s laws of war clearly define a non-ideal 
space of national resistance to the possible hegemony of belligerent neighbours. 
Analogously, Korsgaard defines the use of Kant’s Groundwork as the space of a 
double-level theory where the formula of Universal Law serves as the arbiter of non-
ideal solutions to moral quandaries where one must resist the hegemony of those who 
would use our autonomy as a means to their ends, while the formula of Humanity 
serves as a goal to strive for when ideal conditions for its practice are unavailable.  
What Korsgaard’s analysis makes available to us is a means of understanding 
resistance to power that guards the autonomy of individuals who must transgress the 
autonomy of others by means of a maxim of action justified by the formula of 
Universal Law. This provides for us an egress from the strictures of an unsympathetic 
reading of Kant’s Groundwork that is modelled within his Aufklärung. When Kant 
suggests in the Aufklärung that the ‘only’ thing required for self determination is that 
‘intentional artifices’137 are removed and that people will subsequently work toward 
enlightenment, he places a burden on the essential rationality of mankind, precisely 
the prerequisite for deliberating our duty through the instrument of the Categorical 
Imperative. Not only is Kant suggesting that the Categorical Imperative will give us 
consistent answers, but that once the test of our maxims has been carried out 
correctly, there will be no conflict of duties.138 But Kant requires freedom within the 
state as the prerequisite of rational decision-making, precisely what Foucault thinks is 
unavailable. For Foucault, freedom is found in resistance against those strategies used 
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to dominate, in the movement against assumed asymmetries within power relations. 
We can now see Foucault’s reading of enlightenment as the formation of 
ourselves as moral agents as crossing over toward freedom within the context of 
ubiquitous power relations. Because Foucault denied that reason can be exercised 
only where power is absent and that a rationality can be formed only outside the 
structures of power relations, in his view it is possible to justify four things: first, 
resistance to power, second, the practice of stepping past boundaries to freedom 
within the bounds of the enclosing social structure, third, the movement toward a 
rational commonwealth (even in Kant’s sense) whose practices may transgress against 
the inequities of socially persistent power relations, and fourth, justify individual 
moral improvement even within the enclosing social structure. 
2.3.2. Foucault and Power 
Though Foucault devoted much of his research to deciphering historical 
movements of the relations of power, he did it in an effort to understand the present 
condition of the Western world.139 In Discipline and Punish, and the lectures of the 
early 1970s, the individual is characterized as passive under examination, subject to 
societal forces which mould and shape the self. Though in the late 1970s Foucault had 
been accused of abandoning the genealogical project because of its totalizing focus on 
heteronomous power; this is a mistake. His own later comments reflected in Chapter 1 
of this dissertation tell us that he did not abandon genealogy but rather conceived it to 
be the overarching project on the axes of truth, power, and ethics. In much of his 
work he describes the exertion of power over individuals as a reaction by authority to 
resistance against that authority in many forms. The increasing move toward secrecy 
of punishment140 described in Discipline and Punish is a response to the increasing 
resistance and revolt by the people toward the injustices fomented by the ‘spectacle of 
the scaffold.’141 During public executions the crowd was permitted to voice its 
displeasure with the prince’s judgment, but this created problems from time to time.  
Resistance to power is a common theme in Foucault’s writing. Power is not 
monolithic. In fact, power is not even necessary and doesn’t show itself when there is 
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no resistance. It can be said that power is dependent on resistance, and does not exist 
without it. 
Following the writing of the first volume of The History of Sexuality, 
Foucault’s concerns begin to shift toward the responsibility of the individual not only 
to react against societal forces, but in his writings and lectures of the 1980s, to 
become responsible for ‘the care of the self,’ to take on the project of the development 
of the self. But arriving at this project of self-development required new historical 
studies and a plausible explanation of the political and social being of the state—and 
individuals and populations within the state as it evolved. 
In Security, Territory, Population, Foucault discusses a project that brings into 
focus themes surrounding the development of power around populations. Instead of 
describing a worldview of the disciplinary society around the objects of the prison 
and related architectures as he did in Discipline and Punish, Foucault draws out the 
movement of raison d’État, or reason of state, as the attempt to govern populations. 
And the implementation and elaboration of a political economy by means of a science 
of policing within the state, shows how populations become the stabilized 
functionally productive resource by which the strength of a state was measured. No 
longer is the state measured by its ability to control territory, but by its ability to 
control populations and individuals. Foucault was looking for a mechanism, a strategy 
that non-reductively explained the attitudes present from the seventeenth to the 
nineteenth century in the societies under examination. 
Looking for a plausible link with historical structures of governance, Foucault 
advanced a theory of pastoral power in his Collège de France lectures of 1977-1978, 
Security, Territory, Population and the Tanner Lectures of 1979 at Stanford, 
published as ‘Omnes et Singulatim.’142 The intention of his Tanner lectures was to 
trace a form of power defined as pastoral which addressed the problem of government 
over a population as well as the individual. He traced the transition of pastoral care of 
the flock from the Middle Eastern concept of the king as shepherd to the 
governmentality of populations emerging in the West in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. The multiplicity of strategies for managing populations in the West 
included the forms and structures of policing, organized and driven by a rationality 
defined as raison d’État. In, Security, Territory, Population he described government 
                                                 
142 Power, ‘Omnes et Singulatim,’ pp. 298-325. 
Douglas F. Olena 108  
within the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as moving from the rule of territories 
within a monarchy to the management of labour forces, necessitated by the need to 
address the constantly expanding requirements of manufacturing and distribution of 
goods. These movements drove the increasing attention to the care and distribution of 
the population, maintaining peace and morale toward the assurance of a productive 
economy. This care of the population becomes the responsibility of the police. N. De 
Lamare in Treaty on the Police written at the beginning of the eighteenth century says 
that 
the police must see to eleven things within the state: (1) religion; (2) morals; 
(3) health; (4) supplies; (5) roads, highways, town buildings; (6) public safety; 
(7) the liberal arts (roughly speaking, arts and science); (8) trade; (9) factories; 
(10) manservants and laborers; (11) the poor.143 
This signals a concentration of power within the state apparatus, a transition of 
responsibility from diverse structures charged with managing these various aspects of 
life, to a singular structure justified by raison d’État in an overarching strategy meant 
to secure the stability and productivity of the state. This does not mean, at least 
immediately, that the Church no longer functions in the position of moral authority, 
but rather, that the Church’s authority over the citizen stands in a complementary 
relation of authority over individuals with the state, and that the State uses the Church 
as an instrument of control. 
It will be helpful here to describe what Foucault intended by the phrase 
pastoral power and to trace its emergence within the Christian Church as a form of 
power aimed at guaranteeing the salvation of the whole flock as well as that of 
individuals. My line of reasoning may provide sufficient justification to see some 
aspects of Western forms of government as derived from pastoral power. As well, 
Western forms of government will be the context in which I will draw the form of 
resistance productive of such events as the Protestant Reformation and of groups like 
the Society of Friends, the Quakers in seventeenth-century England. 
My reflections on Foucault will be limited to some central themes. First, that 
the institution of forces over both populations and individuals constitutes a pastoral 
form of power. Second, that resistance to being governed by working through revolts 
of conduct, insubordination, dissidence, and finally five modes of escape through 
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what Foucault named ‘counter-conduct.’144 These five modes of escape in counter-
conduct are described as movements of resistance in which a form of authority other 
than the state—or the Church as an apparatus of the state—defines the group. 
First, what is the character of pastoral power? To answer this I will look at 
Foucault’s description of pastoral power as found in Security, Territory, Population145 
and show how some aspects of pastoral power are instantiated within the structure of 
the science of policing as described in Omnes et Singulatim.  
Within the early Christian pastorate, there are three points of contact between 
the leader, in this case pastor, and the people: through salvation, the law, and truth. 
Foucault wants us to see first that these relations suggest not a disconnection of leader 
and congregant, or leader and flock, but a chain of authority extending outside and 
above the immediate relation of power, both to the larger Church and to God. With 
respect to salvation this relation implied a common destiny of shepherd and flock, 
reciprocal responsibility between the community and the responsible person. The 
shepherd was responsible for the salvation of the whole flock and each of the 
individuals in it, yet he was accountable to the flock since he had to pay the price for 
the loss of one, even if that one was the shepherd himself. Although the shepherd 
must be prepared to give his or her life for the sheep, a pastor’s failure is not 
necessarily grounds for condemnation, but means for edification of the flock. This 
implies 
a subtle economy of merit and fault, an economy that presupposes an analysis 
into precise elements, mechanisms of transfer, procedures of reversal, and of 
the interplay of support between conflicting elements; in short, a whole 
detailed economy of merits and faults between which, in the end, God 
decides.146 
We see in this description of salvation in pastoral power, procedures for how 
government in the disciplinary society extended its reach and influence in the form of 
surveillance and the examination. 
With respect to the law, the shepherd transmits the rule of absolute obedience 
to God’s will. In this the shepherd requires absolute obedience from members of the 
flock, but is also responsible to be obedient to someone else above in the hierarchy. 
We see in this a law of the hierarchical structure of obedience as found in the 
disciplinary society of the West. Foucault illustrates the form of this obedience in the 
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life of the monastery.147 The aim of obedience is the renunciation and mortification of 
one’s will. The law is a form of absolute servitude that implies the destruction of the 
individual will and the self. 
With respect to truth, the shepherd is responsible for the daily conduct of the 
sheep, and must direct the conscience. This form of spiritual direction is mandatory, 
unlike that found in its Greek predecessors, the Stoics and Epicureans. Unlike the 
voluntary direction of the therapeutic Greek philosophers, the externalized, forced 
examination of conscience under the direction of the shepherd is meant to be a 
method of ensuring subservience of the follower. We see in this construction of 
relations of truth within a forced examination of the conscience how power invested 
in the shepherd through the foregoing definition of salvation and law creates 
knowledge within the confines of the disciplinary matrix of pastoral power. But this 
knowledge is suspect. And without defining any universal form of anthropology, this 
confinement of the self within the structure of pastoral power historically produced 
mystification148 that resulted eventually in resistance. And the attempt at clarification 
eventually leads to the production of counter-conduct. 
Looking at N. De Lamare’s list149 found in Treaty on the Police, it is easy to 
see where some aspects of the domain of pastoral power are quickly transferred to the 
state; certainly religion, morals, the guidance of manservants, labourers, and the poor 
were the domain of Church polity. Simple illustrations can be made for health, public 
safety, and schooling in the liberal arts also being within the domain of Church polity. 
Due to the increasing complexity of society, because of the rise of capitalism, 
urbanization, and the failure of pastoral power to scale to large political structures,150 
                                                 
147 Michel Foucault, ‘The Battle for Chastity,’ in Religion and Culture, ed. by Jeremy R. Carrette (New 
York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 188-197. 
148 Os Guinness, The Dust of Death: The Sixties Counterculture and How It Changed America Forever 
(Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 1994). I am defining mystification as the result of being told that 
something is true, and being made to adopt that position for whatever social reason or necessity, when, 
in fact something else is true. The simplest example at this moment is the scandal of young-earth 
creationism in the United States in the twenty-first century. Conservative Christian families are 
choosing to home school their children because of the dangers of secular indoctrination. While, 
arguably, there may be some justification for this move with respect to public morality, one of the 
results is the perpetuation of an eighteenth-century cosmology, fairly common within conservative 
families in the United States. When the student is later introduced to elementary astronomy or geology 
in a college curriculum, the discovery of widely held, plausible, well documented, scientific proof of 
the deep age of the earth results in the student doubting other truths discovered in the same home-
school forum, the very truths the parents wished to preserve by home schooling. 
149 Power, p. 320. ‘(1) religion; (2) morals; (3) health; (4) supplies; (5) roads, highways, town 
buildings; (6) public safety; (7) the liberal arts (roughly speaking, arts and science); (8) trade; (9) 
factories; (10) manservants and laborers; (11) the poor.’  
150 Power, ‘Omnes et Singulatim,’ p. 312. Throughout these lectures Foucault points to police science 
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police responsibility for supplies, physical infrastructure, trade, and factories can be 
derived from pastoral power only by describing in detail the transition from an 
agrarian culture to a capitalist one, a description that Foucault offers in Security, 
Territory, Population.  
Yet there is still a way to relate the assumption of police power given the 
previous description of the law and truth within pastoral power, that there is a relation 
of hierarchy between the reason of state through the police to the control of every 
aspect of the life of the population, and individuals that comprise it. We see also how 
the rights of the state to assume detailed control of every aspect of the life of the 
citizenry is assumed by the structure of police enforcement. 
2.3.3. Foucault on Counter-conduct 
In ‘Sex, Power, and the Politics of Identity’151 Foucault makes explicit the 
connection between power and resistance. There is no power without resistance. 
Otherwise, obedience to authority would not require an expression of power. Without 
resistance, power relations don’t make sense.  
So resistance comes first, and resistance remains superior to the forces of the 
process; power relations are obliged to change with the resistance. […] 
Resistance is a part of this strategic relationship of which power consists. 
Resistance really always relies upon the situation against which it struggles.152  
This struggle emerges from the sentiment that I do not wish to be governed that way, 
and is elaborated in methods ‘how not to be governed like that, by that, in the name of 
those principles, with such and such an objective in mind and by means of such 
procedures, not like that, not for that, not by them.’153 By stating how not to be 
governed like that ‘he is not posing the possibility of radical anarchy, and that the 
question is not how to become radically ungovernable.’154 Rather, Foucault’s intent is 
to discuss how resistance moderates the inevitable movements of government toward 
the intensification of control. This is the virtue of his critical attitude.155 
Foucault traces this sentiment in a discussion of resistance in the analysis of 
pastoral power in Security, Territory, and Population with respect to the nascent 
                                                 
as the domain of pastoral power within the state. 
151 EST, pp. 163-75. 
152 EST, pp. 167-68. 
153 POT, ‘What is Critique?,’ p. 44. and, FAE, p. 158, ‘And it is this task – the minimization of 
domination – which connects the fields of ethics and politics; it is their “point of articulation.”’ 
154 JBR, p. 311. 
155 JBR, p. 312. 
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modern state156 and then reframes the problem of resistance first as a revolt of 
conduct, then insubordination, dissidence, and finally counter-conduct, each level of 
resistance better developed and protected from reasons of state, and from 
manipulation by the state. Schematically, counter-conduct, the best developed of the 
four modes of resistance, shows itself in five forms: asceticism,157 communities,158 
mysticism,159 a return to the biblical text,160 and finally, eschatological beliefs.161 On 
Foucault’s account these are methods of reformulating self government on grounds 
other than pastoral power. They are well reasoned responses to the weaknesses of 
reasons of state. As such, the strategies individuals and groups use sequester them 
from both the influences of heteronomous control as well as volatile strategies like 
revolt, insubordination, and dissidence. Foucault suggests that their autonomous 
choices have the advantage of some form of internal coherence. As I mentioned above 
in section 2.3.2 on Foucault and power, the state had taken on the functions of the 
pastorate, with police taking on the task of shepherding the population. Police 
intervention of ‘men’s activities could well be qualified as totalitarian.’162 The sense 
that the state had justified an overweening authority and misused that same authority 
drove people to respond by looking for forms that more closely reflected their own 
sensibilities about what governing should consist of. Their revolt was not against 
government, but against the abuses of authority. There was a recognition that 
government was necessary, but what that consisted of was a matter of contention.  
Those engaged in the five different forms of counter-conduct mentioned 
above, must not be seen as expressing singular behaviours but rather mixing and 
matching strategies with the intent of securing alternative ways of living, rationales 
separated from the state for the production of an autonomously moral context for life. 
Instead of just rebelling, or reacting, or struggling against authority, those engaged in 
a counter-conduct have reasons against the state, and the ability to tolerate abuse, 
even persecution from the authorities because on their account their reasons are 
superior to the reasons of state. 
Ascetics, by means of self disciplines and self-incurred privations, bypass the 
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need for a pastor to control behaviour. This is not the ascesis Foucault describes in 
The Hermeneutics of the Subject.163 Communities in the sense Foucault discusses are 
egalitarian in structure, each individual holding the same authority as any other. 
Mysticism, where one receives guidance directly from God, bypasses the need for a 
human guide, a pastor. When one returns to the biblical text to avoid being governed 
pastorally, one has said that the pastoral form of government does not fulfil the 
requisites of a biblical model. An eschatological focus is unconcerned with day to day 
life, but is governed by the necessity of fulfilling one’s role in the overall scheme of 
things, bringing in the final apocalypse. Each of these forms of counter-conduct avoid 
the necessity of falling under the influence of pastoral power, whether in the Church 
or the state, and as such can be counted as mature forms of resistance to it. Combined, 
they form an alternative worldview with strategies and techniques of guidance in 
cases of moral conflict. They supply a polity in contraposition to the surrounding 
culture with a rationale for promoting its differences from this culture, and the 
superiority of its counter-conduct over the reasons of state administered by police. 
I will now demonstrate how this theoretical structure of counter-conduct is 
exemplified by the Society of Friends, the Quakers, a Christian group having 
foundations in seventeenth-century England as an offshoot of the Puritan expression 
of resistance to the Anglican Church.  
2.4. Quaker Counter-conduct 
The emergence of the Quakers in England of the 1650s follows the pattern of 
revolts of conduct Foucault describes in Security, Territory, Population. The Quaker 
revolt of conduct does not take place in isolation, nor is Foucault’s explanation of 
resistance to the state sufficient to explain the complex origins of Quaker society. The 
Quaker Society of Friends emerged as only one of a number of revolts of conduct 
within a politically unsettled and morally transitional age, a period of expanding 
frontiers and changing English polity. Within the Quaker community of counter-
conduct, ruling principles are formalized only in the period following the first and 
second generation Quakers around the turn of the seventeenth century.164 From that 
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time, the development of American Quakerism becomes the predominant expression 
of this group. It is within this expression that John Woolman emerges as a minister 
and weighty member of the Quakers in the American Colonies.  
The principles of Quaker character are consolidated shortly after the early 
formation of their sect. The following four general principles were consolidated, the 
first three of which were developed within the early decades of Quaker behaviour, 
and constitute the context for church life until the nineteenth century when numerous 
disputes arose about church polity and practice.165 The interpretation of these first 
three rules differ in the modern world, though they are still part of what it means to be 
Quaker. The last rule is a development of the first generation of adherents, that 
became a permanent fixture persisting until today.  
1) the centrality of direct inward encounter with God and revelation, and thus 
forms of worship which allow this to be experienced…; 
2) a vote-less way of doing church business based on the idea of corporate 
direct guidance; 
3) the spiritual equality of everyone and the idea of ‘the priesthood of all 
believers’; 
4) based in part on the latter, the preference for peace and pacifism rather than 
war, and a commitment to other forms of social witness.166 
These rules are of interest because they suggest reasons why Foucault was interested 
in them. The counter-conduct of the Quakers implied in the first rule is that there is no 
external authority, either human or textual, that is as important as the intimate 
connection to God implied by the direct inward encounter with God. Pastoral power is 
of no consequence in this context. The second rule denies any oligarchy. Though 
there are members who carry more weight than others, the final recorded consensus is 
left to the Clerk, the one who is responsible to the whole Quaker meeting for 
perceiving the consensus correctly. This final voice is not meant to quell opposing 
voices but rather to consolidate the individual leadings of the members. The third rule 
opposes hierarchy. The Quakers were birthed in a time when the overweening power 
both of the state and the Anglican Church had made inroads, through pastoral power 
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165 Hugh Barbour and J. William Frost, The Quakers (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988) p. 169. 
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as Foucault describes it, into many aspects of life. The Quaker dissent takes the form 
of levelling all people by considering them as being equally able to get individual 
guidance from God. No priest or magistrate has any more intrinsic authority than the 
common person. This third rule marks Quaker dissent from the Puritans as well, who 
believed with the Catholics and Anglicans that all English people should be under one 
church authority.167 The fourth rule, developed in the first five decades of Quakerism, 
allowed them to take a moral stand against the futility of promoting the kingdom of 
God through violence. They took seriously the pragmatic effects of non-violence, 
seeing the force with which they themselves and contemporary separatist groups such 
as the Ranters and Diggers were treated. The Quakers learned their lesson about 
public demonstrations and found non-violent protest to be more lastingly effective. 
These four rules distinguish the Quakers against the power of both Church and State. 
2.4.1. English Context of Quaker Origins 
Following the Protestant Reformation in Europe and the birth of the Anglican 
Church in England in the sixteenth century, a variety of Protestant expressions 
emerge that can be traced back either to the arrival of individuals like Martin Luther, 
John Calvin, or in the eighteenth century John and Charles Wesley. Other movements 
like the Quakers, Baptists, Anabaptists, and Moravians can be understood as 
principled protests with varieties of leaders, none of whom entirely characterize the 
movements of which they are part. This second group best fits the structure Foucault 
suggests as the route of protest against the abuse of power found in the form of 
pastoral power within the Roman Catholic Church. This is not to say that Luther and 
Calvin did what they did alone. The movements they led were already in motion by 
the time they emerged as leaders. The history of strife over the Roman pastorate since 
the Great Schism of Christianity in the fourteenth century is well documented. 
What is of interest in this context about the Quakers is the historic route of 
their protest. Foucault does not elaborate, but says that both the Quakers and 
Methodists emerge out of the Anglican Church.168 The beginning of the Quaker 
community, though, is less directly associated with the Anglicans than it is with the 
separatists and Puritans. The Quakers, a working-class group,169 and separatists (as 
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were the Baptists) whose origin can be traced roughly from Puritan roots,170 placed 
little faith in central leadership. They were convinced ‘that being bred at Oxford or 
Cambridge was not enough to fit and qualify men to be ministers of Christ.’171 
Foucault wants to attribute to the Quakers the establishment of a form of internal 
policing like that of the Methodist ‘John Wesley, for example, [who] visited the 
Methodist communities on inspection trips, a bit like the bishops of the early Middle 
Ages.’172 But the establishment of an informal ‘inspection tour’ among travelling 
Quaker ministers enforcing their rule is something that would not be found until the 
eighteenth century in both America and England—long after the early struggles with 
the English government and Anglican Church during the seventeenth century. In fact, 
‘since the Spirit was the Friends’ only authority, they rarely quoted each other, but no 
Quaker could easily admit another Friend had erred. Thus their tracts defended each 
others’ doctrines, however casually some had been first thought through.’173 Though 
the writing of defences of doctrine could be part of theological discourse, defence of 
Quaker practice carried over to the behaviours purportedly driven by the spirit as 
well. The development of the eighteenth-century self-examination of the Quaker 
society happens after the establishment of the community as both a political force in 
colonial Pennsylvania and the establishment of English rules of toleration that 
permitted peculiarities of the Quaker testimony. Self-examination and internal 
policing is subsequent to toleration, not, as Foucault implies, coextensive with, and an 
escape from, external policing. 
Foucault admits in ‘Truth and Juridical Forms’174 that he would not be dealing 
with American examples of state control of individuals, and so his omission of the 
political circumstances of the colonial Quaker state, Pennsylvania, could be seen as an 
oversight with respect to the development of Quaker society in England and its 
intimate ties to Quaker society in America. This tie between English and American 
Quakers is essential to understanding the resistance that Quakers maintained 
politically to English law, especially as it applies to the Quaker William Penn who, as 
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governor of Pennsylvania and political figure in England, tied the two continents 
together. 
Penn, a second generation Quaker, set up the Charter of Pennsylvania granted 
by Charles II in 1681 and reduced the death penalty for crimes from over 200 to just 
two: murder, and treason.175 Clearly, Penn recognized that in order for the religious 
experiment of Pennsylvania to succeed, there must be a break from the traditional 
practices of an English penal code. It is here that one can see how Quaker resistance 
takes a political form. In addition, with the persuasion of William Penn, under King 
James II, Parliament passed the Toleration Act of 1689, and, while not granting to 
Quakers the rights of full citizenship, or releasing them from paying mandatory Tithes 
to the Anglican Church, acknowledged their importance as a social force.176 The 
Quakers and Puritans, ‘had earned the trust and respect of all English people’ because 
of ‘their morality and nonviolence under persecution.’177 
Though Foucault is correct about some aspects of Quaker society in the 
eighteenth century, the resistance of early Quakers of the 1650s was marked by an 
egalitarian refusal of special respect for magistrates and royalty, a refusal to take 
oaths,178 and as a precursor to feminism, the free participation of women in 
leadership.179 This set them apart from both their Puritan forbears and English polity. 
In addition, ‘Puritans, Anglicans, and Catholics had all assumed that all Englishmen 
should belong to one national Church.’180 The Puritans, unable to see their vision of 
the Church fulfilled in England, founded a colony in New England where the disputes 
between the Quakers and Puritans could be seen more starkly. It was because of 
disputes over models of governing that the Puritans believed that Quakers should be 
removed from New England. Before the English enforcement of the Toleration Act of 
1689, Puritan New England hanged four Quakers. ‘The ostensible grounds for these 
penalties were not the Quakers’ religious dissent per se but their seditious qualities: 
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failure to take oaths, to obey laws, to doff their hats to magistrates, and to serve in the 
militia. Clearly, reasoned the Puritans, Quaker beliefs would undermine all 
government.’181 Quaker reaction to this persecution was a sense of confirmation that 
their beliefs were correct. 
Foucault is not incorrect to point to dissent as having political consequences, 
but he is mistaken to think that the dissent was altogether politically motivated. 
Attempting to trace the genealogy of pastoral power through the Church to ostensibly 
governmental authorities, Foucault misses a key to the emergence of Quaker society. 
Puritan and Quaker dissent, though it was characterized by a mistrust of Roman 
Catholic authority and found expression in political institutions, nevertheless was 
motivated by the desire to become more essentially Christian than the highly 
politicized Catholic or Anglican rule they dissented from. Though some streams of 
the Puritan expression of this dissent still retained formal ruling structures, the Quaker 
innovation centred around a more distinctively egalitarian polity. Foucault is correct 
that the dispute centred around the Roman Catholic pastorate, but didn’t account 
correctly for the motivations of the development of some of those groups of counter-
conduct under examination.  
I contend that though Foucault correctly describes some central features of 
counter-conduct with respect to power relations, he doesn’t account for the reasons 
those features were adopted instead of others. It is with respect to these motivations 
that The Journal of John Woolman becomes important. Foucault is correct to recover 
a description of the modes of escape from pastoral power, but misses the positive 
motives for adopting those modes. In Woolman’s Journal we find positive rationales. 
These rationales are best explained in Foucault by looking at the problem of freedom 
and discourses about techniques of the self found in his ethical work. Woolman 
adopts rules for his own behaviour that promote both freedom and social 
responsibility; they promote a way of living that fully engages the self and society. 
2.4.2. John Woolman 
Absent from Woolman’s Journal are any references either to the overweening 
power of the Catholic Church, the Anglican Church, or to the Puritans, though 
certainly those religious contexts are part of the background of Quaker dissent.182 The 
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connective tissue of Quaker origins in dissent also does not appear in Woolman’s 
Journal. As an individual, Woolman—in the process of conducting a relentless 
internal accounting of his own motivations and behaviours—arrives dynamically at a 
form of life that satisfies his sense of appropriate ethical conduct. It is here that 
Foucault’s analysis of the genealogy of power, a description of the driving forces 
behind the emergence of the Quaker ethic, must become part of the analysis of the 
project of a historical ontology of the self. John Woolman provides an example of the 
confluence of Foucault’s analysis of power relations with the analysis of freedom and 
enlightenment. 
One of the innovations in the Pennsylvania charter, in addition to the 
reduction of crimes leading to capital punishment, specified that people would be 
given the freedom of religious conviction. The attitude embodied in this charter 
contrasts with the treatment of Friends before the establishment of Pennsylvania who 
‘met bitter persecution at the hands of sects already settled in the Colonies.’183 One 
must observe here the forces at work in Colonial America in order to see how the 
resistance of the Quakers to both religious and political force was elaborated. A mode 
of resistance in the Quakers develops into personal techniques of the self as a form of 
resistance to patterns of life that are antithetical to Quaker egalitarian foundations. 
Woolman and his compatriots are conscious of the equality of American Indians and 
Negros with people of European descent. The Journal recounts numerous times when 
the mistreatment of Woolman’s fellow human beings distressed him. The 
development of techniques of truth-telling within Quaker polity to respond to 
mistreatment of the American Indian and Negro—and to move anti-slavery 
propositions into the political sphere—mark the last part of Woolman’s 
development.184 
                                                 
dissent in the 1650s and results in a mature form of Quaker counter-conduct present in eighteenth-
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183 Faith and Practice of the Religious Society of Friends of Philadelphia and Vicinity (Philadelphia: 
Friends’ Book Store, 1926), p. ix. 
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Douglas F. Olena 120  
The first part of Woolman’s life in New Jersey, and subsequent young adult 
development as a member of colonial Quaker society, though not well documented 
outside of Woolman’s journal, is known in its broad outlines. From the age of sixteen 
to the age of nineteen, ‘he vacillated between experiencing God’s judgment and 
mercy and “giving way to youthful vanities.”’185 After that he became convinced that 
he must commit himself to obeying God. At the age of thirty-six he began to write his 
journal, which retrospectively recounts some of his earlier activities. In what follows I 
describe two examples of how Woolman’s spiritual ‘exercises’ helped him make 
practical decisions and two examples of his social and political activity. The goal of 
Woolman’s spiritual exercises is freedom, and the tools he uses to decide how best to 
obtain it are compatible both with sound reasoning and traditional Quaker principles. 
This is a model of an enlightened decision procedure, which for Kant186 results in the 
discovery of one’s duty, and which for Foucault requires the elaboration of an 
historical ontology leading to the development of one’s self as a moral agent.  
The first of these events, which could be understood as conduct determined by 
a spiritual exercise, concerned Woolman’s decision to reduce the amount of time he 
spent on work so that he may be free to minister. The second is the decision to travel 
to England in steerage187 both to save money and to avoid the ‘superfluity’ of passage 
in a cabin. These two incidents took place twenty-four years apart yet in them I find a 
steady purpose and technique of the self which educated Woolman and motivated his 
entrance into public life. These two examples are by no means unique. His Journal 
tells of many such incidents. But these will serve as representatives of a life lived out 
in freedom and aimed toward the discovery of duty that required resistance to 
contemporaneous power relations.  
The decision to reduce his workload was motivated by the felt requirements of 
his Quaker worldview which interfered with the ordinary course of business growth. 
What, in fact, is the spiritual technique Woolman used to decide to put off growing 
his business? Foucault gives us a few clues from the Epicureans, when he speaks of 
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the mature individual using an equipment or paraskeue. ‘Paraskeue is precisely what 
will make possible resistance to every impulse and temptation that may come from 
the external world. […] It is the exact opposite of paideia [culture],’188 and is 
constituted by a knowledge of the world, a phusiologia, which in the Quakers is 
informed by a sensitivity to the spirit’s guidance, the Christian scriptures, and a grasp 
of coherent rational responsibilities derived from them. The spiritual technique 
displayed by Woolman consisted of a synthesis of these words, influences, and 
reasons into a plan of action in a logical and justifiable form. What Woolman called 
exercise in many places in the Journal is the process of working out first, the form of 
the decision and then the requisite timing of the action. Not only did Woolman arrive 
at a decision after this exercise, but he could explain why he decided what he did. For 
Woolman as a Quaker this technique is unique only in the degree and scope of its 
application. Woolman left very little out of the equation and subsequently required a 
good bit of deliberation for even simple decisions. 
Woolman’s application of an exercise is clearly different from the Epicureans, 
in that the Epicureans did not include in their equipment a sensitivity to the leading of 
the spirit, and that the paraskeue, at least in Foucault’s description did not appeal to 
texts. However, any attempt to gain knowledge of the world must include study of 
some texts, otherwise each learner would be forced to start from the beginning, 
repeating all the same experiments and blunders as those who went before. 
Woolman’s appeal to the spirit for positive guidance is also different from the purely 
negative Socratic gift of God, arguably a spiritual effect, that prevented Socrates from 
carrying out an intended speech or plan of action.  
Woolman’s decision to limit his money-making work was determined by his 
desire to remain available to do what the spirit led him to do. He felt that pursuit of 
financial gain was a dead end that included responsibilities and obligations preventing 
him from ministering. Further, the occupation of tailoring and sales would force his 
involvement in the advancement of an excess of superfluity, a whole accompaniment 
of vain and unnecessary accoutrements beyond what was absolutely required to get 
along in society. Also, since he felt called to minister, he wanted to be free to do so. 
This was a personal decision with no necessary public considerations. He did this for 
himself, to advance his availability to God.  
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In this first decision Woolman decided to forego any sustained engagement of 
his efforts toward material prosperity to avoid the entanglements that greed forces on 
a business person. He tells us, ‘My mind through the power of Truth was learning to 
be content with real conveniences that were not costly, so that a way of life free from 
much entanglements appeared best for me, though the income was small.’189 He notes 
in Manuscript C, in terms familiar to the Enlightenment era, that ‘with the blessing of 
Providence [a man] might live on a little, and that where the heart was set on 
greatness, success in business did not satisfy the craving.’190 Woolman engaged in 
this spiritual exercise leading to modest, frugal living, saying ‘that nothing might 
hinder me from the most steady attention to the voice of the True Shepherd.’191 
Woolman’s public activism was the direct result of his intentional formation 
of his private life. He concerned himself with the same Quaker egalitarian values he 
brought to his private encounters. In Woolman and his contemporaries’ public 
activity, an egalitarian polity within Quaker society became public policy as shown 
toward American Indians and Negro slaves. This shows a consistent Quaker 
testimony lived out in public, even though the Quakers in Pennsylvania had given up 
their positions in government.192 
In addition to the Quaker virtue of simplicity, Woolman aimed at the freedom 
afforded only by undistracted attention to the True Shepherd, to the Truth that can be 
learned only by following the Light Within. He was certainly being responsible not to 
live outside his means, but also was able to respond to his moral feelings. 
Participating in the life filled with all the trappings of the rich Quaker business 
persons of his age, he believed, would damage his sensitivity to the Truth. For 
example, Woolman recounted: ‘When I eat, drank, and lodged free-cost with people 
who lived in ease on the hard labour of their slaves, I felt uneasy.’193 Woolman took 
this feeling seriously. This feeling told a truth about slavery, and Woolman’s care in 
setting up his own living circumstance gave him a moral authority unavailable to 
those living on the labour of slaves. This example gives us a view of a technique of 
living that provides first, Woolman’s consideration of his own rational and spiritual 
freedom, and second affords empathy for his fellows living as slaves. Third, though 
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Woolman is aware of his own youth and comparative insignificance, he is troubled so 
deeply by the mistreatment of slaves that he speaks privately to abusive slaveholders, 
trying to convince them of their wrongdoing.194 
The Christian Scriptures do not explicitly oppose slavery, and justifications 
for the perpetuation of the institution of slavery were often bolstered by appeal to the 
Scriptures. But the Quakers took the Scriptures as secondary guidance, a testimony of 
God’s working in history. Primary guidance was the sole responsibility of the 
individual following the Light Within. Individual techniques of the self like those of 
Woolman, to remain undistracted by external influences in the attempt to discern the 
truth, are marked by continuous lifelong effort. ‘We were taught by renewed 
experience to labour for an inward stillness, at no time to seek for words, but to live in 
the spirit of Truth and utter that to the people which Truth opened to us.’195And, near 
the end of his life Woolman wrote a letter to a friend saying, ‘When I followed the 
trade of a tailor, I had a feeling of that which pleased the proud mind in people, and 
growing uneasy, was strengthened to leave off that which was superfluous in my 
trade.’196 This continuity in thinking about living a life constrained from excess is 
evidence of a persistent spiritual technique. 
In the second example, Woolman, near the end of his life booked passage to 
England in order to travel among the Quaker meetings there. His friend, Samuel 
Emlen, Jr. who was to travel with him, took passage on the same ship in a cabin. But 
Woolman, ‘feeling a draught in my mind toward the steerage of the same ship,’197 
believed that if he were to travel on that ship, he should do so in steerage. This was 
not the end of his decision-making process. The owner of the ship, John Head, also a 
Quaker, tried to convince Woolman not to take passage in steerage, citing the 
hardship that it would be. Woolman, though troubled by possible hardship, 
recognized that the cabins were fitted with some ‘superfluity of workmanship’ which 
added to the cost of the boat and therefore to the cost of the cabin,198 and so decided 
that it was best, for economy, to reside in steerage for the journey. Woolman noted 
that these superfluities were meant to cater to the vanities of the passengers, an 
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attitude he thought to be contrary to ‘that wisdom which is pure.’199 He confirmed, in 
the face of their protests, both for himself and for his friends that he would not take 
passage in a cabin. 
From an initial feeling, ‘a draught’ as he said, Woolman found rational 
justifications coherent with his general sensibility of participation with those in 
society who were suffering while the wealthy prospered. When he finally took 
passage on the first day of the fifth month of 1772, he felt satisfied that his 
proceedings were not in his ‘own will but under the power of the cross of Christ.’200 
But the determination of what constituted being under the power of the cross of Christ 
was personal, rational, social, within the techniques and practices under which 
Woolman subjected himself continuously. Further, his sensitivity to the spirit served 
as motive for the discovery of justifications. The moral techniques he subjected 
himself to both provided the possibility of being sensible to guidance of the spirit, and 
also the context for interpretation of that guidance. These techniques also have an 
effect in the Society of Friends as he communed with people of similar demeanour in 
the mid-eighteenth century. The two following examples tell the story of the personal 
and social struggle Woolman had making decisions about the American Indians and 
the colonial slaves. 
In 1755, shortly after the outbreak of hostilities in the French and Indian War 
that impinged on the borders of Pennsylvania, the Quakers, a minority in the 
legislature at that time, ‘withdrew from Pennsylvania’s General Assembly en masse 
rather than support a vote for troops and war taxes.’201 Though the Quakers 
abandoned political power in Pennsylvania rather than bowing to English force over 
this issue, some of their number still refused to pay the tax. They did this risking 
imprisonment because they opposed both the war against the American Indians and 
the inevitable profiteering and misuse of funds raised by taxation.202 Woolman 
struggled over the issue of paying the war tax and decided to refrain from doing so: 
‘To refuse the active payment of a tax which our Society generally paid was 
exceeding disagreeable, but to do a thing contrary to my conscience appeared yet 
more dreadful.’203 
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Woolman recounted a three-week journey he took in 1763 to the wilderness 
parts of Pennsylvania seeking an opportunity to reconcile the colonists with their 
American Indian neighbours.204 Becoming acquainted with some Indians in 1761, 
Woolman was convinced that the same divine power of guidance he himself claimed 
was present in the Indians.205 Here Woolman appeals to a universal law of human 
nature guided by his Quaker training. But this perception must reside in some 
sensibility beyond mere training, as evidenced by the negative way some fellow 
Quakers treated the Indians and negroes.206 Woolman’s behaviour could not have 
been attributed to Quaker training alone. However, the forms of Quaker discipline set 
up the conditions under which Woolman could advance.207 
After the realization that the Indians also felt the touch of the divine, he felt 
drawn to visit them, but waited until he thought the time was correct.208 When in 1763 
he believed the time for the journey had come, his wife was deeply concerned, but 
Woolman, after further consideration recounted: 
…my mind became settled in a belief that it was my duty to proceed on my 
journey, and she bore it with a good degree of resignation. In this conflict of 
spirit there were great searchings of heart and strong cries to the Lord that no 
motion might be in the least degree attended to but that of the pure spirit of 
Truth.209 
Without trying to sort out either the foundation of Woolman’s spiritual 
exercise or what in fact constituted the Truth, he believed it possible to have both a 
legitimate connection to his conscience and a sensibility of truth greater than that 
which he himself could arrive at merely through reason. Reason certainly had its part 
to play, and the reformulation of humankind’s relation to God for the Quakers of the 
eighteenth-century Quietists210 is indicative of the age of Enlightenment in attitudes 
arguably similar to the results of the Pietist upbringing of Immanuel Kant. For 
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Woolman as for Kant, practical wisdom was the ground upon which truths of reason 
were to be tested. In addition, for Woolman, an unalloyed pure conscience was like 
Kant’s good will, the ground for appropriate derivation of duty. While Kant struggled 
with the technical expression of this rule, Woolman struggled with the relations 
between peoples affected by it as reflected in his ethical struggle to act according to 
that rule.  
Woolman’s struggle was not to break out of the bonds of law, as if freedom’s 
task was to allow any behaviour whatsoever, but to behave freely on truths that were 
by his account often problematic, transgressive, or resistant to normally accepted 
behaviour. 
With respect to slavery, the Journal tells of Woolman’s journey toward both a 
theoretical and practical resistance to the forces of slavery before the American 
Revolutionary War. Though at first Woolman allowed the fact of slavery, fair 
treatment of slaves was important to him. ‘Often, when entertained in a slaveholder’s 
home, he insisted upon paying the slaves for their services.’211 A poorly treated slave 
was, to Woolman, a sign of the corrupt character of the owner.212 He tried to persuade 
the slaveholder either to treat slaves better, or free them. He was deeply disturbed that 
some of his fellow Quakers held slaves. His view as a Christian forbade counting 
people as property.  
In 1758, through a series of yearly assemblies of the Quakers in Philadelphia, 
Woolman and others persuaded the assembly to recommend that their fellow Quakers 
free their slaves. John Greenleaf Whittier in ‘An Appreciation,’ written as a preface to 
the 1871 edition of Woolman’s Journal, said ‘The annual assemblage of the Yearly 
Meeting in 1758 at Philadelphia must ever be regarded as one of the most important 
religious convocations in the history of the Christian Church.’213 Woolman said 
nothing during the whole meeting while other issues were being discussed. When the 
slavery issue came up it was at first agreed that members of the Society of Friends 
should not buy slaves. But appealing to the purity of God, Woolman and his 
compatriots convinced the assembly to ‘induce Friends who held slaves’ to set them 
free and provide for them.214 
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The context for those moral techniques, both guiding personal and political 
behaviour as illustrated by the four examples above, were under Quaker discipline as 
well as a judgment of the truth consistent with a grasp of the rationalistic movement 
within the Enlightenment. It is here that I find the concern for freedom in Kant and 
Foucault fulfilled. In Kant, the political movement within the Quaker assemblies, 
made way for the possibility of enlightenment by legislating freedom for slaves. 
Woolman demonstrates a philosophical ethos, both in the exercises of his life as 
techniques of the self and in the practice of journaling in the compilation of a 
historical ontology of himself consistent with Foucault’s requirement of the 
development of a historical ontology. Woolman transgressed the ordinary expected 
practice of his contemporary colonials and Quaker brethren by breaking moral 
barriers to equitable treatment of all people, often against the recommendations of 
those who normally agreed with him. Woolman and his fellows in the anti-slavery 
movement exemplify in practice the individual and social moral ideal detailed by 
Kant and the practical techniques endorsed by Foucault. 
2.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I looked at Foucault’s views of enlightenment. The quest for 
enlightenment was the central theme and the force behind a development of resistance 
into various sub-cultures, what Foucault called counter-conducts, such as that of the 
Quakers. My engagement with Immanuel Kant and his observations of the 
Enlightenment was an attempt to locate Foucault’s concerns with the abuses of reason 
and rationality, so that I would be able to develop a narrative about the development 
of the self in Foucault’s aesthetic terms. An aesthetic development of the self does not 
reduce the need for both clarity and consistency in the project, but it provides 
flexibility to examine other features of self-development in terms of the techniques of 
the self that I illustrated with John Woolman. The introduction of Christine 
Korsgaard’s account of Kant’s Categorical Imperative, was meant to allay some of 
Foucault’s concerns about the mishandling of reason, and to modify Kant’s account 
so as to admit the possibility of a conflict of duties, a conflict of reasons that in 
Foucault’s analysis seems impossible to avoid. The discussion about reason of state 
was meant as a context to reintegrate Kant with his own history and development. 
(His development did not take place in perfect liberty, but rather under the specific 
pressures and powers that constituted eighteenth-century Prussian political reason of 
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state.) The discussion of reason of state was also a means to explain resistance, 
critique, and the development of counter-conduct. 
The elaboration of Quaker religion and politics of the seventeenth century 
shows that even under reason of state, a group of individuals, agreeing on some basic 
precepts, can successfully integrate their lives on terms different from and opposed to 
reason of state. Though in conflict with the state, by force of moral culture, they 
changed that political culture and the reason of state that supported it in favour of 
tolerance of religious differences. From this scenario Woolman enters as a product of 
Quaker moral culture and colonial freedoms. Woolman, following the precepts and 
intention of Quaker morality in his own self-development, uncovers problematic 
practices—political, social, and religious—that contradict the very spirit of his own 
maturing sensibilities. Exercising himself deeply to do the right thing and have the 
right attitude, (in Foucault, the philosophical ethos,) turned outward transforming 
Quaker culture, and helped set the course of anti-slavery reform in America for the 
next two centuries. Woolman’s life and Journal were certainly a permanent critique 
of his historical era. 
Though in Foucault, the quest for enlightenment had no preset goal, the 
development of the Quaker expression of enlightenment, though unpredictable, on 
reflection seems inevitable. Just as the reasons of state could not be reduced to 
formulae, one could not predict the forms that counter-conduct would take. Neither 
can one predict the sort of techniques of the self that will be required for an adequate 
response to the pressures and powers that impinge on the souls of modern people. 
The next chapter of this dissertation will be an examination of Foucault’s 
analysis of techniques of the self, and of the reasons why thinking of self-constitution 
in terms of these techniques is more useful for the discovery of freedom than 
attempting to derive human goals by means of a reductive teleology for human 
development under the guidance of some supposed universals of human experience. 
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Chapter 3: Technologies of the Self 
3.1. Introduction 
Foucault uses the term ‘technology of the self’ to speak about a cultural form, 
a way of life practiced with a constellation of techniques of the self centred around 
the care of the self.1 So a technology of the self could be construed as an ethos, or 
worldview, whereas the techniques would be individual methods used that have the 
goal of self-mastery.2 ‘Foucault defines these technologies of the self as a certain 
number of practices and techniques through which individuals actively fashion their 
own identities.’3 For example, Foucault speaks of the technology of the self practiced 
by the Pythagoreans, and ascetic components such as dietary requirements as 
individual techniques within that ethos.4 Foucault gives ‘the word “ascetical” a very 
general meaning, […] of an exercise of self upon self by which one tries to work out, 
to transform one’s self and to attain a certain mode of being.’5 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore Foucault’s work with an eye to 
extracting a technology of the self, a certain mode of being, as a philosophical ethos. 
For Foucault philosophy was a spiritual exercise, an exercise of oneself in 
which one submitted oneself to modifications and tests, underwent changes, in 
order to learn to think differently. This idea of philosophy as a way of life, 
[…] of ethics as proposing styles of life is one of the most forceful and 
provocative directions of Foucault’s later thought.6 
I will look at the technique of writing specifically as an example of how those 
techniques of the self fit into a philosophical ethos whose goal is the care of the self, 
and has as a result self-mastery. 
3.1.1. Context Within This Dissertation 
In the first chapter of this dissertation I examined the movement of Foucault’s 
thinking from the early to the later writings along with some difficulties the 
movements of his thinking forced to the surface. Within the overall context of his 
writings, the second chapter focused on the issue of resistance to power and the 
elaboration of freedom within the context of a discussion about the Enlightenment 
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and the difficulties in its definition. Also in the second chapter I laid out the transition 
from his discussions of power in the early and mid 1970s to his treatment of ethical 
government and individual freedom in the late 1970s and early 1980s. I used the 
example of the seventeenth-century Quaker John Woolman to connect resistance to 
power to the elaboration of an ethos leading to freedom; this is an ethos structured 
around techniques of the self, exercises of purification, guidance, and ministry.  
In this chapter, after outlining Foucault’s ethical works, I will discuss specific 
techniques of the self as they are related to the acquisition of knowledge, as they give 
the practitioner a right to knowledge on the basis of self-transformation. Using the 
technique of writing, which is one of the techniques of the self outlined by Foucault in 
his examination of the Ancients, as a background I will give four examples of self-
transformation: the Ancients, Foucault, and in the twentieth century, Emma Goldman, 
and the Freedom Writers. 
In the next chapter I will trace a movement of critique within modern ethics 
that has led to a philosophical ethos, an eclectic methodology, and a new way of 
thinking about knowledge within techniques of the self, which is new to our age. I 
believe these techniques of the self are present and yet undefined in Foucault’s work 
in the 1980s, and Foucault presciently marked the transition, the movement toward 
these techniques. These techniques are ethical at their core because they mark a return 
to the legitimation of knowledge on the basis of a movement toward freedom, a return 
to the self as a core spiritual concern for possible authentic engagement with the self, 
others, society, and the world. 
3.1.2. Foucault’s Ethical Practice and Theory 
Foucault demonstrated practical ethical concerns by his participation in the 
student rebellions of the late 1960s and early 1970s in France and by his engagement 
with projects associated with political treatment of disenfranchised peoples in the 
prisons of France and the United States in the 1970s. But Foucault’s theoretical work 
on ethics was a slow development, rising out of some of his practical concerns with 
French polity. By the middle of the 1970s Foucault had developed a theory of power 
relations as a critique of Western civilization. In the mid to late 1970s Foucault 
looked for a positive mechanism whereby the relation between resistance and power 
formed the structures of modern society. In Security, Territory, Population, the 
lectures of 1978, Foucault drew up a sketch of the process of the social development 
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of the structure of the modern state as the effect of some strategies of enclosure 
adopted from pastoral power. In The Birth of Biopolitics, the lectures of 1979, 
Foucault, in an extended treatment of twentieth-century liberal economic theories, 
discussed a theory of human behaviour that could lead to mutual cooperation between 
social architects and the population aimed at profitably building an economic 
structure within society. In The Government of the Living, the lectures of 1980, 
Foucault examined the question: ‘How was a type of government of men formed in 
which one is required not simply to obey but to reveal what one is by stating it?’7 
Within the matrix of religious and political forces society had become, Foucault 
intensified his focus on the problem of formation of the subject. It is within this 
context that Foucault examined some of the connections between governmentality 
and the political and religious disciplines of early Christianity. In Subjectivity and 
Truth, the lecture series of 1981, Foucault asked a number of questions revolving 
around the problem of the establishment of the subject within its overall contexts of 
knowledge and experience, institutions and schemas. He suggests that  
The guiding thread […] is constituted by what one might call the “techniques 
of the self,” which is to say, the procedures, which no doubt exist in every 
civilization, suggested or prescribed to individuals in order to determine their 
identity, maintain it, or transform it in terms of a certain number of ends, 
through relations of self-mastery or self-knowledge.8  
The content of Subjectivity and Truth, an examination of ancient literature and 
culture, became a substantial part of volumes two and three of The History of 
Sexuality. In this series of lectures Foucault moved his focus away from problems of 
the relations of power to a discussion of the elaboration and formation of the subject 
through technologies of the self. 
This collection of lecture series from 1978 to 1981 includes a discussion of the 
acts and thoughts of subjects as determining factors in the formation of society, the 
relation of the self and society, and finally, a preliminary examination of the 
formation of the self. This mutual production of social structures and subjects became 
the general focus of his work because of his increasing concern with the subject; this 
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is what he described in the 1980s as the central project of his work.9 ‘Another way of 
understanding Foucault’s new concern with the self’s relation to itself is to think of it 
[…] as at the intersection of two themes that he had previously treated, namely, a 
history of subjectivity and an analysis of the forms of governmentality.’10 
3.2. Foucault’s Ethical Writing Project 
In this section I will survey what have come to be recognized as Foucault’s 
ethical writings. I will briefly outline Foucault’s lectures, books, articles, and 
interviews and summarize how his ethical position is characterized. Though the 
lectures preceding the series of 1982, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, include 
elements of an ethical world view—especially the series of 1981, Subjectivity and 
Truth—it is explicitly in The Hermeneutics of the Subject that Foucault considers the 
formation of the subject in terms of epimeleia heautou, the care of the self.11  
In addition to The Hermeneutics of the Subject and the second and third 
volumes of The History of Sexuality, I will survey essays, lectures, and interviews that 
organize and reorganize Foucault’s ethical position. I will look at his English 
language lecture entitled ‘Technologies of the Self’12 given in October of 1982 at the 
University of Vermont. This lecture is both an overview of the material delivered in 
The Hermeneutics of the Subject as well as a further development and refinement of 
that same material. 
3.2.1. The Hermeneutics of the Subject 
3.2.1.1. Purpose of the Lecture Series 
In The Hermeneutics of the Subject, the lecture series of 1982, Foucault 
devoted his effort to elaborating the problem of development of the subject, of self-
knowledge in terms of care of the self. He began the series by asking, ‘In what 
historical form do the relations between the “subject” and “truth,” […] take shape in 
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the West?’13 He answers by taking up ‘the notion of “care of oneself”’14 or, as he 
says,  
a very complex, rich, and frequently employed Greek notion which had a long 
life throughout Greek culture: the notion of epimeleia heautou, […] care of 
oneself, attending to oneself, being concerned about oneself.15 
He notes that philosophy has not paid much attention to epimeleia heautou, and has 
instead devoted its attention to ‘the famous Delphic prescription of gnothi seauton 
(“know yourself”).’16 
Know yourself was one of three postulates of prudence one should consider 
before posing a query to the god. Foucault corrected a mistaken general trend of 
interpretation by saying that ‘know yourself’ was a reminder to the supplicant that 
‘you are only a mortal after all, not a god, and that you should neither presume too 
much on your strength nor oppose the powers of the deity.’17 Foucault reminded us 
that in philosophical texts, the Delphic pronouncement, whatever its meaning might 
be, is always associated with Socrates, and ‘in some texts […] there is […] a kind of 
subordination of the expression of the rule “know yourself” to the precept of care of 
the self.’18 Foucault justified this partly by the discursive Socratic practice of waking 
people to care for themselves,19 and partly by referring to the commentators Proclus 
and Olympiodorus who suggest that one should start their studies of Plato and 
Platonism with the Alcibiades I where Plato outlines the necessity of giving attention 
to the care of the self [epimeleia heautou] to Alcibiades.20 
The Stoics, Cynics, and Epicureans also placed the primary weight for the 
philosophic ethos on the care of the self. Foucault thought that the care of the self is 
not only a cultural phenomenon in the Greek and Roman era, but that it is also ‘an 
event in thought,’21 and that the historian of thought must grasp ‘when a cultural 
phenomenon […] actually constitutes within the history of thought a decisive moment 
that is still significant for our modern mode of being subjects.’22 
                                                 
13 HS, p. 2. 
14 HS, p. 2. 
15 HS, p. 2. 
16 HS, p. 3. 
17 HS, p. 4. 
18 HS, p. 4. 
19 HS, pp. 7, 8. 
20 HS, p. 170. 
21 HS, p. 9. 
22 HS, p. 9. 
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So, to discover an early part of the formation of the Christian West, Foucault 
traced the lineage of the care of the self from the Greco-Roman world into the 
Christian world where it acquired a new and divergent meaning from the Socratic 
practice of waking people up to the care of the self.  
In the process of elaborating this genealogy of the care of the self, Foucault 
enumerates three categories of description useful for understanding the care of the 
self. First, ‘the epimeleia heautou is an attitude toward the self, others and the world.’ 
Second, epimeleia heautou is a ‘form of attention, of looking. […] The care of the self 
implies a certain way of attending to what we think and what takes place in our 
thought.’ And third, what is most important for this thesis, is that ‘epimeleia also 
always designates a number of actions exercised on the self by the self, actions by 
which one takes responsibility for oneself and by which one changes, purifies, 
transforms, and transfigures oneself.’23 It is within this process and the resultant 
change that one gains the ability, the right to comprehend the truth. 
Foucault gave two reasons why ‘know yourself’ took precedence in Western 
culture over the care of the self. The first is found in Christianity which due to its 
austerity toward the self in the service of others, redefines the care of the self by 
prescribing behaviour that denies the self in a ‘morality of non-egoism.’24 More 
important for Foucault was the second reason, what he called the ‘Cartesian 
moment.’25 
The Cartesian moment came into play in two ways. First, by ‘requalifying the 
gnōthi seauton’ and second, ‘by discrediting the epimeleia heautou,’ Descartes ‘in the 
Meditations, placed self-evidence (l’èvidence) at the origin, the point of departure of 
the philosophical approach. [… This] made the [dictum] “know yourself” into a 
fundamental means of access to truth.’26 Discrediting the care of the self is more 
complicated. The Ancients, with the exception of Aristotle, never considered that 
‘knowledge itself and knowledge alone gives access to the truth.’27 Knowledge was 
always tied to the ‘spiritual’ conditions under which it could be possible.  
Foucault outlined three conditions of this spirituality. First,  
                                                 
23 HS, pp. 10-11. 
24 HS, p. 13. 
25 HS, p. 14, and Edward McGushin, ‘Foucault and the Problem of the Subject’, Philosophy and Social 
Criticism, 31/5-6 (2005), 623-648, (p. 638). 
26 HS, p. 14. 
27 HS, p. 17. 
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that the truth is never given to the subject by right. […] It postulates that the 
truth is never given to the subject by the simple act of knowledge 
(connaissance), which would be justified simply by the fact that he is the 
subject and because he possesses this or that structure of subjectivity.28 
Second, one must be changed before the truth becomes available. ‘There can be no 
truth without a conversion or a transformation of the subject.’29 Third, when one has 
in fact been transformed, contact with the truth itself transforms the subject.30 So, one 
must set up the conditions where truth becomes possible through a set of exercises 
and changes to one’s practice, through techniques of the self.31 ‘Spirituality is a care 
of the self which transforms one in the necessary way to gain access to the truth.’32 
The use of Descartes Meditations by Foucault must be qualified by the 
structure of the Meditations as literature. Edward McGushin makes a good case33 that 
despite the results of the Meditations, described here as Foucault’s Cartesian moment, 
Descartes meant them as a spiritual exercise. The project of engaging in doubt as the 
Meditations require: giving time, effort, and consideration to the problems with belief 
is every bit as difficult as the work of self-examination required by the Socrates of 
Alcibiades. With this caveat in mind, let’s proceed now to an examination of the 
results of the Cartesian moment. 
When, in the history of thought after the Cartesian moment, knowledge 
became available without the requisite spiritual exercise, those spiritual exercises 
were disqualified with the conversions they implied. Foucault reminded his readers 
that there remain conditions for knowledge after the Cartesian moment, though, 
without conversion. First, one must not be insane, and second, one must possess the 
requisite cultural conditions such as education and retain a broad range of moral 
attitudes, such as disinterestedness. This will lead finally to the constitution of an 
objective view within the subject. But these qualifications ‘do not concern the subject 
                                                 
28 HS, p. 15. 
29 HS, p. 15. Also CCF, Arnold I. Davidson, ‘Ethics as Ascetics,’ p. 137: ‘But this achievement can 
only be attained through the arduous path of spiritual exercises that require nothing less than a 
transformation of one’s way of life. It is this self-transforming, life-transforming askésis that makes 
Socrates, and every other true philosopher, atopos.’ 
30 HS, p. 16. 
31 HS, p. 15. 
32 FA, p. 39, and Edward McGushin, ‘Foucault and the Problem of the Subject’, Philosophy and Social 
Criticism, 31/5-6 (2005), 623-648, (p. 635), ‘Spirituality was a singular way of experiencing the 
relation between the subject and the truth that lay at the basis [of] care of the self. […] Further, 
spirituality implies that it would be impossible to transform oneself ontologically without this 
transformation resulting in ontically manifest effects or consequences.’ 
33 Edward F. McGushin, ‘Foucault’s Cartesian Meditations’, in International Philosophical Quarterly, 
45:1.177, (March 2005), 41-59. 
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in his being: they only concern the individual in his concrete existence.’34 After the 
Cartesian moment the cultural and moral qualifications no longer have anything to do 
with the qualifications of the subject but only with external conditions for the 
acquisition of knowledge. The acquisition of truth entails no necessary transformation 
of the subject. The subject, suggests Foucault, who comes into contact with the truth 
without spiritual transformations, cannot be saved by it.35 In this way, knowledge 
became separate from spirituality. The care of the self ceases to be a necessary 
qualification for knowledge when only ‘objective,’ external, cultural qualifications 
are required.  
With many caveats about the actual time of the Cartesian moment,36 Foucault 
reminded his audience that the process of the transition away from work on the self as 
a criterion of truth, is found many times, in many writings and authors. There is no 
abrupt moment of transition, though there are indicators that the Cartesian moment is 
at hand. ‘The disengagement did not take place abruptly with the appearance of 
modern science. The disengagement, the separation, was a slow process whose origin 
and development should be located, rather, in theology.’37 Foucault traced early 
evidence of the disengagement and separation to Aquinas, who, under the influence of 
Aristotelian rationality, set up the conditions of a rational theology, separating 
knowledge of God from necessary work on the self.38 Foucault suggested then, that 
starting with Kant, one can begin to look at the process of the transformation found in 
the Cartesian moment after the tide had already changed.39 
                                                 
34 HS, p. 18. 
35 HS, p. 19. 
36 This treatment of timing for the event of the Cartesian moment is consistent with what Foucault does 
in The Archaeology of Knowledge concerning the emergence of discursive formations. 
37 HS, p. 27. 
38 HS, pp. 26, 29, 191. 
39 HS, p. 28. For example, the examination of Kant and Foucault in the second chapter of this 
dissertation is an effort to distinguish the explicit purposes of Kant and Foucault’s readings of 
enlightenment to show first, that there is a distinction between Kant’s explicit purpose in the 
Groundwork and the requirements of morality in the face of evil. Kant’s objectifying moral rationality 
must be subjected to the care of the self to enable the self to preserve its own autonomy. Second, 
Foucault required one to free oneself through the construction of an historical ontology. Freeing 
oneself requires formation of the self by the self by attention to breaking through, crossing over, even 
transgressing socially determined constraints in order that one may begin to think differently, to think 
new thoughts, eventually to construct a new social milieu.  
Korsgaard’s reconstruction of Kant illustrates first, the deep puzzle of an enlightenment trend 
toward an objectifying rationality, one that on Foucault’s account marks the Cartesian moment. 
Second, it illustrates that when Kant is positioned in a real-world ethical dilemma he must choose an 
ethical solution that poses a conflict between components of his rational ethical system in favour of self 
preservation at the cost of another’s autonomy.  
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The change is not absolute even though the physical sciences, in some fashion, 
reject as false science those practices which have at their core a spiritual exercise 
requiring conversion.40 But the demarcation between a spirituality and a science is not 
quite as simple as that, for example, within the psychoanalytic or Marxist 
communities where ‘There has been an attempt to conceal the conditions of 
spirituality specific to these forms of knowledge within a number of social forms.’41 
So there is a movement away from spiritual exercise as being the qualification for 
knowledge, but some social models that lay claim to rational objectivity—and make 
claims to scientific authority—are constituted by techniques of elaborating the self on 
par with a form of spirituality similar to that of the Ancients discussed by Foucault. 
The theological and rational movement away from spiritual forms of 
qualification for knowledge is perhaps the reason why debates about ethics in the late 
twentieth century became so important. Ethics as a discipline was revitalized by 
disputes centred around practice, subsequent to the rise of emotivism of the early 
twentieth century. This revitalization was evidenced by critique of the rationalist bent 
of ethical theory and a renewed interest in Aristotle and the Ancients with many 
attempts to reengage spirituality with ethical theory in one form or another. 
Foucault’s effort to re-establish the groundwork of Ancient ethics along the lines of 
the care of the self is an important contribution to this dialogue.  
3.2.1.2. Summary of Three Models 
In The Hermeneutics of the Subject Foucault traced the movements of three 
models of the care of the self in ancient thought and practice: first, the Socratic-
Platonic moment, second, the Hellenistic culture ‘of the cultivation of the self,’ and 
third, the forms of Christian asceticism as they differ from their predecessors in 
purpose and practice.42 Foucault’s research led him to believe that the Platonic and 
                                                 
Though Korsgaard’s proposal does not achieve, or attempt to achieve, a return to the spiritual 
techniques Foucault proposes as constituent elements and requirements of knowledge, she nonetheless 
poses the moral dilemma that would require their implementation when one might choose to transgress 
Kant’s formula of humanity with the result of causing some regret. (CKE, p. 153)  
It may be, as Foucault says, that ‘there has been an attempt to conceal the conditions of spirituality 
specific to these forms of knowledge within a number of social forms. (HS, p. 29)’ In the context of 
this remark, Foucault is not speaking of ethics, but rather near-sciences like Marxism and 
psychotherapy. Ethics cannot be thought of as a science, even though, for example, Kant, Mill, and the 
neo-positivists made great efforts to ground ethical theory and practice in reason, logic, first principles, 
and linguistics, much as one would do to justify a scientific proposition. 
40 HS, p. 28. 
41 HS, p. 29. 
42 HS, p. 30. 
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Christian models—‘the model of recollection and the model of exegesis—have 
obviously had an immense historical prestige which has hidden’43 the Hellenistic 
model. Foucault’s innovation was to highlight some of the connections between the 
three models, while at the same time privileging the emphasis on the care of the self 
as a unifying theme within the Hellenistic model. The Hellenists were not so much 
concerned with the Delphic, Platonic, or eventually Christian versions of the gnōthi 
seauton (know yourself) as they were with the practices that lead to a stable life. The 
Hellenists concerned themselves with a technology that defined a flourishing life and 
whilst not ignoring knowledge of the self or the cosmos, it was focused on developing 
the art of living, and the methods for bringing all the threads of human thought, 
desire, and practice under the dominion of the self. But the emergence of the Stoics, 
Epicureans, and Cynics in the fifth to third centuries BCE as part of the flourishing of 
Greek philosophy drew much from the pre-Socratics with respect to their cosmology, 
and from various streams of Pythagoreans, Platonists, and others. With respect to 
practice, Foucault suggests that Greek society in the time of Plato already took the 
‘care of the self’ to be a general prescription that is defined and developed in the 
dialogue Alcibiades I. 
3.2.1.2.1. Model One: Platonic 
Foucault justifies his discussion of the centrality of the Platonic practice of the 
care of the self by suggesting that the Alcibiades I was Plato’s primary text. If one 
wishes to study Plato, one must start with the Alcibiades.44 Further, Foucault referred 
to the place in the Apology where Socrates describes his job as that of stopping people 
in the street and reminding them to care for their souls. 
In the Alcibiades Socrates confronts Alcibiades with the fact that he does not 
have the tekhnē, the art, ‘the know-how (savoir)’45 to rule the state because the men 
who were to be teaching him this art, instead, used him for sexual favours without 
fulfilling their social responsibility to instruct him. Even though Alcibiades was old 
enough to have learned this art, his lovers had abandoned him before imparting this 
knowledge. So Socrates took up the challenge of spurring Alcibiades to care for 
                                                 
43 HS, p. 256. 
44 HS, p. 170. Both Proclus and Olympiodorus, second-century Neo-Platonist commentators, ‘agree 
that the Alcibiades […] should be placed at the head of Plato’s works and that the study of Plato and 
Platonism, and so of philosophy generally, should be approached through this dialogue.’ Note: I will 
henceforth refer to Alcibiades I as Alcibiades. 
45 HS, p. 35. 
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himself. It was an uncomfortable moment for Alcibiades to discover that though he 
was in a position to rule Athens, he was not qualified.  
By using the Alcibiades, Foucault wanted us to see three things about the care 
of the self in Plato. First, caring for oneself required knowing oneself. One must know 
one’s limitations, one’s strengths. One must have an honest estimation of oneself.46 
Gnōthi seauton (know yourself) in this context ‘is given in a weak form. It is simply a 
counsel of prudence. […] Socrates asks Alcibiades to reflect on himself a little, 
review his life, and compare himself with his rivals.’47 Second, the care of the self 
was a project for the young. It was part of the process of training that would enable a 
young aristocrat to take his place in Athenian politics. The exercise of caring for the 
self was not one that had to be continued throughout one’s life. It was preparatory. 
Third, the care of the self was not for everybody; it was reserved for those who were 
to be part of the political process. ‘The need to be concerned about the self is linked to 
the exercise of power.’48 
In addition to these three characteristics, Socrates posed the problem of the 
nature of this self which is in need of being cared for. ‘It seems to me that the 
outcome of the argument of the Alcibiades on the question, “What is oneself, and 
what meaning should be given to oneself when we say that one should take care of the 
self?” is the soul as subject and not at all the soul as substance.’49 The second problem 
Socrates posed concerned what was required to take care of one’s soul. The answer to 
this query is more difficult than to the first, but it is also more useful.  
Well before the time of Plato there were practices of the self—techniques or 
methods that set up the conditions for knowledge of the truth, whereby one could 
qualify for access to the truth. ‘Rights of purification, […] techniques for 
concentrating the soul [… and] techniques of withdrawal’50 are typical. In addition, ‘a 
fourth example, […] is the practice of endurance, which is linked, […] to the 
concentration of the soul and to withdrawal (anakhōrēsis) into oneself, and which 
enables one either to bear painful and hard ordeals or to resist temptations one may be 
                                                 
46 This is not unlike the advice given to the Roman church by Paul. ‘For through the grace given to me 
I say to everyone among you not to think more highly of himself than he ought to think; but to think so 
as to have sound judgment, as God has allotted to each a measure of faith.’ Rom. 12:3 NASB 
47 HS, p. 35. 
48 HS, p. 36. 
49 HS, p. 57. 
50 HS, p. 47. 
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offered.’51 Foucault does not attempt to draw up an exhaustive list; these are only 
representative samples. But their use can be seen in the Pythagoreans, Platonists, 
Stoics, Epicureans, Neo-Pythagoreans, and Neo-Platonists of the Hellenistic era.52  
These techniques cannot be implemented by the self without some guidance. 
What is required is a master, a guide. ‘The care of the self is actually something that 
always has to go through the relationship to someone else who is the master. One 
cannot care for the self except by way of the master.’53 Socrates plays the master to 
Alcibiades when he fosters Alcibiades’ care of himself. And it is in this way that 
Alcibiades must learn to be his own guide, to evaluate himself in light of one greater 
than he. In the Alcibiades, Socrates recommended that ‘to see oneself, one must […] 
look at oneself in the divine element: One must know the divine in order to see 
oneself.’54 So, one improves by being transformed by the truth through looking at a 
reflection of oneself in the divine element.55 One therefore becomes fit to rule since 
‘taking care of the self and being concerned with justice amount to the same thing.’56 
To sum up, the Platonic position is that the care of the self is the ‘spiritual 
movement of the soul with regard to itself and the divine.’57 Obtaining the reflection 
of the self in the divine and the divine in the self characterizes the outcome of 
techniques that qualify the self for access to the truth, to justice, and to the right to 
rule.  
3.2.1.2.2. Model Two: Hellenistic 
Foucault shifts his focus from Plato and the Platonists to the second model of 
the care of the self in ancient thought and practice within the first and second 
centuries CE, that of the Roman and Hellenistic world. Three characteristics of caring 
for the self58 in the Alcibiades have disappeared from the prescriptions found in the 
Stoics, Epicureans, and Cynics. First, caring for the self becomes a project for 
anybody and is recommended to everyone without regard to status. It is not confined 
to the elite, to the aristocrat, or to those being groomed to rule. Second, ‘the specific 
activity of governing others no longer seems to be the raison d’être for being 
                                                 
51 HS, p. 48. 
52 HS, p. 50. 
53 HS, p. 58. 
54 HS, p. 71. 
55 HS, p. 71. 
56 HS, p. 72. 
57 HS, p. 77. 
58 Found in the third paragraph of 3.2.1.2.1. 
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concerned about the self.’59 Instead, being concerned with oneself is an end in itself. 
It is enough that one flourishes under self-care. Third, ‘the care of the self is plainly 
no longer determined solely in the form of self-knowledge.’60  
In the Hellenistic age there are now two terms that characterize the techniques 
of the self used in the care of the self. Self knowledge is not as it was in Plato the goal 
of either of these two terms. Instead the techniques are directed toward an art of living 
(a tekhnē tou biou) whose goal was the well-regulated life. The Hellenists promoted 
an art of living for any class of person; however, as in the salvation religions—such as 
Christianity—whilst many are called, few are chosen. There is a universal appeal with 
the recognition that not everyone will take on the clothing of the community. ‘The 
appeal has to be made to everyone because only a few will really be able to take care 
of themselves. And you see that we recognize here the great form of the universal 
appeal that ensures the salvation of only a few.’61 
As with earlier expressions of the care of the self in both Pythagorean and 
Platonic practice, in order for one to advance in self-care one needs a guide, a master, 
and a community.62 Often the authority of a speaker is directly related to their 
connection to the original master. What characterizes techniques of the self in the 
Hellenists that take place under the guidance of a master? Broadly they can be divided 
into two forms of work on the self categorized as meditation and exercise. 
The first term, meletē, is characterized by Foucault as a constellation of ideas 
that have to do with meditation and the practices surrounding meditation. Second, 
gumnazein, or exercises, have to do with practices that prepare one for any event in 
life. However, what is called meletē can also include exercises and is sometimes 
indistinguishable from what is also included in gumnazein.63 
In the Greek phrase ‘epimeleia heautou (the care of the self and the rule 
associated with it),’64 the root of the word epimeleia can be traced  
to a series of words such as meletan, meletē, meletai, etcetera. Meletan, often 
employed and coupled with the verb gumnazein, means to practice and train. 
The meletai are exercises, gymnastic and military exercises, military training. 
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62 HS, p. 135. 
63 HS, p. 84. 
64 HS, p. 8. 
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Epimeleisthai refers to a form of vigilant, continuous, applied, regular, 
etcetera, activity much more than to a mental attitude.65 
In these exercises, Foucault identifies ‘four families of expressions,’66 defining four 
categories of exercise. First, ‘Turning around to look at the self, [… second] 
examining oneself, [… third] one must treat oneself, cure oneself, conduct 
amputations on oneself, lance one’s own abscesses, etcetera.’67 These three 
movements include both legal and religious obligations to oneself. ‘The fourth nebula 
or group of expressions contains those which designate a certain kind of constant 
relationship to the self, whether a relationship of mastery and sovereignty […] or a 
relationship of sensations.’68 What is important for the Hellenistic thinkers is not that 
one should meditate on a text and revelation as one finds in Christianity, but rather 
that the object of these exercises is the self,69 as Foucault suggests, the constitution of 
the subject.70 
In the Hellenistic age, turning around to look at the self, the first category, 
encompasses such exercises leading to conversion to the self,71 and salvation.72 The 
second category, a project of examining the self is not as it is in Christianity, the 
process of exhaustively categorizing the movements of the soul, but rather as 
Foucault finds in Seneca and Plutarch,73 the process of cataloguing the data of one’s 
life—even in the form of writing an account of the day’s events as an accountant 
might make entries into a ledger. The purpose of this data-keeping is to examine and 
adjust one’s behaviour, not through the forms of repentance from sin, but in the form 
of a continuum of improvements. The practice of writing, which will be examined 
later, is one part of this process of constituting the subject, along with listening and 
reading. 
The third category of exercises defined in The Hermeneutics of the Subject is 
that of self therapy. There is a tradition conceiving of philosophy as therapeutic,74 and 
a longstanding association between medicine and philosophy. Foucault, quoting 
Plutarch, said ‘medicine and philosophy have, or more precisely are, mia khora (a 
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68 HS, pp. 85-86. 
69 HS, pp. 133, 185. 
70 HS, pp. xxiv, 57. 
71 HS, pp. 190, 207-210, 257-59. 
72 HS, p. 119-20, and EST, p. 207-21 ‘Self Writing.’ 
73 HS, pp. 360-63. 
74 HS, p. 336. 
Douglas F. Olena 143  
single region, a single country).’75 One subjects oneself to philosophy lectures, to a 
master, so that one may cure, heal, and improve oneself. Different from the Platonic 
project of preparing aristocratic youth for a life of leadership, the Hellenistic and 
Roman philosophers considered that the use of and exposure to philosophy was to 
continue throughout one’s entire life. Correction and adjustment of one’s life through 
listening, reading, and writing was the project of a lifetime. 
The fourth and final category of exercises are those leading to self-mastery, 
and to a sense of satisfaction with oneself, of pleasure in the self. Characteristic of 
this category of effects brought about through the care of the self are evidenced by the 
writings of Seneca and Aurelius. They are instructive of lives, that though not 
perfected, are nonetheless engaged in a process, a practice that fruitfully encompasses 
their worlds, their relations, and their selves. Seneca and Aurelius are exemplars of 
how it might be that one could live maturely in that age. 
To sum up: the Hellenistic societies centred around the care of the self are 
egalitarian in appeal, even though not everyone is capable of taking advantage of 
entrance into the community. The care of the self takes place within that therapeutic 
community under the guidance of a master. The aim of the practices of meditation 
and exercise is to achieve conversion to the self through the process of listening, 
reading, and writing—thereby producing a mature practice that has as its object the 
self, within a well regulated regimen of behaviour.  
In The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self, Foucault outlines moral 
problems within the Greco-Roman world that spawned a vigorous industry of ethical 
writing from which Foucault draws a moral schema. In The Hermeneutics of the 
Subject Foucault narrates the movement of this ethical writing as it is absorbed into 
the Christian sphere, the third model of care of the self. He suggests that the 
Hellenistic morality is suited to a project of self-control, austerity, and self-restraint, 
but that the project of third- and fourth-century Christianity under the auspices of care 
of the self repurposes the ethics of the Hellenists whose morality Christianity adopted.  
3.2.1.2.3. Model Three: Christian 
The third model of the care of the self in ancient thought and practice is 
Christianity. Though Christianity of the East does not so strictly follow the patterns 
Foucault outlines, especially within the Hebrew Christian community, the Christian 
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West, as birthed within the Greek Early Church Fathers, does. It is within the 
Christian West that conversion becomes so important, where ‘metanoia, this sudden, 
dramatic, historical-metahistorical upheaval of the subject’76 stands at the centre of 
concern for the self. 
A fundamental element of Christian conversion is renunciation of oneself, 
dying to oneself, and being reborn in a different self and a new form which, as 
it were, no longer has anything to do with the earlier self in its being, its mode 
of being, in its habits or its ethos.77 
Hellenistic and Roman conversion is not a form of destruction of the original 
self as is found in Christianity, but rather, a turning toward the self, a freeing of the 
self as one frees a slave.78 Christianity requires the denial, destruction, renunciation, 
and burial of the self, that one be born again to a new life, a life whose self is 
generated by an association with God. So Christian conversion requires not a return to 
the care of the self, but the destruction of the self and subsequent rebirth to a life 
guided by the Scripture and revelation. 
Foucault’s concern for the form Christianity takes in the West, his concern for 
metanoia (repentance) as a renunciation of the self, comes from an analysis of the 
Greek Early Church Fathers and a practice of monasticism modelled on Platonic and 
Greco-Roman technologies of the self, as marked by the fusion of Platonic and 
theological concerns within Plotinus and the neo-Platonists. The Greek New 
Testament word which is most often translated into in English as ‘sin’ is hamartia. 
This is a word in common use by the Hellenists to mean ‘missing the mark;’ it 
indicates an error in judgment or behaviour, a mistake.79 This word for the Hellenists 
implies a need to return to the care of the self, a need for conversion to the self. For 
Christianity of the West it implies a mistake in judgment or behaviour against God. It 
also implies a judgment against the self which requires a conversion from the self, a 
‘trans-subjectivation,’ and an analysis of the movements of desire. Foucault indicates 
the difference between the Christian and the Hellenist view of conversion, that the 
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far-off Sicily.’  
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Hellenists ‘conversion is a long and continuous process that I will call a self-
subjectivation rather than a trans-subjectivation’80 as Christian metanoia implies. 
As with Plato, and the Greco-Romans of the first two centuries CE, 
Christianity also requires a form of spirituality that qualified one to receive the truth. 
‘With Christianity then we have a schema of the relation between knowledge and care 
of the self that hinges on three points: first, circularity between truth of the Text and 
self-knowledge; second, an exegetical method for self-knowledge; and finally the 
objective of self-renunciation.’81 The circularity between the truth of the text and self-
knowledge begins first to define the Christian self in terms of its failure to accord to 
the principles of purity defined in the Scriptures. Knowledge of the text defines 
precisely the failure of the individual in his or her efforts to meet God’s demands 
stimulating a turn of behaviour and compliance with the text. So the text becomes a 
route to self-knowledge. And self-knowledge in turn through the text qualifies one to 
understand the text better. The text is both the door and the object to be discovered 
when one qualifies to open the door. 
In the second point of Foucault’s schema mentioned above, the analysis of the 
motivations and movements of the self takes place within an exegetical model which 
was, ‘developed in confrontation with the Gnostic model.’82 Foucault defines the 
Gnostic model as essentially Platonic, and that ‘knowledge of being and recognition 
of the self are one and the same thing. Returning to the self and taking up again the 
memory of the true is one and the same thing for the Gnosis.’83 
The ‘function (or anyway, effect)’84 of this confrontation with Gnosticism  
was to assure the great caesura and division with regard to the Gnostic 
movement, and its effect within Christian spirituality was not to give 
knowledge of the self the memorial function of rediscovering the subject’s 
being, but rather the exegetical function of detecting the nature and origin of 
internal impulses produced within the soul.85 
Under the Platonic and Gnostic care of the self the goal of self-knowledge was 
conversion to the self while for Christianity, self-knowledge through the 
decipherment of internal impulses was instrumental in constructing the self after the 
model of the text and moving one forward to a renunciation of those motivations 
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84 HS, p. 257. 
85 HS, p. 257. 
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whose origin was in the self. Christianity, though distinguishing itself from a 
Gnostic/Platonic model, nonetheless adopts a form of the care of the self where 
knowledge of the self is primary.  
The third point of Foucault’s schema mentioned above defines the goal of 
Christian techniques of the self. These techniques are a product of both one’s relation 
to the Text and the exegetical model surrounding the practices that lead to 
renunciation. ‘The fundamental principle of Christian asceticism is that renunciation 
of the self is the essential moment of what enables us to gain access to the other life, 
to the light, to truth and salvation.’86 One cannot take the old life into the new. 
Conversion requires a death of the old self and resurrection into a new self.87 In 
contrast, such a truncation of the self does not characterize Hellenistic conversion to 
the self, nor the techniques one used to purify the self or bring the self under control. 
The Christian model can be summarized as having three movements: first, a 
process of metanoia or repentance which requires the death of the old life and the 
beginning of the new. Second, there is an exegesis or exhaustive and detailed 
cataloguing of the soul’s movements leading a person to, third, the renunciation of the 
self that one might be reborn in a new life. The Platonic model, in which an image of 
the self is discovered in the reflection of the divine, where knowledge of the self is 
recollection of what was previously known before birth leading to conversion to the 
self is unlike Christianity. It is in this regard that ‘Foucault’s development of the “care 
of the self” theme and its aesthetics of existence is, in part, a corrective to the 
experiences of self-renunciation.’88Christianity requires that knowledge of the self 
leads to the renunciation of the self, and the adoption of a new life altogether. 
Unlike the Hellenistic model of the last two centuries before Christ, the first 
two centuries CE Greco-Roman care of the self produced a meticulous morality 
designed to guide the life toward adoption of the self as the primary object of care.  
Christianity, adopting the morality of the Hellenists,89 transformed it with its 
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techniques of the self, to exegete the soul and its movements and desires and use that 
morality as a method of subjecting the self to a matrix of power relations in the form 
of pastoral power.  
3.2.1.3. Hellenistic Techniques 
Foucault made no effort to enumerate exhaustively the techniques of the self 
as found in the Hellenists because the point of discussing them was not to acquire a 
catalogue that one might practice today. The point of spelling out their use was to 
provide the connection between motivations for care of the self,90 and self-mastery. 
So, Foucault showed how this played out in the three models, Platonic, Hellenistic, 
and Christian with the purpose of segregating the Hellenistic model because its 
primary tools were not directed toward self-knowledge, but self-maintenance, the 
refinement of an art of living whose sole end was mastery of the self. For the 
Hellenist, the process of self-mastery required the effort of the whole person 
throughout his or her life. The reason one converted to the self was not to become a 
just ruler, or to renounce the self, but to care for the self throughout one’s life. 
Subsequently the Hellenistic model can serve as a better guide to the acquisition of 
skills whose purpose is an enduring practice of the care of the self.  
For Foucault, what sets the stage for Hellenist morality literature was an effort 
by the Hellenists to address fairly common moral quandaries. Even though the 
problems of citizens were ordinary, they were persistent and often unresolved. A 
moral rule emerges from this technology circumscribing the behaviour of an 
individual, a group, a community. Foucault attempted to come to terms with the arts 
of living as practices, techniques of the self found in the Hellenists, because of the 
historically successful adoption of this form. However, Foucault did not attempt to 
adopt particular ancient techniques of the self to the modern world because the 
problems the Hellenists addressed are not at all those that faced Western culture of the 
late twentieth century.91 Nevertheless, the attitudes of attention to the self and 
attention to avoiding what is dangerous adopted by Hellenistic culture may be useful 
in forming techniques of the self appropriate to the late twentieth century, or any age. 
                                                 
this morality, because Christianity, like all good religions, is not a morality. At any rate, Christianity is 
a religion without morality. Well, it was this morality that Christianity utilized and repatriated, first of 
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90 Such as the rights and qualifications for access to knowledge. 
91 EST, ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics,’ p. 256. 
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The attitudes, forms, and motivations of the Hellenists encompass both goals 
and practices, and the four forms defined above: turning toward the self, self 
examination, self therapy, and self-mastery, contain both conversion to the self and a 
form of salvation. Within the exercises defined as meletē and gumnazein, attention of 
the individual is focused on listening, reading, writing and speaking as essential to 
this ascesis, this exercise, ‘as subjectivation of true discourse.’92 
The Ancients suggested that listening is the only way one can begin to learn, 
first, because all the other senses permit the entrance of vice, while second, only 
through the entrance of the logos can virtue enter. And, the logos is only expressible 
in rational language.93 Listening is not an art (tekhnē) because tekhnē requires 
knowledge. Even the negligent listener, who has no knowledge, comes away from a 
philosophy lecture with living seeds of knowledge. Foucault quotes Seneca as saying 
that, ‘there will always be something to show because the logos enters the ear and 
then the logos carries out some work on the soul, whether the subject likes it or not.’94 
But for the attentive listener, one who has engaged the project of advancing in 
knowledge, there is more.  
Foucault reminded us of two rules for listening, for the purpose of focusing 
one’s attention. First is the acquisition of the skill of discrimination between types of 
speech. Roughly, if one cannot tell the difference between true and false speech, 
between the logos and flattery or rhetoric,95 then one cannot acquire an art of living.96 
Second is the acquisition of a facility for memorizing true speech so that it might 
refashion the listening subject. So, first there must be a facility for acquiring the truth 
and then a facility for making that truth part of the self.97 
Reading provides ‘an opportunity for meditation.’98 But this exercise of 
reading a text  
does not involving trying to [think about] what it meant. It does not develop in 
the direction of exegesis99 at all. The meditatio involves, rather, appropriating 
[a thought] and being so profoundly convinced of it that we100 both believe it 
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to be true and can also repeat it constantly and immediately whenever the need 
or opportunity to do so arises.101 
It is easy to see how this exercise of meditation, designed to collect a 
compendium of useful phrases that one could use as ‘an equipment of true 
propositions for yourself, which is really your own,’102 can function as the beginning 
of a moral structure. When one comes to the place in life where these phrases could 
be used, the phrases must be immediately available, ready to hand. 
But if reading is an experiment in the production of a catalogue of apt 
responses, then writing must naturally ensue. 
Reading is extended, reinforced, and reactivated by writing, which is also an 
exercise, a component of meditation. […] For simply by writing we absorb the 
thing itself we are thinking about.103  
Epictetus recommends reading, writing, and training (gumnazein) as part of the 
project of self-mastery.104 
Foucault breaks writing down into a number of categories. First, what he calls 
hupomnemata, or technically, recordkeeping. This is writing for the self. He cites 
Seneca and Plutarch as practitioners of this sort of exercise.105 Then, second, with 
respect to hupomnemata Foucault gives examples of correspondence and how Seneca 
used his hupomnemata as a means of communicating the skill, the art of living to 
Serenus in De Tranquillitate Animi.106 Here, writing serves a therapeutic function. 
The goal of Seneca’s writings is to assist Serenus to settle himself, to come to a place 
of mastery of himself, to be undisturbed when passions trouble or disquiet him. So 
first Seneca used the hupomnemata as part of a technique to master himself, then as 
an example for his correspondents, a method to help them master themselves. It is, as 
Foucault says, a ‘spiritual correspondence.’107 So in the Hellenists and Romans of the 
first two centuries, listening, reading, and writing are all part of the exercises leading 
one to an art of living, and part of what qualifies one to speak. This speech, both in 
correspondence and conversation, has certain characteristics that make up the ethos of 
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the speaker, the qualifications that give a speaker both the freedom and boldness to 
speak. 
The Greek word for bold or free speech, parrhēsia, translated to Latin as 
libertas ‘seems to be primarily a moral quality that […] is demanded of every 
speaking subject.’108 The exercises that make up meletē and gumnazein are part of 
what qualifies one to speak. Foucault notes that Plato writes in the Laches that two 
generals came to Socrates for advice because Socrates’ life and speech were 
consistent.109 Socrates qualified as one who could give advice because his integrity 
was not in question. His acts were in accord with his words. He lived out his life in 
terms of his morality. Socrates was one who could speak freely, and when he spoke, 
he spoke the truth. The art of a parrhēsiastes (one qualified to speak the truth) 
depended on having mastered the self, a result of practising the art of living. The 
function of the exercises noted above was to give a person an intimate connection to 
the truth, that one would conform to that truth. ‘The ascesis [exercise] constitutes, 
therefore, and its role is to constitute, the subject as subject of veridiction.’110 The 
subject performing the exercises not only qualifies as having passed the test of truth, 
but is the bearer of that truth having become conformed to it.  
The arts of living, techniques of the self, and the practice of subjectivating 
oneself to the truth are found by exercising four techniques: listening to refocus the 
attention, reading, writing to establish the self in relation to the truth, and finally 
fearless or free speech as a demonstration of self-mastery. Foucault made a 
considerable effort to discuss writing and its place in caring for the self. As a 
technique of the self its use has changed over the centuries, but it has become for 
humans in the twenty-first century one persistent technique for the constitution of the 
self as subject. Like the Hellenistic appeal to writing as a technique within the culture 
of the care of the self, writing and publishing in the many venues available today has 
become a large part of the project of self-transformation from the catalogue of 
exercises available to the modern person. Later on in this chapter I will examine 
writing as a technique of the self. 
The Hermeneutics of the Subject lecture series serves to give the most in-depth 
view of the value of the Hellenistic culture of the self and the structure of the 
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exercises leading to self-mastery. Foucault is not denying the far-reaching effects of 
the Christian and Platonic structures surrounding and justifying the care of the self. 
Rather, by exposing the culture of the self within the Hellenists, Foucault overturns 
the notion that gnōthi seauton, knowledge of the self, was the goal of ancient culture, 
a view that was further entrenched by the ‘Cartesian moment.’ He replaces that notion 
with a view that morality, instead of being grounded in knowledge of the self as the 
object of self examination or, knowledge of the human self as an object of science, is 
grounded in techniques of self-mastery. 
3.2.2. The History of Sexuality 
I choose to ignore The History of Sexuality: An Introduction because its 
concern rests generally more with the genealogical works of the early 1970s in which 
Foucault examined power relations. In addition, the era of its subject matter is the 
seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries, the era on which Foucault spent almost 
all of his previous effort. The publication of that volume precedes the movement of 
Foucault’s focus toward ethical problems, toward the problems of self-constitution. 
This demarcation is not a strict one. Certainly evidence of the tenor and substance of 
later works exists in Volume I. However, the era of the subject matter of Volumes II 
and III was the ancient world. Foucault did not abandon his interest in the second 
millennium CE but rather was explicitly hunting for a rationale for the social 
structures by which it was formed. He believed he found that rationale in the 
Hellenistic philosophies of the care of the self. There may be evidence for the claim111 
that Foucault attempted to trace the lineage of modern technologies of the self from 
its predecessors, including Hellenistic ethics, through forms of pastoral power as 
transmitted to the present by the Church. But first, in The Use of Pleasure, Foucault 
sought to re-examine the moral foundations of contemporary late twentieth-century 
Western culture. 
The project of The Use of Pleasure ‘was to learn to what extent the effort to 
think one’s own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it 
to think differently.’112 The trained and presumed predispositions of the late-
twentieth-century West needed something to jar reasoning loose. The Use of Pleasure 
is an effort to force fresh thinking. The transition between Volume I and Volume II is 
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marked by a sense that freedom became a goal of ethical self-construction instead of 
primarily an ‘historical constant.’113 
3.2.2.1. Volume II, The Use of Pleasure 
In order to discover the forms of relations of power within the Ancients, 
Foucault’s study of the use of pleasure focused not on ‘a history of sexual behaviours 
nor a history of representations, but a history of “sexuality”’114 and all the social 
connections implied in the experience of sexuality, ‘where experience is understood 
as the correlation between fields of knowledge, types of normativity, and forms of 
subjectivity in a particular culture.’115 In order to accomplish this he found that 
studying the social rules in Ancient culture was insufficient to comprehend the 
complexity of these relations. The rules themselves are the product of the social 
interactions under question and therefore can’t be seen as their own origin. Foucault 
wished to tease out of the social interactions under examination, the problems faced 
by the Ancients, and the methods they used to ameliorate those problems. What 
Foucault has called the technologies of the self, or ‘arts of existence’ are just such 
methods. What Foucault means by the arts of existence are  
those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves 
rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves 
in their singular being, and to make their life into an oeuvre that carries certain 
aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria.116 
However, because of difficulties writing a history of ethical problems based 
on practices of the self, Foucault was forced to start with a history of the practical 
texts of the era, texts that formulated rules, that defined interdictions of practice.117 
These systems of morality both in the Greco-Roman and Christian world are the 
surface texts that point to the problem of sexuality in the ancient world. In The Use of 
Pleasure, Foucault asks the question with respect to the body, the wife, boys, and 
truth, ‘How did sexual behavior […] come to be conceived as a domain of moral 
experience’118 subject to prohibitions and interdictions? Rules of conduct cannot have 
emerged fully formed at the beginnings of social consciousness. As with any set of 
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practices in a domain, the formulation of rules must be the residue of social 
experimentation.  
For example, within the Hebrew Scriptures, the history of moral development 
in the Israelites is the product of experimentation, of discovering the parameters of 
God’s tolerance for behaviour. The practical proscriptions against idolatry are not 
taken seriously by the Israelites as an absolute prohibition from the time of Moses 
until the time of the return from exile in Babylon in the fifth century BCE, almost 
twelve hundred years later. Yet within that time, many Hebrew writers attributed the 
failure of Israelite society and its kings to idolatry. The law proscribing idolatry 
emerged in Moses, and there are indications that the use of idols was to be avoided 
even prior to that in the time of Jacob, son of Isaac. But until the destruction of the 
national identity of Israel and subsequent exile into Babylon, the Israelites did not 
take the proscription seriously. When they finally began to observe the rules about 
idolatry they layered it with practical prohibitions and interdictions that pressured 
social compliance, fully fleshing out practical principles intended by the original 
commandment. They put a fence around the law so that even a leaning toward 
idolatrous practice was proscribed.  
Similarly, Foucault’s examination of the practice of sexuality within Western 
culture follows the progress of an experiment with sexual practice and the social 
milieu surrounding it, the formation and transformation of the moral rules and 
behaviours surrounding the problem that sexuality posed to those civilizations. The 
Hellenistic experiment did not take place, however, under the guidance of any divine 
command as did the Israelite experiment with idolatry. The Hellenistic experiment 
takes place as an internal cultural dialogue about morality. 
The term ‘morality’ is ambiguous.119 It connotes both the codes and 
proscriptions of a public law or private system, and the actual practices of individuals 
in relation to those codes. It is not a fixed compendium of permitted and prohibited 
behaviours any more than it is a catalogue of actual behaviours in relation to the 
codes. Morality changes within a social context through history. That does not mean 
Foucault is claiming that morals are relative, but rather that they are not a fixed target 
specifiable in terms of codes. Nor are the justifications given for the codes absolute or 
relative. Modern moral theory often poses the question about that double term: ‘are 
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moral values relative or absolute?’ Foucault is not asking that. He is only asking 
about the practices and the justifications of the Ancients, about the techniques of the 
self used as methods of developing and then mastering the self, and in the case of 
Christianity, of renouncing oneself, and being mastered. 
The theme of self-development as a form of art as described in The Use of 
Pleasure is central to the Greco-Roman practices of the self and central to Foucault’s 
treatment of a Greco-Roman/Hellenistic answer to the problems raised by the use of 
pleasure within the writings about dietetics, economics, and sexuality as forms of 
pleasure. As with The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault traces the theme of the 
care of the self within three models: Platonic, Hellenistic, and Christian; and as with 
The Hermeneutics of the Subject, he examines the rationality of the Hellenists, and the 
genealogy of some of their central moral themes leading to the development of late-
twentieth-century society.  
One thing Foucault takes from the Hellenists concerning self-development is a 
sense of the importance of avoiding danger, of avoiding the trouble associated with 
living a careless life, of avoiding the life of a stultus, one who ‘is defined by this 
nonrelationship to the self.’120 Foucault does not equate danger to evil.121 The 
problem of evil is too closely associated with an essentialist view of human being, 
and is tied to a Christian narrative of the fall that attributes evil to being, a view in 
conflict with Foucault’s view of freedom. So, the form of the problem is defined in 
terms of the danger of certain choices.  
The problem of dietetics122 illustrates the non-universal, temporal, and spatial 
locus of learning to avoid danger through a certain attention to the self. Eating, in 
general, cannot be judged evil in any universal sense since one must eat to live. But 
eating too much or too little, or eating the wrong things can risk one’s good health, 
and diminish one’s strength. The same sort of illustration can be made both for the 
relation between husband and wife (economics),123 and for sexual behaviour 
(erotics).124 
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Consistent with the avoidance of facile and misleading universalizations of 
history, Foucault redefined ethical language in The Use of Pleasure in terms that 
avoided equating ethics to universalizing rules, and instead focused on practices of 
self-formation125 leading to an autonomy unavailable in a heteronomous system. 
What this does is link autonomy and freedom to the care of the self. There is no sense 
that people are judged by a universal rule that they can only posit, but not accomplish. 
So the sense that hamartia (sin) is an absolute that cuts people off from God and/or 
nature, as traditional Christian doctrine suggests, is meliorated. What is required then 
is not salvation in a religious sense,126 in which one must be redeemed from oneself as 
Christian techniques of the self required, but a conversion or return to the self, to 
regard mastery of the self as an attainable goal. In ‘this salvation of Hellenistic and 
Roman philosophy, the self is the agent, object, instrument, and the end of 
salvation.’127 Absent in this evaluation of the self is the requirement that Christianity 
imposes, the denial of the self through self-examination and renunciation of the old 
life, the life of the flesh. In the Greco-Roman mode of ethical conversion to the self, a 
death of the self is not required. One must only redirect one’s life. 
In Plato the conversion to the self is the explicit project Socrates sets out to 
accomplish. In the Stoics, one is wakened to life, to a responsibility for the self, for a 
lifelong project of self improvement. Foucault notes however, that since the care of 
the self is one primary goal of Christian conversion and life in the community, 
Christianity becomes a method of the care of the self, a method derived in part from 
the Hellenists. Christianity may have adhered to the theme of the care of the self 
which it found in Greco-Roman society, either explicitly as one more path toward a 
lifestyle compatible with Christian salvation, or functioning as the underlying ethos in 
a world from which Christianity could no more disassociate itself than the twenty-
first-century West can from scientific technology as given within the social milieu. 
In the three domains of rules Foucault examines in The Use of Pleasure: 
dietetics, economics, and erotics, he describes the movement from an organically 
developing society toward the problems of society which examines its own behaviour. 
Subsequently he considers the rules intended as governance of persons within the 
society and the lasting debates that arise from those rules. In this way Foucault teases 
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out the problems of social and ethical development within the Greco-Roman society. 
He is interested in the dialogue of social interactions in Greco-Roman development 
and in the transformations leading to the formation of rules. This dialogue guides 
Foucault’s adoption of ethical principles for the evaluation and demarcation of 
dangerous behaviour. 
3.2.2.2. Volume III, The Care of the Self 
Foucault, in The Care of the Self elaborates the themes surrounding the care of 
the self within the social milieu that he began to expose in The Hermeneutics of the 
Subject and The Use of Pleasure. He examines the centrality of the ethos of the care 
of the self within the first two centuries CE with respect to society, to the body in 
relation to the self, in relation to a man’s wife, and a man’s relation to boys. 
The first part of The Care of the Self opens with a discussion of Artemidorus’ 
dream interpretation manual from the second century CE. Foucault reveals through 
standard dream interpretations the state of social ethics at the time of Artemidorus’ 
writing. ‘The book by Artemidorus thus constitutes a point of reference.’128 
Artemidorus is not making any explicit outline of social ethics, but by writing a 
dream interpretation manual, he exposes the characteristics of the underlying 
milieu.129 Foucault describes the Greek milieu Artemidorus assumes. The ‘ethics of 
pleasure is linked to a virile society, to dissymmetry, exclusion of the other, an 
obsession with penetration, and a kind of threat of being dispossessed of your own 
energy, and so on.’130 
In the second part, titled ‘The Cultivation of the Self,’ Foucault outlines the 
texts and attitudes of the Hellenistic and Roman writers as they attempt to come to 
grips with the state of affairs Artemidorus outlines. It is precisely the problems arising 
out of living that drove the Greco-Roman writers to call into question the paths of life 
assumed as part of the privilege of free men, which was arguably a narrow class of 
persons.  
A mistrust of the pleasures, an emphasis on the consequences of their abuse 
for the body and the soul, a valorization of marriage and marital obligations, a 
disaffection with regard to the spiritual meanings imputed to the love of boys: 
a whole attitude of severity was manifested in the thinking of philosophers and 
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physicians in the course of the first two centuries. It is visible in the texts of 
Soranus and Rufus of Ephesus, in Musonius or Seneca, in Plutarch as well as 
in Epictetus or Marcus Aurelius. Moreover, it is a fact that the Christian 
authors borrowed extensively—with and without acknowledgement—from 
this body of ethical thought.131 
In this passage Foucault outlines first, the problematic ethos of the free Greek 
world, then traces a rough and schematic genealogy of the ethos of the care of the self 
through the development of ethics in the Hellenists and Romans and its subsequent 
importation into the Christian pastorate. The rest of The Care of the Self examines this 
genealogy in a more detailed manner. 
The importance of the book does not lay with Foucault’s focus on 
technologies of the self, but rather with the extensive literature exposing the ethical 
structures of various schools of thought. As a result Foucault can show that the 
implied and assumed ethics of the society underwent a shift in emphasis both toward 
the care of the self, away from the assumed sexual and moral privilege of an 
aristocracy and toward a more egalitarian account of one’s life and one’s relations. 
Foucault is not explaining the techniques that made this movement possible as he did 
in The Hermeneutics of the Subject. Instead, there is evidence throughout the book of 
the association of one’s care of oneself with practices of self-modification, austerity, 
and behavioural adjustment. In The Care of the Self, Foucault outlines the 
development of moral thought within the Greco-Roman and Christian world, which 
leads to a more thoroughly austere and egalitarian moral social structure.  
3.2.3. Essays, Lectures, and Interviews 
Two things can be noted about the amount and variety of literature generated 
by Foucault. First, Foucault was always careful about what he allowed to be 
published, and second, he edited all interviews thoroughly. Arnold Davidson, notes 
that the great precision with which Foucault answered the questions put to him by his 
interviewers might seem remarkable. But one must understand that before the 
interviews were published, Foucault not only edited his answers, he also edited the 
questions.132 That effort, to appear in print in such a fashion as to avoid quibbles 
about what he meant, is certainly part of the stylistics of Foucault’s method, part of an 
intentionally undertaken development of his self. This might be the reason Foucault 
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stipulated in his estate that nothing previously unpublished was to be released to the 
public. 
Understanding the chronology of the release of these pieces also tells us that 
Foucault found certain themes to be persistently interesting and useful.133 Many of 
these writings and lectures are more focused and refined than the early research that 
characterizes the Collège de France lecture series. They are more telling of his 
conclusions than the sometimes, self admittedly, rambling effort of the lectures. The 
lecture ‘Technologies of the Self’134 given in Vermont in 1982 is one instance of this 
trend of refinement in his work. The research done for The Hermeneutics of the 
Subject exposed him to the problems, context, and specificity of the themes, and later, 
in the Vermont lecture Foucault refined and elaborated the structures within which 
technologies of the self operated.  
In ‘Technologies of the Self,’ Foucault conceives the project for the second 
and third volumes of The History of Sexuality as a way of discussing the connection 
between sexual prohibitions and the interdictions of sexual behaviour in relation with 
one’s ‘obligation to tell the truth about oneself.’135 So Foucault conceived the project 
‘of a history of a link between the obligation to tell the truth and the prohibitions 
against sexuality. How had the subject been compelled to decipher himself in regard 
to what was forbidden?’136 All of that effort is put to use in the production of the self. 
So the ‘technologies of the self,’ the methods one uses in the process of self-
formation 
which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of 
others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and soul, thoughts, 
conduct, and a way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a 
certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality137 
become the central focus of his examination. Much of the lecture is an effort to distil 
the essential points of The Hermeneutics of the Subject, starkly exposing the themes 
                                                 
133 Among these themes are writings associated with his struggles with the problems emerging from a 
twentieth-century relationship with the Enlightenment and the constitution of our selves as free persons 
as found in the collection of essays The Politics of Truth edited by Sylvère Lotringer, and the problems 
associated with religion and Christianity in particular as found in the collection of essays In Religion & 
Culture edited by Jeremy Carrette. The small Semiotext(e) volume Fearless Speech is a lecture series 
given in Berkeley that traces the genealogy of the use of the constellation of meanings of the word 
parrhesia in the ancient Western world. The volume Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth, the English volume 
containing a variety of a broad range of his ethical works, collects many of these themes under one 
cover. 
134 TS, p. 16. 
135 TS, p. 16. 
136 TS, p. 17. 
137 TS, p. 18. 
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found in ancient philosophy, the Hellenists, and the Christians of the first few 
centuries. Among those themes is the persistence of a concern for the self, even 
though the techniques and goals differ between groups. ‘As there are different forms 
of care, there are different forms of self.’138 This is true also of the project of self-
development that Foucault pursues in the essay ‘Self Writing,’139 and ‘What is 
Enlightenment?’140  
The most structured and structuring essay ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics: An 
Overview of Work in Progress,’ an interview with Paul Rabinow and Hubert Dreyfus 
in April of 1983141 provides many clues about how to proceed with Foucault’s ethical 
thought. In this essay Foucault reinterprets the whole corpus of his work as primarily 
concerned with the subject within the matrix of three historical ontologies of the self 
along the lines of Truth, Power, and Ethics. What Foucault provides in this interview 
is a distillation of his work up to that point and hints about the direction of his future 
work, including further elaborations of his work on the subject. I have used this essay 
in this and previous chapters to bring out the structure of Foucault’s thought and 
movement toward a mature view. 
3.2.4. Summary 
Throughout this section I have summarized Foucault’s writings on ethics with 
the explicit purpose of singling out the role of the technologies of the self as defining  
spirituality as a conversion to the self that gives one the right to knowledge. The 
lecture series The Hermeneutics of the Subject is the central work for a 
characterization of the technologies of the self. Foucault emphasises the writing of 
hupomnemata and its various Ancient uses as well as writing the self as a technique 
of his own self-creation. Significant in the process of writing is not the actual writing 
product but the formation of the self the writing was designed to support. Foucault 
claims that the purpose of the writings of the Ancients within a small society of 
correspondents is the formation of a philosophical ethos. The purpose of Foucault’s 
writing is the formation within himself of a philosophical ethos suitable for the late 
twentieth century, being fully cognizant of Modernity, with the aim of constructing an 
historical ontology of his self. That object, the historical ontology, generates the 
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philosophical ethos which reconstructs a history without universals and ideals and 
provides a structure for beginning to think differently about the problems of an era. 
Avoiding ideal history not only prevents teleological interpretations of events, 
but forces events to be understood conditionally within their own temporal structures. 
Avoiding ideal history forces historians to contextualize their remarks without any 
supposition of fit into a universal history. This consideration does not deny the 
existence of causality, it only forces a recounting of the details of transitions without 
requiring that they have a determined end point. Any evaluation of cause and effect in 
some historical transition must then be after the fact and not a presupposition 
underlying the research. 
Writing becomes a properly historicized account of a transformative research 
journey, the product of which is a temporally relativised account of both the historical 
objects and an historical ontology of the movements of the writer’s thought and 
practice through the research. 
In section 3 of this chapter I will examine further the theme of self-writing, of 
the elaboration and development of techniques of the self through the use of writing 
by looking at the work of the Ancients, claims about Foucault’s own writing, and by 
considering what the generation following Foucault’s death may have discovered.  
3.3. Techniques of the Self 
Is it possible to specify practices that fulfil the same purpose for today as the 
techniques of the self fulfilled in Foucault’s view for the Ancients? The following 
examples give a positive answer. There are techniques today that fulfil the same 
purposes of spiritual practice that qualify one for access to knowledge. But in addition 
to investigating the following spiritual exercises, I wish to examine whether those 
same spiritual exercises are the means whereby one creates an historical ontology of 
the self, the central requirement of Foucault’s account of enlightenment. 
3.3.1. Writing in the Ancients 
The exercise I will focus on for this section is writing, one that was in 
widespread use throughout the Hellenistic age, throughout history, as well as our 
own. I will not focus on the entire panoply of spiritual exercises in the Hellenistic 
toolbox because the writing project is an object sufficient to illustrate the relations 
between the technique itself and the project of the writer in writing. Writing is the 
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lasting concrete evidence that introduces a reader to the ethos of the writer. The ethos 
of 
taking care of oneself became linked to constant writing activity. The self is 
something to write about, a theme or object (subject) of writing activity. That 
is not a modern trait born of the Reformation or of romanticism; it is one of 
the most ancient Western traditions. It was well established and deeply rooted 
when Augustine started his Confessions.142 
Foucault suggested that ‘as an element of self-training, writing has […] an 
ethopoietic function: it is an agent of the transformation of truth into ethos.’143 For an 
example of writing as an exercise of taking care of oneself in the Ancients I will look 
at Epictetus’ Encheiridion,144 a Manual, or Handbook. It is a distillate of Epictetus’ 
thoughts meant as a primer to Stoic thinking. It functions as a look into the Stoic 
worldview, practice, and community relations. I am also using it because it has a 
limited scope and illustrates what I believe Foucault was aiming at in The 
Hermeneutics of the Subject, and Technologies of the Self. 
The Encheiridion reveals that the practice of the self called upon techniques of 
reason to resolve the problems of everyday life and to promote a worldview that 
aimed at tranquillity in the face of the difficulties and transitions of life. It tells how 
one might begin to take control of one’s life and move it in a direction that promoted 
healthy mental attitudes and physical practices. This is precisely the kind of spiritual 
practice Foucault defines in The Hermeneutics of the Subject. The techniques of the 
self prescribed in The Encheiridion are aimed at conservation of the self and the 
reproduction of useful practices.  
Foucault discusses the function of writing itself as an exercise on the self from 
the writer’s view when he discusses the hupomnemata, correspondence, and as part of 
a common didactic of ascesis in the philosophical schools of the era. The 
Encheiridion is written from the position of the master who wishes to persuade 
learners ‘that they should adjust their desires and their attitudes toward’145 ideal 
conditions of being human, so that they would not expect ‘to have certain desires 
satisfied, and [live] with the idea that such desires were not worth satisfying anyway.’ 
To that end, the production of The Encheiridion is part of a philosophic ascesis of its 
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writer Arrian who wrote it as part of an exercise of acquiring an equipment or 
paraskeue. 
The Encheiridion is the recollection of Epictetus’ student Flavius Arrianus, or, 
as he is commonly known, Arrian. Though Epictetus is thought to have written 
nothing himself, his student took up the task of reproducing Epictetus’ teaching in the 
eight books of Discourses, of which four remain, and The Encheiridion, a compilation 
of extracts from the Discourses.146 Arrian writes to Lucius Gellius in an introduction 
to the Discourses, that he didn’t intend the Discourses to be publicly distributed, but 
rather, 
whatever I heard him say, the same I attempted to write down in his own 
words as nearly as possible, for the purpose of preserving them as memorials 
to myself afterwards of the thoughts and the freedom of speech of 
Epictetus.147 
Arrian writes the Discourses to equip himself with the logos of Epictetus as part of a 
strategy to reinforce the teachings. The project of writing was itself for Arrian part of 
the method used in his own project of self-mastery. So it is not only the contents of 
the text itself that provide the tools for mastery but also the project of writing the 
things he remembered. Writing is, for Arrian, part of the spiritual exercise leading to 
self-mastery. The same can be said of Michel Foucault, and indeed he says so of his 
own projects. 
3.3.2. Writing in Foucault 
Foucault suggested that he used his own research projects and books to script, 
or write himself, saying that, ‘intellectual work is related to what you could call 
“aestheticism,” meaning transforming yourself.’148 He did not frame the problem of 
becoming one’s self in terms of discovering an essential person, which implies an 
indefensible teleology. Rather, the self becomes an aesthetic construction constituted 
by the free exercise of the will. That doesn’t imply, as I mentioned before, an 
unrestrained libertinism, but a process of self-management leading to mastery, an 
ascetic engagement with techniques, the purpose of which is to corral representations, 
desires, and forces within the social relations of power. Foucault characterizes the 
spiritual exercises of the Ancients as ascesis but does not use the term ‘asceticism’ to 
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describe these practices because ‘asceticism as the renunciation of pleasure has bad 
connotations. But ascesis is something else: it’s the work that one performs on oneself 
in order to transform oneself.’149  
One can also talk about the movement of Foucault’s work within his books as 
a path of discovery. He does not write a book with the conclusion in mind already. In 
an interview with Italian journalist D. Trombadori he said, ‘I write a book only […] 
because I still don’t exactly know what to think about this thing I want so much to 
think about, so that the book transforms me and transforms what I think.’150 His 
methods, contents, and conclusions are uncertain until finished. This can be plainly 
demonstrated by a quick perusal of the works up to 1978 when this interview with 
Trombadori took place. The long-standing quibbles about what precisely Foucault 
was doing in any of his works are part of what makes nailing down any genealogy or 
structure to his method so difficult. Each work has its own method explored within 
the work itself, which often is only defined in later interviews and writings.  
Foucault did not follow a pattern but let the work itself define patterns 
dynamically. In this way Foucault was not only forming his ideas, but his person, if it 
is true that a person is at least partially constituted by what one thinks. Foucault 
certainly considered that to be true; he said that ‘this transformation of one’s self by 
one’s own knowledge is, I think, something rather close to the aesthetic 
experience.’151 Echoing various analyses by Ludwig Wittgenstein, Foucault suggests 
that the acquisition of truth follows the process of changes within a person’s life. It is 
not so much the external relation to power with which the individual is concerned but 
rather self-formation.152 Foucault speaks of the game of truth as the play involved in 
writing the self. Certainly his writing efforts were part of a struggle to come to grips 
with the truth. 
In addition, negatively, Foucault thinks that the inability to write, or produce a 
work is a sign of madness.153 The absence of work as the product of life reveals 
spiritual poverty in an individual. Without work, Foucault suggests, a person can 
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never form his or her self. Macey recounts that Foucault mourned the suicide of his 
friend Jacques Martin whom Althusser and Foucault named ‘philosophe sans oeuvre, 
a philosopher with no works,’154 explaining that for all Martin’s brilliance, he was 
depressed and incapable of productive activity.  
But writing can be more than merely an escape from madness; it can lead to a 
more coherent life. It provides an organizational technique, to escape from seemingly 
insurmountable and inevitable social pressures; it allows for the formation of a life 
different from the current one, the formation of a moral character profoundly different 
from the previous one. In the next section I will mention one feminist example where 
the writing of correspondence became a means of self-formation, then examine one 
instance of character formation through the writing of diaries or journals. Though 
there are many suitable examples of journaling, The Freedom Writers Diary is a 
particularly good one because the transformations of the self through writing 
exercises are explicit. Many times the writers speak openly how their lives have been 
changed. 
3.3.3. Modern Writing 
Kathy Ferguson tells the story of Emma Goldman155 as an example of how 
writing is a formative exercise. ‘Emma Goldman crafted herself as an example of 
anarchism in life.’156 Through voluminous correspondence she both revealed her 
persistent form and held herself in the exercise of writing as an means of struggling 
against the forces of government that would gloss over injustices.157 Quoting 
Foucault’s Technologies of the Self, Ferguson describes Goldman’s self care as 
‘something much more serious than the simple fact of paying attention. […] It is 
always a real activity and not just an attitude.’158 So Goldman’s private exercises of 
self care in her correspondence contributed to the formation of her public self, her 
persistent anarchic ideology, and her careful critique of those who, on her terms, 
misunderstood her.159 
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The book The Freedom Writers Diary is the story of one group of students at 
Wilson High School in Long Beach, California. I want to look at this as a simple, 
obvious case where writing is demonstrated as one of the decisive turning points for a 
group of students.160 The official prognosis for these students was failure, but through 
the attentiveness of one teacher, these individuals transformed themselves into 
socially adept adults. I am not so much interested in the form of writing, whether it is 
journaling, as it is in this case, or research on arcane objects of historical interest as it 
is in Foucault’s, or the hupomnemata of the Ancients intended as a self-directed 
spiritual exercise, but rather on the effects of writing itself. I wish to answer the 
question whether it is possible to write an historical ontology of oneself, as Foucault 
requires as a part of a project of enlightenment. I answer affirmatively. Writing in 
journal form fulfils the requirement of writing history, subjective in its production, 
but providing in duration, access to an objective view of the changes within oneself, 
the changes of what is possible and hoped for along with the stubborn realities of 
being human we all experience.161 
Consistent with Foucault’s analysis of the techniques of the self in the 
Ancients, Erin Gruwell, as teacher, acts as the master of these students. By design, 
modern education assumes the asymmetries between teacher and student. The many 
failures within the educational system demonstrate that this relationship is not well 
understood. However, Gruwell did understand her role if the project she promoted is 
to be taken as evidence, though the performance of that role had unexpected social 
costs for her and her students. One price was the persistent disdain and resistance of 
some of her fellow teachers who complained that Gruwell requested and obtained the 
privileges of a teacher with much greater seniority. 
Journaling is not the only technique Gruwell used, but it was central to the 
movement of the students from the position of victim toward the mastery of the self 
many of them demonstrated later. Five stages of their development can be noted. 
These stages are similar to those Foucault discovered in his study of the Ancients, 
both Christian and Greco-Roman. Even though there are similarities with the ancient 
stages of development the modern ones take on a distinct shape. Seeing the 
transformation of these young lives reminds me of a remark made by Martin Buber, 
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‘The “wicked” become a revelation when they are touched by the sacred basic 
word.’162 These children, many who were damaged terribly by those around them, 
found a route to self-mastery. But that route was marked with terrible revelations. 
These revelations are part of the first category of their writing exercises, that 
of therapeutic techniques. There are at least three distinct sorts of therapeutic exercise 
displayed in the journaling assigned by Gruwell as a form of reacting to literature and 
life circumstances: confession,163 catharsis,164 and conversion to the self.165 In order to 
engage the students who were, at the beginning, recalcitrant and inattentive, Gruwell 
used books that told stories relating to the stories of the students from times and 
cultures that were unlike the circumstances of those students. The focus of the first 
two years of her work with the students was to break down stereotypes166 and create 
empathy. The lives of her students were persistently marked by racism of one kind or 
another, even though the reasons for the original animosity between races were no 
longer understood.167 So, Gruwell introduced the students to a wide variety of 
Holocaust literature, including Elie Wiesel’s Night; The Diary of Anne Frank; and the 
diary of a young girl from contemporary, war-torn Sarajevo, Zlata Filipovic. In 
addition, Gruwell introduced them to resistance literature, including The Color 
Purple, by Alice Walker; Durango Street, by Frank Bonham; and Shakespeare’s 
Romeo and Juliet. 
The fourth technique Gruwell used was the creation of community.168 By 
writing, the students were encouraged to correspond with people who had direct 
involvement with the Holocaust, including a local Holocaust survivor, Gerda Seifer, 
and Miep Gies, the woman who harboured the Frank family during World War II. 
Seifer was able to visit the class and tell them about the Holocaust from personal 
experience. Gies, at the invitation of the students, travelled to Southern California 
from Amsterdam to spend time with the class. They also invited Zlata, who at the 
time was living in Ireland with her parents. As it turned out, Zlata was the same age 
                                                 
162 Martin Buber, I and Thou, tr. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970), p. 67. 
The primary word here is ‘Thou,’ which is, in Buber’s parlance the word one speaks to God, wherever 
and whenever one finds him, in nature, prayer, or people. 
163 FWD, p. 33, Diary 15; p. 67, Diary 34; p. 263, Diary 139. 
164 FWD, p. 34, Diary 16. 
165 FWD, p. 264, Diary 140. This diary contains all three therapeutic exercises. These are only samples 
of numerous instances throughout the book. 
166 FWD, p. 270. 
167 FWD, p. 96, Diary 46. 
168 FWD, p. 276. 
Douglas F. Olena 167  
as the Freedom Writers. She accepted their invitation and arrived with her parents for 
a week in Southern California. The students began to feel that they were part of a 
larger world that had been struggling with the same sorts of problems they were living 
with every day. Through association with the Holocaust literature, their reflections on 
it, and the people they met, they began to broaden their perspective, enlarge their 
community, and abandon their stereotypes. 
The students began to see their writing as a means of changing their world. 
Writing, during their time at high school, became a means of empowerment, a route 
to the mastery of their selves. Instead of being victims, they began to see themselves 
as free individuals responsible for their own futures. This emancipation came with 
some serious side effects. Parents were often not interested in accommodating their 
children’s new-found liberty, and tensions at home ran high when children sought to 
break free to become something different from traditional expectations. For some 
families, the child’s movement was just too much too soon. One student recounted the 
fear she had asking her father if she could participate in extracurricular activities. He 
always said ‘No!’ when she asked, so she stopped asking. Then, when it was time to 
go to Washington D.C. with the class, her father was in Mexico. She asked her 
mother, who permitted her to go. The student suppressed her fear because of the 
chance for liberty; and because of the elation she felt in her freedom, didn’t say 
anything about possible future repercussions for taking the trip.169 
The fifth and last technique practiced by the class was that the students 
became catalysts for change.170 With the new perspective the Freedom Writers gained 
through their exposure to a wider world came a sense of responsibility for those less 
fortunate than themselves. With Gruwell, and John Tu, a local businessman, they 
organized a relief effort for Zlata’s people in Bosnia who had suffered the effects of a 
long war against its citizens. This effort to reach out to the less fortunate was marked 
by the learned tolerance for difference and empathy that was a result of their exposure 
to literature and the working out of their own difficulties, part of which is expressed 
in their writing.  
I wish to emphasize the part writing played in this scenario. In an era when 
computers were finding their way into schools, the computer lab at Wilson High 
School had an insufficient number of computers for all the students in any class. John 
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Tu, the local businessman who had become interested in the progress of the students 
in Gruwell’s class, donated thirty-five computers to help them with their writing, 
enough for each student to have his or her own. Many of the students really didn’t 
have much of a home life, and preferred to stay at their computers writing and editing 
than going home. A number of times the students and Ms. Gruwell had to be kicked 
out of the building by security when the building needed to be closed. At one time 
they all had to crawl out the window to avoid the guard after the school had been 
closed for the night. Gruwell persisted, against the inertia of contemporary education, 
to help the students master themselves and succeed at integrating into a broader 
society than they could have imagined in their earlier years. 
Throughout the book, writing both communicates these techniques and is the 
technique itself whereby the individuals defined themselves. Though the school and 
context are different from those Foucault writes about, the power of writing as a 
technique of self-constitution comes through clearly in the abandonment of unhealthy 
lifestyles, the salvation through a conversion to the self, and the promotion of 
techniques of the self profitable not only for the individual, but also for the wider 
society. 
3.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have demonstrated some of the themes which Foucault 
thought would be important in any analysis of the Ancients. The first is that the care 
of the self was more important than knowledge of the self; the second is that 
establishing this fact requires a selective historiography focused on ethical writings. 
The third is that spirituality was the prerequisite of knowledge and was obtained by 
means of techniques of self-modification under the direction and guidance of a 
master. 
I have drawn from these themes the idea, which Foucault himself suggested, 
that every age and every culture has its own set of techniques of the self. From this I 
have extrapolated the conditions whereby one can recognize one of these techniques. 
In that context I drew parallels between writings of the Ancients, Foucault himself, 
and a group of contemporary high school students to demonstrate that writing as a 
technique of self-care, of self-development, still functions along recognizable lines 
from the Ancients to ourselves.  
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I have not attempted to encompass all techniques of the self in every age, but 
rather focus on demonstrating the similarities between the Ancients and ourselves 
with Foucault’s mediation. This will give me a context within which I will be able to 
extrapolate from a series of problems in contemporary ethical writings, techniques of 
the self that are not unlike those Foucault defined in the Ancients and those I have 
identified in Foucault and The Freedom Writers.  
The important thing to remember about Foucault’s version of the process of 
self-elaboration through self-care is that, even though it is an aesthetic project, it is 
also an ethical one. It is an aesthetic project in that self-care has no specific goal in 
mind; it is not teleological. And it is ethical in that it takes place through the 
elaboration of freedom, the discovery of limits, and the creative exploration of those 
limits and what lies beyond them. Foucault asks the question about limits and 
explores transgression as a method of redefining the self and writing an historical 
ontology of those limits. What Foucault does not do is articulate any philosophical 
structure for self-constitution of an individual. His remarks are leading and 
suggestive, especially when he is motivated to explain his own behaviour. But it is not 
a coherent program of the sort that could be attempted as a rule of living, as a spiritual 
technique. The closest he comes to a sort of personal technique can be understood 
biographically and is evident in three major biographies: Eribon’s, Macey’s, and 
Miller’s. Eribon speaks of the change of Foucault’s life in the early 1980s, how he 
moved toward a tranquillity of mind having found solace in Seneca’s writings. Macey 
describes the care with which Foucault projected himself, while Miller recounts 
Foucault’s own project of scripting the self in great detail. All three writers capture 
some sense of the persistent intentionality with which Foucault describes his own 
self-construction.  
Part of what it is to write a biography is to examine the cause and effect 
relation between actions and their results. What is helpful in Foucault’s remarks is 
that he consciously took the project of writing as a method of self-construction, and in 
that, his books are part of his own biography. Foucault’s books become not only the 
articulation of his research and conclusions, but also an articulation of his own 
formation. The goals he had in mind for his writing display, after the fact, a certain 
movement toward the development of a human ontology—not precisely a universal 
theory but a certain historical regularity, marked by ‘a suspension of ontological 
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certainty,’171 within his own behaviour articulated as the need for self-development 
and elaboration.  
In the next chapter I will explore one aspect of human ontology that represents 
a fair account of a motivation for an ethos sympathetic to Foucault’s intended 
outcome for a historical ontology. I will set up a rough distinction that is implicit in 
Foucault between strong theory and a weak theory. This will permit making some 
generalizations about the limits of human perception, rationality, and theorizing. After 
that, I will look at how a weak ontology, implicit in weak theory, fits Foucault’s 
work, especially in the material related to The Government of Self and Others172 about 
Plato’s seventh letter. In examining the seventh letter, Foucault makes a direct 
connection between the spiritual qualifications for knowledge and an ethos that 
permits Platonic philosophical knowledge. In other words, the possibility of 
philosophical knowledge requires attention to one’s moral qualifications in an ethos 
developed through techniques of the self. ‘The philosopher transforms his life into 
truth and transforms truth into a living reality in his character and actions, in his very 
body — aletheia becomes ethos through askésis.’173 
By examining James Rachels’ moral theory, I advance a technique of 
reasoning for our age within an ethos that qualifies a person for the discovery of 
knowledge. I illustrate this ethos by recounting the journey of Miroslav Volf in The 
End of Memory toward remembering rightly a sequence of events with his captors. 
The tension between his inclinations and the need for his own wholeness requires a 
technique of reason within an ethos whose goal is the redemption not only of his 
memories, but of the people that perpetrated violence against him. 
                                                 
171 JBR, p. 302. 
172 Michel Foucault, The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France 1982-
1983, ed. by Frédéric Gros, trans. by Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 
hereafter GSO. 
173 Edward McGushin, ‘Foucault and the Problem of the Subject’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 
31/5-6 (2005), 623-648, (p. 636). 
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Chapter 4: The Movement From Weak Ontology to Ethical 
Technique 
4.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that a movement toward ethical 
technologies of the self is driven in part by a need for self-mastery. Whether the 
ethical technology is one designed with the purpose of setting into place a formal 
decision procedure as we find in James Rachels’ moral theory, or a work of self-
transformation as we find in Miroslav Volf’s The End of Memory,1 the conditions for 
advancement in these projects rely on the production of a certain ethos in the person 
who recognizes the many ways the project may go wrong. The production of this 
ethos is the work of the self on the self that makes advancement in the project 
possible.  
As a result of this research, I will offer a technique that takes into account the 
results of weak theory, and incorporates the ethical project of self-construction as a 
goal. The ethos that is a result of this project of self-construction is characterized as a 
porosity or vulnerability to experience. Morality on this account again becomes a 
qualification for knowledge. The world is no longer judged from the perspective of a 
detached Cartesian rationality, but transforms the individual within a discipline of 
self-formation. 
The theme I wish to explore in this chapter is an ontological one; authentic 
self discovery forces a recognition of a deep weakness in our apprehension of the 
world and ourselves. What we are, embedded within our world cannot be 
apprehended merely as a matter of a theorizing, scientific, or formulaic logos, but as a 
recognition that entanglements of our reflective consciousness within the world do 
not permit us to ground our knowledge in any specifiable wholeness.2 We are left 
with a drive toward wholeness without knowledge of ontological boundaries, 
boundaries of our thoughts and actions, the constitution of our very selves. Whether 
we characterize the entanglements of our reflective consciousness in Foucauldian 
terms around the nexus of power relations, or in scientific terms around the nexus of 
our relation to the material universe, it may be impossible to demarcate successfully 
                                                 
1 Miroslav Volf, The End of Memory: Remembering Rightly in a Violent World (Grand Rapids, 
Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2006). 
2 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2007). I refer to his extensive appeal to the problems of human striving toward fullness in the early and 
later parts of this book. 
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the limits of the self in relation to the world. It may be impossible to explain the 
restless striving for completeness, for fullness, for knowledge of ourselves and the 
world without also recognizing the inherent limitations of our theorizing. 
Techniques of the self stand as markers in the process of developing access to 
forms of wholeness without theoretical foundations. Foundations per se may not be 
available, but mastery of the self implying mastery of the lived world through 
techniques of the self are rewards for an autonomous search for wholeness.  
The path I take in this chapter will be, first, to mark out a distinction between 
strong and weak ontology then demonstrate the movement to weak ontology nascent 
in Foucault by referring to analyses found in earlier chapters of this dissertation. After 
some general remarks about Foucault I will turn to a passage in the lectures of 1982-
1983, The Government of Self and Others where Foucault interprets Plato’s 
epistemological method described in the Seventh Letter as one that I extrapolate as 
being parallel to modern discussions of weak theory. Specifically, Foucault following 
Plato interprets the process of acquiring knowledge of the thing itself as a process 
requiring tribē or friction;3 this word is used and the state is also described by Aldo 
Gargani, a process rather than an end-point, incapable according to Plato of correct 
annunciation in any logos. The payoff of this discussion is a characterization of weak 
ontology that shows a movement in Foucault from weak ontology to techniques of the 
self. Characterizing Foucault in terms of weak ontology resolves some tension 
between his earlier and later works and sets up some connecting points between his 
narratives on knowledge and power relations that lead to a focus on technologies of 
the self. Specifically, the limitations of human knowledge serve as a context and 
motivation for striving toward self-mastery. 
In a discussion of James Rachels’ The Elements of Moral Philosophy, I will 
observe the structure of one possible movement in weak theory, that which promotes 
the development of an ethical project by defining the role of a rational technique, a 
                                                 
3  GSO, p. 251, ‘When the good quality soul undertakes this slow, lengthy, arduous work of going up 
and down through the other forms of knowledge, when he has practiced what Plato calls tribe—in the 
strict sense: rubbing or friction—knowledge of reality in its very being thereby becomes possible.’ 
Following is the quote from Plato examined in Foucault: ‘After much effort, as names, definitions, 
sights, and other data of sense are brought into contact and friction one with another, in the course of 
scrutiny and kindly testing by men who proceed by question and answer without ill will, with a sudden 
flash there shines forth understanding about every problem, and an intelligence whose efforts reach the 
furthest limits of human powers.’ Plato Letters 7 in Logos Virtual Library, 
<http://www.logoslibrary.org/plato/letters/07.html> [accessed 5 July 2010]  
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decision procedure for discovering what moral obligations ensue in any particular 
case, without pretensions to any universal apprehension of moral duty. 
After the discussion of how weak theory in Foucault led to technologies of the 
self, and the ethical technique of Rachels, I will give an example of a modern 
technology of the self sympathetic to weak theory and to the critique of a Cartesian 
rationality embedded in postmodern thought.4 Unlike the techniques of the self I 
described in the previous chapter, the practices of listening, reading, writing, and 
speech, the technique I specify will be a rational one, part of a studied ethos that 
permits exploration of reality within the limitations of human knowledge. I justify 
expressing this as a technique partly because the seeds of it are already contained in 
Foucault, and partly because it follows from the works discussed in the next section 
of this chapter. The result of practicing this technique is the development of an ethos 
that responds to Foucault’s call for developing an attitude toward the self and its 
mastery,5 and takes as some of its instruments the developments of weak ontology 
within James Rachels’ ethos. 
4.2. Weak Ontology 
Weak theory is not a claim about the weakness of some theory, but a claim 
about the weakness of human theorizing. It is a claim about human inability to 
apprehend existence transparently, or if one can apprehend existence well enough, 
about the expression of that apprehension as being incompletely characterized by any 
written or spoken thought. Weak theory is therefore a claim about human being, a 
claim about the limitations of human thinking and expression. It is an ontology. So, 
weak theory is a weak ontology. The claim of weak ontology is not a sceptical claim, 
however, but a claim about the impossibility for human beings to have transparent 
flawless access to reality itself and to any corresponding expression of that reality. It 
is not a claim about the impossibility of knowledge.6 
It may be helpful to start this discussion with a view that though not strictly 
the definition given for weak theory by some Italian and American philosophers7 
nonetheless sets up an instructive contrast with ‘strong’ theory. Lee Smolin details 
                                                 
4 See Chapter 1.3.2 of this dissertation. 
5 POT, ‘What is Enlightenment?’ p. 97. 
6 I refer here to all the cautions about knowledge derivable from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, as well 
as other parts of his work. He is not denying knowledge, rather denying it is absolute. This plays well 
with Foucault’s treatment of knowledge. 
7 Italians: Gianni Vattimo, Aldo G. Gargani, and Pier Aldo Rovatti; American: Stephen White. 
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some problems with physics through the narratives of its practitioners, their successes 
and failures, triumphs and defeats. He does not define weak theory, instead, he 
suggests that what philosophers are doing in the late twentieth century is not strong 
theory.  
The Italian philosophers have what I think is an interesting way to refer to the 
transition taking place in the twentieth century in philosophy. They refer to 
what they call strong theory and weak theory. Strong theory is what the 
philosophers aspired to do before this century, which was to discover by 
rational reflection and argument the absolute and complete truth about 
existence and elaborate these truths into complete philosophical systems. 
Weak theory is what philosophers have been doing since Wittgenstein and 
Gödel taught us the impossibility of doing this.8  
A decade later,9 Smolin traces some problems with the discipline of physics that lead 
him to conclude that science cannot be characterized as following any particular 
reasoning process, or experimental practice. ‘Success in science is to a large extent 
driven by courage and character. […] Science progresses because it is built on an 
ethic recognizing that in the face of incomplete information we are all equal.’10 As a 
theoretical physicist and cosmologist Smolin encourages a move toward humility and 
caution in the knowledge enterprise in the face of the difficulties faced by any 
scientific explanation of the universe. Though he is generally optimistic about the 
product of scientific research, the history of scientific practice tempers that optimism.  
Even a cursory review of scientific theorizing over the last few centuries 
reveals how often theory has been wrong, even when a contested theory has had some 
explanatory power and predictive success. Models of scientific theorizing, from 
Cartesian rationalism and Baconian empiricism to modern theories of physics, 
biology, and psychology all betray their limitations, their inability to exactly 
correspond with reality. These methods lack exact knowledge, not because the 
questions they asked have been incorrectly posed, but because of an inherent inability 
of human theorizing exposed in the failure to solve once and for all lasting riddles and 
puzzles thrown up in the face of the persistent effort of scientific practitioners.  
In its strongest form Smolin’s sentiment about scientific theory is that the 
scientific theoretical enterprise can only roughly produce experimental results, and 
                                                 
8 Lee Smolin, The Life of the Cosmos (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 297-98. 
9 Lee Smolin, The Trouble with Physics: The Rise of String Theory, the Fall of a Science, and What 
Comes Next (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2006).  
10 Smolin, the Trouble with Physics. p. 306. Notable here is Smolin’s conclusion that it is not a 
scientific method that founds scientific practice, but rather an egalitarian ethic. 
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those do not count as formal theoretical proofs. In all probability theories do not grasp 
reality correctly at this moment. Smolin’s appeal to weak theory is a response to the 
history and practice of science in its attempt to know the universe. The cogency of his 
critique of foundations is necessary, first, because much of mankind’s greatest 
intellectual effort has been spent in various scientific projects, and second, scientific 
research has often been treated as a secure foundation.11 
I refer to Smolin to suggest that weak theory is not confined to philosophical, 
historical, or ethical discourse. Smolin gives us a view of a problem with the human 
enterprise of knowledge acquisition and expression in general. The effects of 
Smolin’s insight about the physical sciences suggest that theorizing should move 
toward a modest and critical rational attitude. So Smolin’s reference to weak theory is 
a way of saying that theorists must mistrust absolute totalizing claims about reality. 
Now, let us move beyond Smolin’s use of weak theory to an evaluation of some 
remarks by the Italians he refers to because it may be useful if we can specify what 
this claim of weakness is. 
Giovanna Borradori in Recoding Metaphysics12 provides access to some 
expressions of weak theory. Weak theory is a general term meant to describe some 
aspects of human character, and defined by Borradori it is a choice of an attitude 
promoting weak thought. Weak thought as outlined by Borradori is in 
clear-cut opposition to the Cartesian-rationalist tradition, with which it 
identifies tout court the totalizing root of the innovative and revolutionary 
“ideologies” of modernity. This “weakness” (debolezza) of thought is in fact 
taken up as the product of “a rationality which must de-strengthen itself 
within, cede ground, have no fear of drawing back, …must not remain 
paralyzed by the loss of the luminous, unique and stable Cartesian 
reference.”13 
These remarks extracted from the Italian thinkers Gianni Vattimo and Pier 
Aldo Rovatti define limitations of human being as weakness, and distance, 
respectively. Aldo Gargani describes the problem of the human knowledge enterprise 
in terms of friction between the self and reality.14 Stephen White, an American, 
                                                 
11 I am referring to the Vienna Circle and the practitioners of positivism, but not only that project. 
Many disciplines like that of the positivists of the twentieth century have assumed the tautology that 
the truth of statements and their associated provability need no further theoretic or evidentiary support. 
12 Giovanna Borradori, Recoding Metaphysics, ed. by Giovanna Borradori, (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1988), hereafter RM. This is collection of essays from late twentieth-
century Italian philosophy. 
13 RM, pp. 6-7. She quotes Vattimo and Rovatti. 
14 RM, p. 13. 
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speaks of the ‘stickiness of subjectivity’15 which is contrasted with ‘the idea of 
subjects striving toward frictionless forward motion.’16 
White reminds his reader of the deep entanglement of the knowing self with 
its human realities and makes a case for the suspension of prejudice, of generalized 
judgements arising from the ‘disengaged self,’17 Comparing a certainty of the truth 
arising from a ‘categorical positing […] of human nature or telos [with] existential 
realities, most notably language, mortality or finitude, natality, and the articulation of 
“sources of the self”’18 White suggests that our existential groundedness, instead of 
needing to be dispensed with for the construction of an objective truth of the world, 
must inform the limited constructions of any possible worldview. A weak ontology on 
this account non-reductively captures an engagement with reality that forbids a 
‘crystalline conviction of the truth.’19 
Vattimo reflecting on Heidegger and Nietzsche20 suggests that there may be 
no absolute ground to found a metaphysics on. A hermeneutic grounding appears to 
be the only ground available.21 It only becomes available at ‘the nth metamorphosis of 
the hermeneutic circle,’22 when one can go no further. One finds a hermeneutic 
ground as a persistent residue of possible interpretations. It must not be taken as truth, 
or foundational, but more like a working hypothesis, amenable to adjustment. This 
ground is weak in the sense that it never achieves correspondence with reality, and 
must stop short because the ideal of correspondence is unachievable. The weak 
grounding in reality Vattimo offers arises from a weak ontology. 
Pier Aldo Rovatti uses two metaphors to describe human experience that 
emerge from use of the word scarto.23 He defined scarto as a swerve or sudden jerky 
movement. The first metaphor arising from this term is that of the river that does not 
proceed in a straightforward fashion. It swerves. ‘The river does not follow a direct 
route. Its tortuous course is also experience, which is almost always the longest path, 
                                                 
15 Stephen K. White, ‘Weak Ontology and Liberal Political Reflection,’ in Political Theory vol. 25, 
issue 4, August 1997, p. 507. 
16 Stephen K. White, ‘Weak Ontology and Liberal Political Reflection,’ p. 507. 
17 Stephen K. White, Sustaining Affirmation (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), 
hereafter SA, p. 8. ‘The disengaged self’ is also a central feature of Charles Taylor’s discussion of the 
‘buffered self’ in A Secular Age, pp. 37-38 and passim. 
18 SA, p. 9. 
19 SA, p. 9. 
20 RM, Gianni Vattimo, ‘Toward and Ontology of Decline,’ pp. 63-75. 
21 RM, Vattimo, ‘Toward an Ontology of Decline,’ p. 69.  
22 RM, Vattimo, ‘Toward an Ontology of Decline,’ p. 73. 
23 RM, Pier Aldo Rovatti, ‘Maintaining the Distance,’ pp. 117-18. 
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made up of curves and bends.’24 The second metaphor is that of the tightrope humans 
must walk to cross the abyss, and the precarious equilibrium one must maintain to do 
it successfully. One misstep, ‘a small movement, a scarto, is sufficient to lose it.’25 
Rovatti asks whether it is possible to avoid that small movement that disrupts our 
equilibrium, and to stand above the curves of the river that characterize our normal 
experience.26 He concludes that it is not possible. The scarto is inevitable in human 
being. 
Rovatti suggests that a non-foundational rationality27 admitting the scarto 
provides a necessary distance,28 though that distance couldn’t be called objectivity. 
There is no time when people couldn’t be surprised by experience, but they are 
buffered from the actual surprise by the distance provided by admitting the possibility 
that experience can surprise and turn our perception in unexpected ways. The human 
being cannot separate itself from the entanglement of being in the world. Human 
experience of being in the world denies a Cartesian objectivity and entails permanent 
risk of losing equilibrium. Apprehension of the world for Rovatti is therefore weak. 
Perhaps the most telling voice with respect to the line of reasoning I offer 
about weak ontology is that of Aldo Gargani. First, he rejects the strong theories of 
the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries and, second, he rejects the ‘cultures of 
paradigms, of the versions of the world, and of conceptual schemes’29 that developed 
later to replace those theories. He explains that strong theories require a frictionless 
mirror in which to see the pure possibility of the origins of their thoughts and actions, 
and to access the truth of their being.30 Neither correspondence nor coherence define 
truth, but correspondence and coherence create possible versions of the world that is 
not the world or thought itself. Instead, thought 
is not a specific, autonomous, and independent essence that interprets, that 
forms ideas, versions, or conceptions of the world. […] No, thought is the 
concrete weaving formed from an unpredictable constellation of events, of 
diverse scenes, of signs of passions; and if these same events, scenes, these 
different signs, details introduced by chance or accidentals of life, by the 
                                                 
24 RM, Rovatti, ‘Maintaining the Distance,’ p. 118. 
25 RM, Rovatti, ‘Maintaining the Distance,’ p. 118. 
26 RM, Rovatti, ‘Maintaining the Distance,’ p. 119. 
27 Rovatti wishes the reader to recognize that the scarto prevents any thorough formalization of 
knowledge. The scope of what we can possibly know must shrink to acknowledge limitations within 
the knowledge project. 
28 The distance is a form of the impossibility of the observer’s correspondence with the world. 
29 RM, Aldo Gargani, ‘Friction of Thought,’ p. 77. 
30 RM, Aldo Gargani, ‘Friction of Thought,’ p. 78. This mirror metaphor is reminiscent of some of 
Richard Rorty’s remarks in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. 
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fragments that each person lives of this existence, were removed, there would 
no longer remain anything we could call “thought.”31 
Gargani does not arrive at an idealization of thought in logically strong theory or 
frictionless reflections of reality resulting in versions of the world dispossessed of 
persons, but a lived world with all the attendant difficulties, frictions, and accidents. 
Gargani gives a version of weak ontology that leaves purported strong ontologies 
lacking in the very characteristics that supposedly made them desirable: an aloof 
Cartesian subject that permits theoretical coherence and consistency, objectivity and 
foundations.  
The disengaged self described by White, and the evasive and unattainable 
ground of Vattimo show the failure of foundationalism. Rovatti’s scarto prevents the 
availability of objective truth as correspondence, entailing permanent risk of losing 
equilibrium. Gargani explains the failure of strategies designed to delineate 
correspondence and coherence theories of truth. These representative approaches 
mark the embeddedness of human being that admits and even thrives within 
limitation. They mark out a space where human ontology lives within constraints that 
cannot be eliminated.  
This survey of weak theory and weak ontology in the last thirty years is 
indicative of an abandonment of strong theory arising out of a Cartesian moment,32 
and a consolidation of a set of problems not yet fully fleshed out in the late Foucault.  
However, Foucault struggled successfully with the ontological problematic stated in 
the preceding paragraphs. When Foucault required the construction of an historical 
ontology as part of the process of self-construction,33 he acknowledges the deep 
embeddedness of the self within an historical matrix of power relations and the 
inability of formal rationality to arrive at a distanced, dispassionate, objective 
acquisition of either self-knowledge or knowledge of the world. In what follows I 
provide an extended discussion of Foucault’s relation to weak ontology. 
4.3. Foucault and Weak Ontology 
In this section, I will trace some movements within Foucault’s methodology 
that parallel the development of weak ontology. I will refer to work already 
mentioned in earlier chapters of this dissertation. In addition, I will discuss some of 
                                                 
31 RM, Aldo Gargani, ‘Friction of Thought,’ p. 87. 
32 HS, p. 14. 
33 POT, pp. 113, 115, ‘What is Enlightenment?.’ 
Douglas F. Olena 179  
Foucault’s analysis of Plato’s epistemology found in The Government of Self and 
Others, in order to make a connection between Foucault’s thought and weak 
ontology.  
4.3.1. Archaeology 
One clue that Foucault’s archaeology is comparable with weak ontology is in 
the archaeological method described in The Archaeology of Knowledge. First, the 
objects he used and referred to: the archive, positivities, discursive regularities, 
singularities, etc. are never foundational. Foucault does not attempt to claim for these 
objects any sort of universality. They are constructions of purposively limited data 
sets. His intention is to avoid any appeal to universals, idealizations, teleological 
explanations, or general consensus. From these data sets the archaeological method 
exposes the emergence and/or disappearance of discursive regularities, the products 
of human enterprise that may or may not coalesce into sciences. 
Foucault critiques historical analyses that attempt to ground their work in 
certain origins, the continuity of and ‘apostolic succession’ of ideas, and finally a 
version of history that is driving teleologically toward the apotheosis of man, under 
totalized formal rules for progress. Foucault dismisses a version of history that 
requires the reduction of disparate events and formations in history to a single locus, a 
single explanatory logos, a single lens through which all history needs to be viewed, 
an ideological structure privileging a single totalizing idea.34 
The seamless world of the history of ideas he critiques, that smoothes over 
discontinuities, eruptions, and breaks leading to an ideal humanity, becomes 
implausible when the data of history speak in their own voice. The death of man in 
Foucault’s early work is nothing more than a recognition that Cartesian subjectivity as 
a construct of scientific examination of man is impossible to achieve.35 Subjects don’t 
have access to the world supposed in that view. There is a necessary distance 
(Rovatti), irremediable friction (Gargani), and stickiness (White) in human 
apprehension of the subject and the world. Foucault sees this and so chooses in his 
research to allow historical objects to present themselves as embedded in the world 
without reductive theoretical structures that weave together an artificial story of 
origins, continuity, and totalization. The lumbering, clumsy, chaotic, and accidental 
                                                 
34 AK, p. 138. 
35 FL, ‘The Birth of a World,’ interview with Jean-Michel Palmier, p. 67. 
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progress of man can as easily disappear in Foucault’s archaeology as it appeared in 
the first place because there is no telos, no predictable end of either man or the world 
in some apocalypse.  
One aspect of weak ontology in Foucault’s thinking is demonstrated by his 
distance from the attribution of some transcendentally purposive connection 
privileged by the observing subject.36 He held instead to a more plastic subjectivity. 
In the early- to mid-1970s that plastic subject was formed by the power relations it 
was embedded in. In Foucault’s ethical writings, the self becomes responsible for 
forming the plastic subject in the context of ordinary power relations. Foucault did not 
dispense with this view of man, and throughout his writing appealed to it. Like 
Smolin, Foucault rejects strong theory, and opts for a limited subject. 
4.3.2. Genealogy 
The objects Foucault observes in his genealogical research of the early- to 
mid-1970s at once fill a much larger scope than those aimed at through archaeology.37 
As I mentioned previously, archaeological research provides the ground for an 
accurate though extremely limited excavation of history, while genealogy attempts to 
capture the movements of history in conjunction with relations of power.  
Why didn’t he use the tools of his own contemporary society to look at 
history? The answer is, negatively, that he wished to avoid an anachronistic view of 
historical social structures38 even though he was not entirely successful in doing so in 
the Archaeology.39 Foucault discovered that archaeology was insufficiently flexible to 
comprehend the broad features of social relations. It excluded too much. The objects 
of his genealogical research were also incapable of providing sufficient room for the 
subject. In Discipline and Punish the subjectification of individuals on whom 
                                                 
36 Even as Borradori suggests above. 
37 Genealogy is a method that, like archaeology, does not look for ‘genesis, continuity, [and] 
totalization.’ (AK, p. 138) Foucault discusses the nature of genealogy as being ‘Opposed to a genesis 
oriented towards the unity of some principial [sic] cause burdened with multiple descendants.’ (POT, 
‘What is Critique?’ p. 64) While including the archive, the object of archaeology does not confine itself 
to that archive, or merely to the emergent properties within a civilization that generate discursive 
regularities. The scope of genealogy is larger, taking into account not only the explicitly archaeological 
work but also the problems of power as well as ethics, (EST, p. 262) creating an account of society at 
once more general, as well as more supple and inclusive. 
38 Early in Discipline and Punish Foucault outlines the project of genealogy with respect to a study of 
the prison system: ‘I would like to write the history of this prison, with all the political investments of 
the body that it gathers together in its closed architecture. Why? Simply because I am interested in the 
past? No, if one means by that writing a history of the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one means 
writing the history of the present.’ (DP, p. 30-31)  
39 Merquior, pp. 62-64, in his chapter on the Archaeology. 
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legalities were forced40 within the disciplinary, hierarchical society is too complete. 
Freedom of choice and movement is severely circumscribed and the individual’s very 
soul is formed by the disciplinary powers. In the objects41 Foucault examined, the 
subject is over-determined by the disciplinary apparatus. 
Because of the weakness of the subject discovered in these studies, Foucault 
kept returning to the problem of freedom in the studies of the late-1970s and early-
1980s. He moved toward an ethical and aesthetic construction of the self. Though the 
early genealogical work was not capable of portraying a fully free subject, it did 
nonetheless open for inspection a weakness in objective science residing within the 
subject itself, that is, a subject is too deeply embedded in the matrix of power 
relations to extricate itself, and cannot achieve an objective view. 
4.3.3. Discourse on Freedom 
In chapter 2 of this dissertation I examined some problems with freedom. I 
concluded that though Kant’s ethical work tended toward a project possible only in 
ideal circumstances, his call to be courageous enough to use one’s own reasoning is 
central to his view of enlightenment.42 Though in the Groundwork the virtue of 
courage is neither essential nor foundational, it seems to be so in the Aufklärung. Kant 
asked us to break the internal boundaries of our self-incurred tutelage, and there 
seems to be some risk of failure without courage. However, Kant wished to mollify 
the effects of any possible risk resulting from that lack of courage by binding us to an 
ideal state where we could remain obedient to the authorities while speaking our mind 
freely. It is hard to shake the feeling in Kant that if we work hard enough within a 
state that limits its own power, we can perfect ourselves.  
In hindsight, Foucault saw that Kant missed the important element of 
pervasive power relations within the state. So, in Kant, the objective of enlightenment 
ceases to concern itself with limiting the power of the state. Foucault then constructed 
a strategy for forming ‘a philosophical ethos consisting in a critique of what we are 
saying, thinking, and doing through a historical ontology of ourselves.’43 Part of this 
project of forming an ethos will require that we call into question the presupposed 
                                                 
40 Ordinarily, the poor, the working class, the common soldier, and the delinquent are subjects of the 
disciplinary society. But in The History of Sexuality Foucault also outlines a focus on upper-middle 
class sexuality. 
41 At least the birth of the prison and sexuality. 
42 POT, p. 29. 
43 POT, p. 113, ‘What is Enlightenment?’ 
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limits of speech, thought, and behaviour through an experiment in freedom. Doing 
this will require resistance to pervasive power relations. Resistance will require 
courage, and it is here Foucault advances beyond Kant. Foucault concluded that this 
experiment will never be ‘practiced in the search for formal structures with universal 
value’44 because these structures were not available. Weak ontology also does not 
permit transparent access to any possible formal structures. 
As shown by the archaeological project Foucault did not think that there were 
such things as universal structures or universal values. Trying to impose those 
structures on a historical ontology would twist the results of research until the history 
would be history no more and the ontology an ideal incapable of representing human 
being.  
I used the Quakers to explain how a discourse on freedom can take place 
within a society that had a weak ontology with respect to their view of people. I 
demonstrated with them, following Foucault’s discussion of counter-conduct, that 
resistance to power can be effectively carried out, without the requirements of formal 
state structures and Kantian framed limitations on it. The Quakers appealed to the 
direct revelation of God and staged their resistance to overweening state and church 
authority on Biblical and ethical grounds. The friction they endured by retaining a 
posture of ethical counter-conduct to the state eventually brought them liberty and 
prosperity, though not without cost. Requiring the direct revelation of God as 
intervention in their decision-making process shows that the Quakers mistrusted 
something of their view of reality, and their ability to correctly calculate the outcome 
of their decisions. This posture is perfectly coherent as an expression of weak 
ontology. Freedom is possible even without Cartesian objectivity, rationality, or 
foundational structures of human ontology. 
The Quakers sidestepped external social authority altogether by not appealing 
to the guidance and wisdom of either the state or the Church of England. Guidance 
from God in the Quaker ethos takes human limitations within ordinary life as 
foundational. No human has a God’s-eye objective view of reality or truth. The 
experimental ethos of the Quakers required a posture of dependence on God. In 
obeying the light within, the spirit of God, they achieved a form of freedom within the 
world. For Foucault, in any experiment of this kind, the outcome is uncertain, 
                                                 
44 POT, p. 113, ‘What is Enlightenment?’ 
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unpredictable, liable to all the friction and swerving that on my account might 
characterize a weak ontology. But the project of self-constitution carried out by the 
Quakers shows evidence of the perspicacity of Foucault’s insight.   
4.3.4. Platonic Epistemology 
In this section, I show how Foucault’s weak ontology as described through 
Plato’s refusal to write in Letters: 7,45 requires the development of the self through 
ethical techniques as part of the process of acquiring philosophical knowledge. 
Foucault’s reflection here describes the failure of formal studies to adequately 
account for subjective apprehension of reality. The ethos required contains a moral 
component, concentration, and work. 
In The Government of Self and Others Foucault lectures on a passage in 
Plato’s Letters: 7, 341-345. Foucault follows the argument fairly closely and 
concludes that Plato was beginning a whole new practice: ‘It is the advent of 
philosophy, of a philosophy whose very reality would be the practice of self on self. It 
is in fact something like the Western subject which is at stake in this simultaneous 
and conjoint refusal of writing and of logos.’46 The stakes Foucault refers to here are 
the price for commitments to a possible ethos found in a Greek worldview. The first 
ethos Foucault discovered during the late 1970s early 1980s is that the Greeks were 
primarily concerned with answering how one should take care of the self. The second 
arose from the dictum ‘know thyself’ taken from the oracle at Delphi, and was made 
out to be an ethos of self examination, of self analysis and exploration. Out of 
practices associated with this internal analysis, Foucault wanted us to see the 
formation of the Cartesian ego, distanced, dispassionate, objective judge of the world 
and the self. Associated with the formation of subjectivity along these lines is a belief 
that the truth of being is capable of being captured in writing and logos and the sense, 
mistaken on Foucault’s account, that knowledge acquired by this form of subjectivity 
leads to the truth of being. Absent from this form of subjectivity based on self-
knowledge, is the spiritual qualification outlined by the ancients, specifically by Plato.  
The refusal of writing and logos in this passage refers to a distinction Plato 
draws between knowledge of the thing in its very being, which is inexpressible in 
                                                 
45 This letter pointed to the insufficiency of Dionysius’ knowledge of philosophy, how his claims to 
competence founded on his own writings fails in Plato’s judgment to count as philosophical 
knowledge. There are other places in Plato’s dialogues where writing philosophical knowledge is 
questioned, such as the Phaedrus. 
46 GSO, p. 245. My emphasis.  
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writing and logos, and a systematic presentation of knowledge ‘in the form of 
mathēmata, [that] cannot in any way correspond to the reality of philosophical 
knowledge: the constant friction between the different modes of knowledge.’47 
Mathēmata or formal studies, annunciate at best some science of a thing. Mathēmata 
can order the examination of the object, but fail to achieve for the auditor or reader a 
sense of the being in itself, what Plato called philosophic knowledge. 
Early in the 16 February 1983 second-hour lecture Foucault quotes Plato who 
says that anyone who has written or claimed to have knowledge of his studies has ‘no 
real acquaintance with the subject.’48 Here Plato claims also not to have composed 
any writing about it and promises never to do so because ‘there is no way of putting it 
in words like other studies (mathēmata).’49 Instead after long arduous work of 
‘instruction in the subject itself and of close companionship, when, suddenly, like a 
blaze kindled by a leaping spark, it [philosophical knowledge] is generated in the soul 
and at once becomes self sustaining.’50 
The first crucial feature of this exposition is that philosophical knowledge is 
knowledge of the very being of a thing and can’t be summarized in a mathēmata, a 
formula to be used as instruction.51 The second feature is that the process of acquiring 
philosophical knowledge requires work whose real effort is ethical formation of the 
self, work on the self that qualifies one for knowledge. 
The acquisition of philosophical knowledge can be broken down into five 
parts. The first three parts of the examination are the name (onoma), definition 
(logos), and image (eidolon) of the object. The fourth part is knowledge (epistemē) of 
the object which Foucault translates as science.52 This includes knowledge (epistemē), 
intelligence (noūs), and true opinion (alethes te doxa).53 The fifth element of 
                                                 
47 GSO, p. 252. 
48 Plato: The Collected Dialogues including the Letters, ed. by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985), Letter VII 341c, pp. 1588-89. Here Plato is referring 
explicitly to Dionysius who claimed to have philosophic knowledge that he had written in books. 
49 Plato, Letter VII 341c, p. 1589. 
50 Plato, Letter VII 341c, d, p. 1589. 
51 This is why Plato criticises Dionysius for his philosophical works. He is saying that Dionysius has 
missed the point entirely, thinking that writing books shows how qualified one is in philosophical 
knowledge. 
52 GSO, p. 250. and Plato, Letter VII 342b, p. 1589. 
53 Plato, Letter VII 342c, p. 1589. I don’t know here whether Foucault’s Greek text is the same one I 
have or not because Foucault calls one constituent of the fourth part orthe doxa (GSO, p. 250) or right 
opinion. L.A Post (referred to in this reference) translated the term as correct opinion, and the Greek 
text I have uses the phrase alethes te doxa, translated by Bury as true opinion. I’m not sure here that 
any of these translations are adequate. It might also be translated as revealed or unconcealed or 
discovered opinion since alethia is derived from the negation of lethe translated as forgetting. Here the 
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knowledge, knowledge of the thing in its being, takes up the large part of Foucault’s 
discourse. It is this fifth element, philosophical knowledge, that cannot be 
successfully reduced to formal study, either written, or spoken. Plato, therefore, 
refuses to do so.54 However, Plato gives clues to a technique useful for setting up the 
conditions for the possibility of experiencing this ‘blaze kindled by a leaping spark.’55 
The first step leading toward qualification for philosophical knowledge is to 
specify what distinguishes the object in question by a thorough examination of the 
first three elements. Being the most readily available parts, name, definition, and 
image must first be examined; they lead to a science that is modified (and modifies 
the distinctions within the first three elements) as the study progresses. Foucault asks 
what the agent of the fifth form of knowledge is. He points to one of the elements of 
the fourth form, nous, (mind or intellect,) which according to Plato’s Timaeus is a 
divine element of the soul. One must acquire this form of knowledge ‘through the 
coming and going, the ascent and decent through the four other degrees of knowledge 
and through the instruments that characterize these other forms of knowledge.’56 The 
second qualification, ‘that the soul be of good quality,’57 leads Foucault to connect the 
acquisition of philosophical knowledge with the necessity of ethical techniques and 
the work of the self on the self.  
The third qualification for the acquisition of knowledge of the thing in its 
being is the work surrounding the development of an intimate acquaintance with the 
thing itself. Foucault roughly translates the term intimate acquaintance (sunousia) as 
‘to live with’ or ‘cohabit’ with the thing itself as the only way to gain that intimate 
knowledge.58 R.G. Bury translates the term as ‘communion’59 and L. A. Post as ‘close 
companionship.’60 Foucault expects, however, that the intimacy necessary to acquire 
the fifth dimension of knowledge would need ‘affinity with, must be suggenēs (kin) 
with the thing itself, with precisely to pragma (the object);’61 this kinship produces 
through labour a knowledge of the thing in itself. That labour is characterized by a 
                                                 
concept alethia is derived in Platonic epistemology as recollection. Plato: In Twelve Volumes, vol. IX, 
tr. R. G. Bury (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 534-35. Hereafter Bury. 
54 Plato, Letter VII 341c, p. 1589. 
55 Plato, Letter VII 341c, d, p. 1589. 
56 GSO, p. 250. 
57 GSO, p. 251. and Plato, Letter VII 343e, p. 1591. 
58 GSO, p. 248. 
59 Bury, p. 531. 
60 Plato, Letter VII 341c, p. 1589. 
61 GSO, p. 251. 
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study of virtue and existence by ‘constant practice (tribē) throughout a long period.’62 
It is this constant practice (tribē) in moral virtue and science which qualifies the 
inquirer for knowledge. Foucault focuses on the word tribē, translating it strictly ‘as 
rubbing or friction, [and, more commonly] everything which is exercise, training, […] 
through which one gets used to something, practices something.’63 Gargani’s insight 
is useful here. Having abandoned strong, universalizing theories and the ‘cultures of 
paradigms, of the versions of the world, and of conceptual schemes’64 that followed, 
Gargani rejects as candidates for philosophical knowledge65 the mathēmata of modern 
science, the formal, logical treatments of truth. The frictionless mirrors of a Cartesian 
self do not represent the ‘lived world with all the attendant difficulties, frictions, and 
accidents.’66 On Foucault’s and Plato’s account, one can attain to knowledge of the 
thing itself but doing so will require tribē, friction, effort to reach the goal. Finally, ‘a 
flash of understanding […] blazes up, and the mind, as it exerts all its powers to the 
limit of human capacity, is flooded with light.’67 Gargani might not dispute the 
possibility of Plato’s flash of insight, but, like Plato he thinks that it is ineffable.  
For Foucault, the ethical exercise on the self, and the work required to reach 
insight are part of the process of self-construction even as the attainment of 
philosophical knowledge is for Plato. Foucault was in agreement with Plato’s 
assessment about the limitations of mathēmata and the ethical exercise required to 
attain philosophical knowledge. Foucault believed that a historical ontology can be 
constructed that is part of the project aimed at producing a philosophic ethos that 
takes into account the encounter with the thing in itself without specifying it in terms 
of a frictionless access to truth. 
4.3.5. The Ethical Turn 
I consider that the ethical turn in Foucault from the late 1970s is compatible 
with a weak ontology. As a result of his query into knowledge, power relations, and 
the problems of freedom he adopted a view like that of the weak ontology I have 
described earlier in this chapter. For Foucault, a recognition of the disengaged subject 
                                                 
62 Plato, Letter VII 344b, p. 1591, and Bury, p. 539, ‘Through the most diligent and prolonged 
investigation.’ 
63 GSO, p. 251. 
64 RM, Aldo Gargani, ‘Friction of Thought,’ p. 77. 
65 in Plato’s parlance. 
66 Quoted from section II. of this chapter. 
67 Plato, Letter VII 344b, p. 1591.  
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in what he called the Cartesian moment, marked a return to ethical techniques, to 
spiritual practices as the qualification for knowledge.68 So a weak ontology, on this 
account, leads to ethical techniques of self-construction. I am claiming that a weak 
ontology can be understood as underlying Foucault’s historical ontology, through the 
development of an ethos in an inevitable move toward an ethical and critical 
engagement with the world.  
4.4. From Weak Ontology to Rational Techniques 
In the following section I will examine part of the ethical project of James 
Rachels that represents one possible result a weak ontology permits. Explicitly, 
Rachels does not aim at a mathēmata of ethical truth. Rather he allows that though the 
individual may strive for ethical truths, the truths acquired are severely limited by 
circumstance, by the limits of science and human knowledge, and by available 
rationales. Critical reason alone, for Rachels, is not sufficient to produce a single 
unequivocal universal ethical rule. Reason, paralleling Plato’s use,69 does the work of 
analyzing all parts of a problem, produces an answer to whatever ethical dilemma is 
posed. That answer is not universalizable or capable of capturing any essential 
foundational characteristics of ethical decision making. 
4.4.1. James Rachels’ Moral Philosophy 
Though Rachels’ The Elements of Moral Philosophy is only one of many 
introductory ethical texts, it is worth singling out as a paradigm case70 of an attitude 
that favours contingency yet provides fair guidelines for proceeding.71 It is a text, not 
unlike Foucault’s oeuvre or Sissela Bok’s Lying where history, science, statistics, 
philosophy, and psychology play on a level field of discourses, where moral axioms 
in an Aristotle, Kant, or Mill are treated without deference, except as historical 
objects within an analysis of their fitness. For Rachels, none of these stated historical 
models for ethics can be accepted without modification, elaboration, and sufficient 
caveats concerning their weaknesses.  
                                                 
68 The subject/object double no longer exists within a weak ontology because the Cartesian subject on 
which the distinction rested, turned out to be an inadequate description of human ontology. 
69 Reason constitutes the divine element in the soul. 
70 I am not referring to Thomas Kuhn’s multifaceted use of the word ‘paradigm’ here, but rather to an 
ordinary sense.  
71 A weak ontology is not a limit on ethical problematization but a cautionary note about ideal  
solutions and closed systems. Weak ontology in ethical thought requires that a critical function should 
persist even when a solution to a problem has been found and one should remain open to more 
evidence. 
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The keystone of Rachels’ ethical project is a minimum conception of 
morality.72 For Rachels, the minimum conception is foundational. It is surprisingly 
free of ethical rhetoric but rich in historical and practical implications. For the 
moralist, however, each statement within the minimum conception reflects the most 
successful results of ethical thought proposed through the ages.73 The minimum 
conception contains two elements: 1. reasoning, as stated above; and 2. concern for 
the interests of others. Reasoning is a process, not a particular rationality, while 
concern for the interests of others focuses on a thorough identification with the people 
subject to the ethical decisions being made. Rachels, though he considers moral 
theories as methodologically useful, tests their suitability in each case by how that 
theory addresses concern for the interest of others.  
Rachels’ moral philosophy centres around the development of fitness or 
aptness principles for deciding what one must do based on the minimum conception; 
This is conducted with an awareness that decisions must proceed without complete 
information, or knowledge of actual consequences, without the law of God, or any 
particular logos. Rachels does not privilege any system or axiom, but pleads in the 
final chapter of The Elements of Moral Philosophy for the cooperation of every 
feature of moral life in the decision-making process. 
Rachels’ conclusion has three parts: principles, methods, and attitudes. First, 
principles arise as the residue of a critique of salient historical principles and 
practices, and though not provable in terms of scientific evidence, still compel in 
terms of recommended behaviours.74 One such principle is impartiality, part of 
Rachels’ minimum conception: ‘The basic idea is that each individual’s interests are 
equally important; from within the moral point of view, there are no privileged 
persons.’75 The scope of impartiality reaches to groups of people as well. Through an 
examination of history this principle compels us to recognize that all people have at 
                                                 
72 EMP, p. 13.  
73 Rachels believes that principles like the Golden Rule, and respect for persons without being 
foundational are required because ethical systems and decisions that do not include them can be shown 
to be deficient on the same grounds that relativist ethics can, in which the ethical relativist cannot 
explain why some behaviours are preferable to others.  
74 EMP, p. 47. There is no appeal to foundations here, only a durable persistence of considerations 
from multiple perspectives. 
75 EMP, p. 13. 
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one time or another been subject to proscriptions76 justified by some moral or 
physical difference seen as marking an inferiority by the dominating group. 
Second, Rachels introduces reasoning as his method in the discussion about 
the principle of impartiality. ‘Morality is, at the very least, the effort to guide one’s 
conduct by reason.’77 This part of the minimum conception is similar to John 
Hospers’ criterion of human freedom and responsibility. For Hospers, a person can be 
counted responsible to the degree that an ‘act can [be] (or could have been) changed 
by the use of reasons.’78 Rachels does not specify any particular reason or rationale, 
nor does Hospers, no universal principle of reason, no philosophically ramified 
structure in human nature, such as the logic of sentences, or a unified grammar, as if 
there was a universal law of moral reasoning. Rachels leaves out any specification of 
a universal that reasoning will arrive at, but rather promotes reliance on a primitive 
human ability to discriminate between good and bad reasons for doing things, ‘to do 
what there are the best reasons for doing—while giving equal weight to the interests 
of each individual who will be affected by what one does.’79  
Individuals are not specified. In the narrow sense, the minimum conception 
prohibits treating other humans as less worthy of consideration than ourselves. In a 
broad sense this criterion carries the weight of all possible human and non-human 
individuals, not even preventing acknowledgment of either animals or artificial 
persons in the deliberation about what we ought to do. The minimum conception of 
morality contains no inherent distinction specifying that relative intelligence bears the 
weight of concern about interests. The minimum conception does not specify a 
threshold for what counts as intelligent life, or that the decision ultimately rests on 
relative intelligence. For example, we may find good reasons not to go ahead with a 
plan when doing so will harm some semi-sentient life, or a mentally challenged 
                                                 
76 Proscription <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proscription>  [accessed 29 December 2010] (para. 1) 
‘(Latin: proscriptio) is a term used for the public identification and official condemnation of enemies 
of the state. It is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as a “decree of condemnation to death or 
banishment” and is a heavily politically-charged word frequently used to refer to state-approved 
murder or persecution. Proscription implies the elimination en masse of political rivals or personal 
enemies, and the term is frequently used in connection with violent revolutions, most especially with 
the Reign of Terror in the French Revolution.’ 
77 EMP, p. 13. 
78 John Hospers, ‘What Means This Freedom?’ in Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, 9th ed., eds. 
John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education Inc., 2004), p. 59. 
Emphasis in original. 
79 EMP, p. 13. 
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human. Instead of a formal system the minimum conception is a conception about 
what it means to be a conscientious moral agent  
who is concerned impartially with the interests of everyone affected by what 
he or she does; who carefully sifts facts and examines their implications; who 
accepts principles of conduct only after scrutinizing them to make sure they 
are sound; who is willing to “listen to reason” even when it means that prior 
convictions may have to be revised; and who, finally, is willing to act on the 
results of this deliberation.80 
The need for impartiality required by the minimum conception therefore avoids the 
objection to modern moral theories posed by Michael Stocker who suggested that 
their ‘externality-ridden universes […] are devoid of all people.’81 Decision 
procedures based on universes of logical concerns82 are not informed by how one 
should address concern for the interests of others.83 So, when Rachels requires this 
concern, individual persons become the central feature of decisions related to them. 
The minimum conception turns out to be less concerned with the rules of 
reasoning than with the need for work of the self on the self in a project of becoming 
a conscientious moral agent. Unfortunately, the moral agent in the attempt to produce 
a systematically correct version of ethical truth has no access to foundations. The 
moral agent must be satisfied with a provisional, experimental ethos. Rachels 
recognizes that the ethical project is an unfinished one, and developing reasoning 
skills is part of that process of maturation in the moral agent. Ethical decision-making 
resides in the moral agent, not in a theory of morality.84 Ethics on Rachels’ account 
then becomes a technology of the self. 
Reasoning, in Rachels, is a distinctly human ability, and as such must be part 
of the psychologically apt treatment of humans. ‘Rational thinking consists in giving 
reasons, analyzing arguments, setting out and justifying principles, and the like.’85 
The broad scope of this reasoning method, therefore, relies on critical thinking about 
                                                 
80 EMP, p. 13. 
81 Michael Stocker, ‘The Schizophrenia of Modern Moral Theories’, in Ethics: The Big Questions, ed. 
by James P. Sterba (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1998), p. 154. An externality-
ridden universe is for example, a worldview that makes people responsible for following a higher law 
or absolute principle irrespective of the consequences to people.   
82 As in an ethical system like Aristotle’s, Kant’s, or Mill’s. 
83 Sissela Bok in Lying addresses a similar deficiency by appealing to the principle of Publicity. When 
a proposal has been advanced that would require lying to an individual or group, the proposal must be 
vetted by people representing the intended target. Outsiders of diverse backgrounds and commitments 
must be consulted before adopting or rejecting that proposal. She also uses a form of the golden rule 
wherein I ask myself whether I would wish to be lied to if I found myself in a similar position. 
84 Modern treatments of ethics have turned often to the conversation about virtue, the development of 
the virtuous self, and about training that leads to becoming a better person. 
85 EMP, p. 47. 
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real problems at hand, and it deals with real relations between people. It must remain 
dynamic as opposed to responding to moral dilemmas by recommending  pre-scripted 
formulae that give a list of remedies. Diagnosing persons by a method like this treats 
people as if they were mechanical devices. 
The promise of making the right decision is not assured using Rachels’ 
method, but the likelihood of eliminating many sub-optimal decisions is greatly 
increased. One never gets the sense reading Rachels that he has found the absolutely 
precise answer. One does get the sense that as humankind stumbles along in the youth 
of its rationality, it will be less dangerous for people if they attend to his form of 
moral reasoning. 
Summarized in the conclusion to the final chapter of his book, Rachels 
recommends his theory of ethics as a medially plausible one, open to refinement. ‘It is 
instructive to remember that a great many thinkers have tried to devise such a theory, 
and history has judged them to have been only partially successful.’86 But Rachels 
does think he has done better than his predecessors.  
Here, we arrive at the third part of his ethic; as important for Rachels as the 
form of his recommended ethical method is the attitude in which it is proffered. 
Deeply conscious of the fallibility of human reasoning and the process of 
justification, Rachels has constructed a method that delicately balances reasons and 
motives while guarding the interests of the ethical reasoner in relation to the interests 
of others. One must foster the attitude of a person in the middle of the process of 
refining his own moral sensibilities. Humility of a sort becomes necessary, because 
the absolute and universalizing claims of past theorists, though helpful, are in 
retrospect incomplete. Humility is required when considering the consequences of 
ethical decisions because of a persistent concern for the interests of others. Rachels, 
however, is not averse to optimism. He thinks we have come a long way from our 
predecessors, and keeping the correct attitude about our accomplishments will prevent 
overconfidence and the failures it brings.87 
Of the principles, methods, and attitudes that comprise Rachels’ programme, I 
find that the attitudes he recommends encapsulate a dimension of ethical thinking that 
                                                 
86 EMP, p. 202. 
87 I imagine keeping the correct attitude is a matter of many small adjustments, using techniques of the 
self like the one I offer later in this chapter. 
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carefully takes into account the characteristics of being human within a space weak 
ontology defines. 
Rachels is first sceptical, then pragmatic. He is not, however, pessimistic 
except in the sense that though there will be development in moral philosophy, that 
improvement may take a very long time. Rachels is pessimistic only in that there is no 
suggestion that we will complete the task of drawing up a moral system, only that 
humans will slowly improve their grasp of correct moral reasoning. He is sceptical of 
absolutes, pragmatic in the development of methods, and insistent on holding 
attitudes that permit transformation of our theories and methods by the facticity of our 
being in the world as it is freshly described with each moment of human maturation. 
In addition to being sceptical, pragmatic, and capable of conceiving the evolution of 
moral theory alongside the transformations of human society, Rachels, like Foucault, 
implicitly permits the critique of his own theory recognizing the weakness of his 
position as arbiter of truth. Rachels permits the probability of new knowledge and 
discovery, a better grasp of what it means to be human than currently exists. 
Cultivation of an ethos through the techniques Rachels requires for his moral 
theorizing is what I wish to offer as the framework for a technology of the self, not 
only concerning morality, but for all human theoretical enterprises.  
4.4.2. Moving Toward Rational Techniques 
What would be required for the construction of rational techniques? Part of 
that must be to set up the mode of discrimination for the choices we make when 
observing, listening, reading, writing, and speaking. Keeping the characteristics of a 
weak ontology in mind, this will mean that modesty should guide the flexible criteria 
for the choices we make and the weight we give to our observations. I am not 
proposing a comprehensive definition for rationality in general. That is outside the 
scope of this work. I am reflecting partly on the sorts of choices Foucault made, 
mentioned in some remarks I made in the Introduction,88 where he refused to engage 
in polemics,89 offer an unstudied opinion, or treat the results of his own efforts as 
fixed within one interpretative matrix. I am reflecting on the modesty of Foucault’s 
proposals concerning the results of his own work. What I have classed as weak theory 
                                                 
88 Section 0.2. 
89 James D. Marshall, ‘Philosophy, Polemics, Education’, in Studies in Philosophy and Education 26.2, 
(March 2007), 97-109. Marshall examines two contemporary examples of the difficulties posed by 
polemical attitudes. First of polemics exclude real dialogue and conversation in favour of combat with 
the intent to overthrow the position of the interlocutor. 
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in Foucault is carried out in a form of practice that itself can be characterized as a 
rationality, a posture of engagement in the world, a technique of reasoning about the 
world that constructs the world outside the parameters of strong ontologies.90 
Weak theory itself is a cautionary note, a critical instrument that forces a 
recognition that there is no simple, trivial, smooth movement from observation of the 
world, the self, or others to a knowledge of the same. On what terms, then, can weak 
theory be embodied in a method, a technique, a positive structuring heuristic that 
retains its critical function but allows the production of a rationality that can function 
as a momentary stopping place for evaluating regularities of the self and the world? 
This stopping place could never be characterized as a formalized rule, or even a 
science, but as Foucault suggests in The Archaeology of Knowledge perhaps, an 
epistemologization,91 a structure of rationality capable of organizing thoughts and 
observations, but one that could return again to its primitive precursors, or disappear 
entirely. Using the language of The Archaeology of Knowledge the stopping place 
would be a discursive formation, an agglomeration of evidences of a movement 
discovered within the archive, not a science as Foucault interpreted in The 
Archaeology but an epistemē or system of beliefs,92 perhaps, interpreted as the fourth 
element of knowledge in Plato’s sense, composed of knowledge (epistemē), 
intelligence (noūs), and right opinion (orthē doxa).93 
Foucault outlines four stages in the development of discursive formations in 
The Archaeology. None of these stages are necessary or inevitable, but are categories 
that roughly outline the formation of discursive practices.94 Foucault describes them 
in terms of thresholds: positivity, epistemologization, scientificity, formalization.95 
For example, the rational techniques embodied in Rachels’ ethic have, on my account, 
crossed the threshold of epistemologization. Foucault suggests that when 
a group of statements is articulated, claims to validate (even unsuccessfully) 
norms of verification and coherence, and when it exercises a dominant 
                                                 
90 FF, p. 73, ‘Foucault’s treatise, as it is encountered in his writings, constitutes a practice which 
educates his readers into an ethical responsibility for intellectual inquiry. It provides not an obligatory 
conduct but a possible escape from an intellectual milieu unnourished by ethical interrogation.’ 
91 AK, p. 187 
92 I also do not wish to take the sense Foucault gives in AK that an epistemē is the single underlying 
rationality of an age that J. G. Merquior critiques in chapters 4 and 5 of Foucault. 
93 GSO, p. 250. 
94 I say this with all the caveats about Foucault’s archeological project in place. 
95 AK, pp. 186-187. 
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function (as a model, a critique, or a verification) over knowledge, we will say 
that the discursive formation crosses a threshold of epistemologization.96 
Rachels articulates a group of statements, found within the minimum conception of 
morality that function as a method. It includes the principle of respect for persons as 
the distillation of historical ethical theorizing and a critical scientific rationality that I 
outlined above in the previous section. He uses the minimum conception as a 
validation test for ethical systems. Any ethical system that is unable to reason through 
to a solution, for example, a system relying on theological commands, is incapable of 
satisfactorily resolving some ethical dilemmas. It fails the coherence test. In addition, 
any ethical system that doesn’t respect persons, like some forms of utilitarianism, will 
fail Rachels’ test as well because it will privilege one people group over another, or 
one individual over another.  
Following Foucault’s schema above, the norm of verification Rachels 
promotes is critical reasoning grounded within the facticity of human behaviour, 
privileging persistent human behaviour in history, for example, the human drive for 
freedom, resistance to domination, and the rejection of some forms of behaviour like 
lying and murder that are incapable of promoting human flourishing.  
A useful coherence is achieved by Rachels through a critique of moral systems 
with an eye to the adoption of principles, like respect of persons, that retain persistent 
sensibility without also forcing any particular set of ethical rules.97 Again, Rachels 
relies on the persistence of forms of human behaviour to promote the usefulness of 
rules like the Golden Rule, Kant’s Principle of Humanity, or Mill’s Principle of 
Utility (properly contextualized) as adjuncts to critical thinking about moral 
problems. 
When Rachels asks what a satisfactory moral theory would look like,98 he 
provides a model of the procedures one must follow to ensure compliance, not only 
with the minimum conception, but with the process of judging the adequacy of moral 
rules within the constraints of the social context. Rachels’ rational technique takes 
human weak ontology into account, the inability to discover or construct a scientific 
or coherent formalized ethic that forces the elements of our practice that most affect 
our community to be primary features of our ethic. So the discursive formation of 
                                                 
96 AK, pp. 186-187. 
97 Persistent sensibility is shown by the negative consequences for human society of removing these 
principles from a moral theory. 
98 EMP, chapter 13. 
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Rachels’ ethic crosses the threshold of epistemologization as a form of heuristic 
procedures for ethical decision making, but never achieves a scientific or formalized 
knowledge. 
On Rachels’ account the history of ethical philosophy has many examples of 
prematurely turning ethical practice into a science or a formalization, even though at 
the time of the formation of ethical systems, adequate characterization of human 
being was not available.99 Rachels promotes an attitude or ethos within his rational 
technique of ethical decision-making that permits the possibility of advancing ethical 
theorizing. It is this rational technique that indicates a wider movement of thought in 
this age that provides, in the face of our weakness, friction, distance,100 or 
stickiness101 a temporary public shelter from which to proceed with our 
investigations, but not only our investigations. This gives persons a temporary place 
within which they may practice an ethic derived by those investigations. 
Beyond choosing to take the step toward ethical techniques, Pier Aldo Rovatti 
suggests that the ethical turn may be inevitable.102 
With the name “ethics” we can try to mark a border or a line that identifies the 
overall attitude with which these philosophies take leave from the traditional 
concepts of truth and knowledge. Ethics thus comes to indicate the dominating 
tonality, a shifting in the way of thinking.103  
This may mark, in Foucault’s parlance, a turning away from the subject/object 
double of a Cartesian subjectivity of knowledge and a return to ethical techniques of 
the self on the self, to spiritual practices as the qualification for knowledge. So, weak 
theory leads to rational techniques in a move toward an ethical and critical 
engagement with the world.  
In the following section I outline a form for a rational technique, a method for 
the production of a philosophical ethos permitting a weak ontology while engaging 
the lived world in a thoroughgoing fashion. This technique will permit the subject to 
                                                 
99 I refer, for example, to Kant with the contrast between the universal declarations in his Groundwork 
for the Metaphysic of Morals, and his provincial declarations in the Anthropology.  
100 RM, p. 13. 
101 SA, p. 8, and, ‘Weak Ontology and Liberal Political Reflection,’ p. 507 
102 Like the ethics of care found in Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (London: Harvard University 
Press, 1982), Rovatti may be appealing to ethical responsibility generated by necessity. In Gilligan, the 
difference between an ethic of justice and an ethic of care is marked by the way in which moral 
responsibility is assumed. In the ethic of justice moral responsibility is taken on as a rational choice 
between alternatives. Its foundation may best be described in Kantian terms where one chooses to 
perform one’s duty. Gilligan suggests that much of moral obligation does not come on people in this 
way. Instead, obligation often comes like the duty of a mother to her child. The relationship is not one 
of rationally chosen duty but the necessity of care. 
103 Aldo Pier Rovatti, ‘In Praise of Modesty,’ in Contemporary Italian Philosophy, p. 187. 
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engage the world on its own terms, fully cognizant of the limitations of human 
apprehension, while permitting also the development of the self in freedom. 
4.5. A Rational Technique 
I want to propose a technique that can be used as a discipline, a propaedeutic 
to theorizing. This rational technique is ethical104 because its discovery and practice 
requires a philosophical ethos, a formation of one’s being with an attitude that rejects 
first the limitations of universalizing and problematically tidy systems preferring the 
‘quasi-chaos’105 of experiences of a ‘confused and superabundant life’106 as William 
James describes it. This ethos requires a partial suspension of belief. A suspension of 
belief is necessary to prevent fixing knowledge of the world and our selves in 
universalizing terms that appear to resolve conflicts in data, but serve to insulate the 
observer from conflicting data. This is one lesson of Foucault’s Archaeology. All the 
data of experience in its uninterpreted state can be set aside but should be kept 
accessible. That data should be allowed, even required to intrude on theorizing in a 
fashion that may be inconvenient, as a reminder not of the fixity of data but the 
persistence of the world, of the emergence of the world at the moment of its 
observation. This effort at keeping data present should help the observer avoid any 
facile reductionism. That is not to say that research mustn’t be reductive, but that 
prematurely limiting what may be included in a study will produce knowledge that 
would fail a simple sceptical query that takes as its background a wider world of 
inquiry.107 
The acquisition and development of this ethos takes place as a matter 
recognizing when useful models of theorizing reach their limitations. This ethos 
should be seen as a kind of porosity to the world that does not accede to some 
universal applicability of principles seeing as how the structures of human theorizing 
are at best temporary structures, maps to organize observations.  
                                                 
104 The technique is ethical in Foucault’s sense where he reflects on the formation of the self by the self 
as a qualification for philosophical knowledge. 
105 William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism (Lincoln, Nebraska : University of Nebraska Press, 
1996), p. 65. 
106 James, p. 39, paraphrased. 
107 For example, there is a tendency, widespread in the United States, to justify belief in a young earth 
by appealing to the biblical text. The sceptical inquiry of the geologist, or astronomer should put this 
quibble to rest, except that often the young earther will not accept the evidence of geology by claiming 
that science doesn’t produce reliable knowledge. 
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It is well known that the observer transforms the data in observation, but this 
technique requires that the subject submit also to the process of observation with the 
sort of focus Plato and Foucault define as a form of relationship with the observed 
object. This relationship transforms the observer’s sensibilities. I reflect here on 
Plato’s requirement of communion, or as Foucault says,108 an affinity with the object, 
a form of interaction that implies transformation of both the observing self, and the 
object observed.109 I will characterize this as a form of vulnerability, denying first the 
disengaged self and, second any mathēmata of an object that claims to have given a 
comprehensive account of the thing in its being, that claims to have systematized 
Plato’s philosophical knowledge. What emerges from this communion is, rather, a 
practitioner, a self engaged with the world, explicitly embedded in reality, grounded 
in Plato’s philosophical knowledge out of which springs the possibility of further 
engagement with the world. 
This technique of vulnerability does not deny the usefulness or force of 
theoretical productions emerging from engagement with the world. It only requires 
that theoretical productions be held in suspension with respect to their qualification as 
foundations for knowledge. Whatever practical use or benefit can be made of them 
should be the project of further exploration, the sort of exploration, first, that has 
fostered the fruitfulness of modern science, and second, the contemporary meditations 
on ethics that have made some progress against the background of failed over-
optimistic ethical speculation. 
It is undeniable that modern science has been fruitful. Astronomy has given us 
a universe to replace the cosmology of our ancestors, medicine has given us cures for 
many historically common killers. It is unnecessary to further rehearse the prodigious 
advances of modern scientific endeavours. It is not the practical consequences of 
scientific enquiries that are problematic, only the failure of theoretical enterprises that 
have gone wrong through holding to mistakenly chosen foundations.  
                                                 
108 GSO, p. 251. 
109 For the transformation of the object, I refer to twentieth-century physics, especially Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty principle, that discovered that the observer changes the object by observing it. Also the 
intuition that the observable universe springs into being when it is observed. ‘“The truly creative nature 
of any forward step in human knowledge,” we know, “is such that theory, concept, law, and method of 
measurement—forever inseparable—are born into the world in union.”’ from John Archibald Wheeler, 
“Information, Physics, Quantum: The Search for Links” found in Complexity, Entropy and the Physics 
of Information, SFI Studies in the Sciences of Complexity, vol. VIII, ed. by Wojciech H. Zurek 
(Reading, MA: Perseus Books, 1990), p. 17. 
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In philosophical ethics, the advances of James Rachels, for example, reveal an 
openness to the possibility of transforming the theoretical enterprise, a vulnerability to 
new explorations that take the best of historical principles into account without falling 
to the temptations of closed and exclusive ethical theorizing. Though I believe it may 
be possible to demonstrate this for scientific inquiry, and Lee Smolin’s research is an 
example of how this might be done, I will use an ethical project of this past decade to 
show how a concern for the persistence of data can move a person toward an ethic of 
self-care. 
An exploration of a historical ethical problem that may be fruitfully 
categorized as a form of the ethical porosity and vulnerability to data I recommend, is 
found in a book by Miroslav Volf, The End of Memory: Remembering Rightly in a 
Violent World.110 Though Volf offers a solution to the problem of memory through 
his own engagement with Christianity, I believe the difficulties he faced formulating 
that solution can be extrapolated for use by anyone facing similar circumstances. 
Even though I think it is possible to extrapolate his method, I’m not sure he would 
countenance schematizing it, treating it as a technique separable from his account of 
divine intervention. With respect, I find methods within his practice that can, in a 
spirit of generosity, produce the sort of resolution toward which he aimed. 
Volf in The End of Memory reconstitutes a form of historical ontology that 
writes the self in terms that accurately characterize his embeddedness in the world in 
relation to a specific offense against him. Suffering persistent interrogations at the 
hands of ‘Captain G.’ during 1984 in Yugoslavia because he was a Christian 
theologian and ostensibly because his wife was an American suspected of being a 
CIA agent, Volf, though not physically tortured, experienced fear, sometimes 
paralyzing fear. 
I feared the seeming omnipotence of these evildoers. […] I was trapped and 
helpless, with no ground of my own on which to stand. Or from which to 
resist. Trembling before the false gods of power, I was something, all right. 
But as a person, I was nothing.111  
His captors faced him with an extensive dossier of his activities, reminiscent of that of 
a Foucauldian patient in Discipline and Punish. Volf’s soul was shaped by his 
captors’ scrutiny and cruelty.  
                                                 
110 Miroslav Volf, The End of Memory: Remembering Rightly in a Violent World (Grand Rapids, 
Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2006). 
111 Volf, pp. 3-6. 
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After the fact, Volf had a choice how to respond: react in kind, or deflect the 
evil by loving his captor. The choice of forgetting the offense doesn’t arise, because 
of the persistence of memory of the captivity itself. Here Volf finds solace in taking 
seriously that ethical innovation introduced by Jesus, ‘love your enemies.’112 Then 
Volf offers a rationale for this move.  
To triumph fully, evil needs two victories, not one. The first victory happens 
when an evil deed is perpetrated; the second victory, when evil is returned. 
After the first victory, evil would die if the second victory did not infuse it 
with new life.113 
Choosing to deflect the evil through non-retribution motivated by love, Volf 
nonetheless encounters the difficulty of the persistent memory of the evil done to him. 
This is the dilemma he set out to explore in the book.114 Love, in this circumstance is 
higher than either hating or disregarding Captain G. So Volf asks what it would take 
to actually love Captain G.? The call to love is the principle under which Volf chose 
to operate. This principle, that would present itself as a further elaboration of Rachels’ 
minimum conception under the principle of respect for others, moves Volf to consider 
the interests of Captain G. as well as his own. Volf’s method will be memory itself, 
with a set of conditions that prevent it from overthrowing reason or overthrowing the 
observations themselves by way of revenge or self destruction. 
The call to remember, ubiquitous in the late twentieth-century West as a 
response to crimes against people, was not the problem for Volf. Volf remembered 
what was done to him. The problem for him was remembering rightly. Volf suggests 
at the outset of his examination that remembering rightly involves not only what is 
right for the victim, but also what is right for the victimizer and society in general.115 
Memory under this definition is broader than Volf’s subjective recollection. 
To contextualize the project of remembering rightly within my proffered 
technique, the ethos Volf creates is one that is compatible with a weak ontology. Volf 
struggled to remember rightly because of the problems with observation, and as 
Foucault described, because of his embeddedness ‘within a historical matrix of power 
relations and the inability of formal rationality to arrive at a distanced, dispassionate, 
objective acquisition of either self-knowledge or knowledge of the world.’116 Volf is 
                                                 
112 Matthew 5:44, Luke 6:35: Bible. 
113 Volf, p. 9. 
114 Volf, p. 9. 
115 Volf, p. 11. 
116 Section 4.2. 
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aware that any simple human response, such as revenge will not answer the depth of 
the evil done to him. He is conscious of the weakness of human anger and the 
difficulty of preventing the escalation of violence. His response takes into account 
human connectedness and embeddedness in the world alongside all the painful 
residues of his torture. Volf provides three different distinct effects that require a 
response in the dilemma of remembering rightly: First, aspects ‘that concern primarily 
the wronged person,’117 aspects of the intrusion of memory into personal space and 
time. He asks himself ‘how much of my projected future would Captain G. 
colonize’118 in the expected recurrence of memory? The question here is how much 
and in what way Captain G. will be permitted to form the internal structure of Volf’s 
future self.  
Volf’s choices here were choices about self-formation. Would he leave the 
effort to the dominance of his memories or transform himself into a person who has 
transcended those memories, without also forgetting? Part of the difficulty Volf faced 
is that he was responsible for his own mental and moral health. To allow his future to 
be dominated by memories formed by the demands of his own unconscious reactive 
disposition seemed like the wrong course to take. To rein in the demands of an 
undisciplined disposition in a principled way, to become the arbiter of his own mental 
and moral health was the project that commended itself to him. At that time he made 
this choice, though Volf was a Christian, he realized that the decision to overcome the 
abuse of the Yugoslavian system was his. He expected that God would help him and 
reported that God did. But the work on himself had to be taken on voluntarily, and he 
carried it out successfully with a great deal of effort. 
The second effect concerns the abuse against him in a wider social setting. 
How will Volf choose to see the world? Will the world become an essentially 
negative world? ‘Would I be allowing the abuse to whirl me down into the dark 
netherworld, the memory of the abuse having darkened my world, and the darkened 
world having made me remember the abuse even more negatively?’119 or would his 
experience be interpreted as an anomaly in an essentially good world. 
The third aspect concerns the effect of the struggle to do justice to the memory 
of the wrongdoer. ‘Knowing how faulty memories generally are, and being aware of 
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victims’ proclivities and blind spots, I could not fully trust even myself’120 to 
remember rightly, and judge correctly. Volf refrains from making a judgment then, 
preferring to put it off till the eschatological judgment of God. But irrespective of 
God’s judgment, Volf believes his task lies in listening to the truth of Captain G. and 
honouring his personhood even while Volf rehearses the mistreatment narrative.121 
Volf recounts moments when he realizes how badly the reconstructed narrative could 
go wrong, when mistreatments are exaggerated by the effects of the damage done 
within his memories. To misremember would be to wrong Captain G. ‘The devil is 
not in “facts,” large or small, but in their interpretation. It was as though a warped 
mind was reading a plain text and coming up with the most bizarre interpretations that 
somehow managed to account for the facts.’122 Volf here required that the facts 
themselves are essential to the account, and that they must remain, but that 
interpretation is the weak link to remembering rightly. 
This may seem obvious, but Volf’s hesitancy to rush to judgment is indicative 
first of his recognition of the deep weakness of human memory, and second, a 
recognition of the entangled nature of actions performed and attitudes held in relation 
to others. Volf avoids any simple, or obvious resolution to the dilemma posed by the 
generous fairness he himself requires. The consequence Volf is looking for is an 
ethical construct for remembering correctly. Volf does not wish to bring Captain G. to 
account for his crimes. That is beyond the scope of his investigation. He is hunting for 
a technique of the self that will resolve his subjective memory in truth, taking account 
of his own reactions within his personal turmoil holding to the supposition that the 
evil behaviour of persons in the context of a problematic social construct can be 
redeemed within a fair narrative of the events. Volf wished for the facts of the 
interrogations to remain while he first put the memory of them into a perspective that 
respected both the social context of socialist Yugoslavia within the wider world, and 
the life of Captain G.  
Volf neither wished for an absolution of Captain G.’s crimes where he would 
be characterized as an unwitting pawn of an evil regime, nor did he wish to place 
Captain G. at the nexus of blame for the crime, as if all his actions were self-serving 
and independent of his social context. The social context is far too complex to permit 
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either option. Though Volf’s memory of Captain G.’s interrogation remains very two-
dimensional in the power relation that subjectified Volf, the truth of Captain G. 
remained to be reconstructed in his ordinary humanity. Obtaining this perspective that 
would effectively distance Volf from the persistent memory of the crimes committed 
against him is set as the goal of a technique that allows first, the facts to remain facts, 
while the interpretation unfolds as a matter of permitting the facts to find their 
ordinary equilibrium. Though Volf recounts the ‘small scale rebellion’123 erupting in 
himself as he meditated on the prospect of loving Captain G., it is a testament to the 
persistence of his ethical porosity to permit the work of struggle within memory that 
could lead to resolution with the facts of the crime still in place. 
How can Volf’s project of remembering rightly be understood in terms of the 
technique I offer? Principles, methods, and attitudes provide a porous apprehension of 
the facts of the matter, forming a decision procedure that takes as its context a weak 
ontology. The primary principle Volf offers is Christ’s injunction to love one’s 
enemies. This prevents Volf from rushing to judgment or devising vengeance. It also 
equalizes the humanity of Captain G. with Volf’s own.124  
The method Volf offers is that of remembering. But remembering is not an 
unalloyed good. Volf enumerates many ways that remembering can go wrong. Like 
reasoning in Rachels, Volf’s remembering must be focused on the facts, and in 
addition held strictly to the task of reconstructing not only his own experience but that 
of his interrogator, Captain G.  
The formation of Volf’s attitude is that of being deeply aware of the 
limitations of human being, how quickly human projects can become derailed, how 
psychological damage can make it difficult to carry out the project of remembering 
truthfully. It is the attitude of humility with an ethical porosity in the face of these 
obstacles that transforms the project from mere remembering to remembering rightly. 
4.6. Conclusion 
Not a science, but an experiment, ethical techniques modelled on a necessary 
modesty force the exclusion of formalizations from the discussion of justifications for 
behaviour. Though reductionist science reveals much of knowledge that we have 
come to take for granted, it conceals the implications of the reductionism that 
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marginalized man, turning him into an object. In 1929 Joseph Wood Krutch suggested 
that ‘science displaces one after another the myths which have been generated by 
need, [and] it grows more and more likely that [man] must remain an ethical animal in 
a universe which contains no ethical element.’125  
Ethical projects such as emotivism, born out of positive science are the formal 
results of searching in the bleak reductive atmospheres of the hard sciences for human 
motivation. Coming up empty, the conclusion of positivism is that moral feeling is 
nothing more than a conventional emotional throwback to religious or tribal practices 
that don’t belong in the modern age. When desire is reduced to interactions of 
pheromones and lovesickness to psychosis, persons are reduced to gray machines. For 
Krutch, this is an intolerable state of affairs. Rachels dispenses with the certainty of a 
formalized science to reintegrate humans into a practical theory of ethics, moulded on 
a deeply conditioned, weaker theory assuming a necessary human embeddedness in 
the world. 
Rachels does not promote ethical absolutes, necessary empirical foundations, 
ethical sciences, or formalizations because their reductionism disqualifies them from 
declaring the truth about human epistemic and ontological weakness. Though not a 
doctrine of sin, weak theory is a doctrine of human contextualization which is 
incapable of being transcended. Metaphorically, humans don’t find themselves in a 
place with an impenetrable ceiling in a room with definite structure but in an ocean 
from which one cannot find the shore with a horizon that moves further beyond our 
reach as we move toward it. The project of ethics in Rachels becomes a project, not a 
theory, a set of techniques, not universals. Gone is the certainty of a theoretical ethical 
gestalt, in favour of a set of well exercised rational techniques for deciding at any one 
time, what should be done. 
Foucault struggled in the 1960s to annunciate a response to a form of critique 
exemplified in Anscombe’s ‘Modern Moral Philosophy.’126 The tendency of moral 
philosophy at that time was to assume the authority of a universal in the form of God 
without actually having a God. Foucault struggled to dispense with the need for a 
universal. In the 1970s Foucault announced a theory of power relations that morphed 
eventually into his ethical programme of self-development in the late 1970s and early 
                                                 
125 Joseph Wood Krutch, The Modern Temper (New York, NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
Publishers, 1929), p. 10. 
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1980s. Foucault’s work is a cautionary note from which emerged a variety of 
critiques.127 
Rachels re-evaluated and integrated the best of past and present ethical 
theorizing with an eye to the data, and created a method that advanced modestly the 
project of ethical decision making. Rachels gave us a technique of ethical 
rationalizing that can improve our chances of correctly deciding what to do. 
The technique I offer acknowledges the results of weak theory, while 
incorporating the ethical project of self-construction as a goal. One result of this form 
of self-construction is a porosity or vulnerability to experience in an ethos that sets in 
place moral (Plato) and spiritual (Foucault) requirements as a qualification for 
knowledge. It requires a non-reductive empiricism, a persistence of facticity, not as 
foundation, but as a force on our consciousness of the persistence of the world.  
In the final chapter of this dissertation I will review the procedures and 
summarize the content of the preceding chapters. In addition, I will note the strengths 
and deficiencies of my work with an eye to further research possible for techniques of 
the self, and give a rationale for the direction I took in this work. 
 
                                                 
127 Foucault criticized Marxism, structuralism, postmodernism, universalizing theories of history, 
French conservative political culture, psychiatry, psychology, power relations, gay relations, dominant 
epistemological assumptions, etc. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
5.1. Introduction 
Foucault’s work has provided useful guidelines to work with. First, the variety 
of his interests revealed connections between many problematic domains. Second, the 
intersection of history, aesthetics, philosophy, ethics, and political theory inside 
Foucault’s growing precision of thought through the three decades of his writing 
uncovered many broad truths about the human enterprise. Third, Foucault’s ethos in 
which he intended not to speak about things he had not studied1 and found solidarity 
in action for social projects about which he cared deeply2 showed a sense of academic 
restraint alongside action and writing for the causes he engaged. ‘Foucault’s writings 
constitute a practice that educates their readers into an ethical responsibility for 
intellectual inquiry.’3 
The latter part of the twentieth century was a time of fundamental change 
within national and world communities. For example, political leaders in the United 
States since the 1960s and 1970s began to be held accountable for their public and 
private behaviour with respect to their sexual, financial, and political mores. And, for 
example medical professionals fell under increased scrutiny for behaviour that was 
permitted a few decades before.4 Alongside increased observation of leaders came a 
dramatic increase of fine-grained surveillance of ordinary people in society.5 Foucault 
is prescient, first, in challenging the assumptions of historical research that lent 
credibility to established relations of power invested in institutions of Western 
society. For example, Foucault discovered plausible links between pastoral power 
within Christianity and the emergence of police forces in the sixteenth through 
nineteenth centuries. The police assumed the right to stand as moral authorities over 
the public as if they were invested with divine objectivity. The challenges to the 
dominance of police showed themselves in the formation of counter-conduct like that 
of the Society of Friends, the Quakers.  
                                                 
1 EST, ‘Sexual Choice, Sexual Act,’ p. 142. 
2 Power, ‘Interview with Michel Foucault with Italian journalist D. Trombadori 1978,’ p. 244. Also, 
Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault, tr. Betsy Wing (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 
238-41. 
3 FOF, p. 17. 
4 This accountability is due partly to the failure of leadership to hold itself accountable for its own 
behaviour and the resultant loss of public trust.  
5 Foucault noted architectures of surveillance, such as the Panopticon, that set up the conditions for 
transformation of the soul. Today, the resolution of details about individuals approaches persistent 
public surveillance through financial tracking, facial recognition, etc. 
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Second, Foucault unpacked for public inspection ubiquitous power relations as 
persistent grounds of the social milieu, drawing attention to connections between 
knowledge and power. Third, without abandoning the results of his previous 
research,6 he explored the problems of individual freedom, even experimentally by 
transgression7 in his movement toward the care of the self in an ethos that required 
lifelong attendance to techniques of the self the goal of which was self-mastery.  
Researching Quaker counter-conduct which Foucault merely mentioned8 
proved to be a fruitful ground for the discussion in this dissertation about resistance 
within power relations but also a place to observe the conscious working out of the 
life of John Woolman in the eighteenth century under the rigorous constraints of 
sensitivity to principle and guidance of the light within as a full-featured technology 
of the self. Beginning with observations of Quaker resistance to church and state, a 
life cycle of the development of techniques of the self whose consequences have had 
lasting impact on the socio-political outworking of politics of the United States 
emerged. The payoff of individual techniques of the self leading to self-mastery, 
became for Woolman the slow steady migration to a world where justice is possible, 
at least in principle. Unsuccessful, or minimally successful experiments in resistance 
to power that had their origins alongside the Quaker dissent in England9 were of 
minimal use for this dissertation because, though they are instructive on some 
account, their failure as social movements betrays their inability to gauge rightly the 
temper of their times and the touchstones of power relations. It may have been chance 
and timing that made it possible for the Quakers to prosper eventually, but there is 
evidence that the Quakers understood their circumstances often enough to persist, 
even when their unpopular actions occasionally resulted in their unjust deaths. 
As a model for this dissertation, Foucault in his lectures in The Hermeneutics 
of the Subject neither adopted an ancient technology of the self for his day nor 
suggested that technologies of the self were unnecessary. The Greco-Roman world 
and Foucault’s world had little in common, making problematic the adoption today of 
ancient technologies of the self. But it also appeared that there must be some 
                                                 
6 Foucault nonetheless moderated the goals of his methodology. 
7 Eribon, p. 328. Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
8 Power, ‘Truth and Juridical Forms,’ p. 60. 
9 Barbour and Frost, pp. 18, 19. I am referring to the Diggers and Ranters specifically, but also the 
Puritans. I do not use the Puritans as an example because of the wide range of beliefs within their 
ranks. The Quakers, though more radical in some ways unified themselves in basic principles which 
they worked out in the first few generations of practice. 
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individual techniques of the self generalizable from the ancient ones that could aid 
moderns in taking on the project of governing the self. 
Modern writing has many cognates with ancient techniques of writing that 
fulfilled Foucault’s spiritual requirements—qualifying the individual for knowledge. 
Not contextualized in the same culture of elite Athenian or Roman society—
academic, technical writing was explicitly for Foucault an instrument of self-
construction. Journaling also became for the high school students of The Freedom 
Writers Diary a means of self-mastery, and writing in many forms serves similar 
purposes today. Writing as a technique of the self used for self-mastery is explained 
in chapter three. In chapter four I offered two examples of ethical writing, Rachels’ 
The Elements of Moral Philosophy, and Volf’s The End of Memory to demonstrate 
how self-mastery could be achieved in contemporary writing. 
In the latest published English language lecture series The Government of Self 
and Others I found a link between Foucault’s techniques of the self and a Platonic 
model of knowledge. Foucault’s exposition of Plato’s work gave a justification for 
recommending a rational technique along the lines of a weak ontology that preserved 
a sense of the difficulty of objective knowledge and yet permitted the possibility of 
legitimate apprehension of the truth, at least in principle, within a technique of the 
self, a practice of research under the constraints of ordinary human limits. 
5.2 Summary and Results of the Research of This Dissertation 
5.2.1. Chapter Summaries 
In the first chapter I examined Foucault’s methodology for consistency and 
coherence. Foucault’s critics often misrepresented his views, for example, when it 
came to the controversy over structuralism. However, when Foucault’s critics had a 
point, he was amenable to change, such as when he acknowledged problems with the 
goals of the archaeological method. Foucault’s treatment of historical objects in the 
method that became genealogy was much subtler than many of his commentators 
gave him credit for. Some interviews support this. As well, reading and research 
which has not been explicitly included in this dissertation supports this, especially the 
introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, where Gary Gutting surveys 
Foucault’s accomplishments only by reference to his published books. None of the 
interviews, lectures, or biographies are even mentioned by Gutting, and those sources 
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expose much of the subtlety of Foucault’s work, especially when part of Foucault’s 
project is the production of his own life as an art. Little discussion of that art as a 
whole of Foucault’s life shows up in his major published works. That is not to say the 
books are unimportant, but the books need to be seen within a broader context. The 
books are objects in themselves with their own trajectories. This examination is not a 
rough psychologising of Foucault’s life, an attempt to piece together clues to his 
intentions. He was fairly explicit about those intentions, even if only after the 
publications of his major works. 
Foucault was not consistent in any formal sense, and not in any sense that 
might try to unify his oeuvre under a single comprehensive heading. Foucault’s 
consistency was found in the progress he made in life toward the development of an 
ethos that was at once scholarly and experimental, challenging the boundaries of 
convention to provide space in which he could work.  
Foucault was also coherent, but discovering that coherence has been a result 
of this project, not a presupposition under which the research began. His coherence 
does not appear as a set of formal properties, but rather becomes visible in terms of a 
style of life where Foucault is both at ease with himself and fully engaged with his 
work. I find Foucault’s coherence a matter of a consciously constructed then integral 
social imaginary,10 a ground of experience and work that became second nature. 
James Bernauer sees coherence in Foucault’s work even within ‘the variety of 
subjects he has explored.’11 Rajchman sees Foucault’s work as coherent also, but as a 
form of scepticism designed ‘to avoid, the coherence of a single method or 
doctrine.’12 
In the second chapter I engaged a number of puzzles about freedom and the 
Enlightenment. Foucault took up the task of evaluating Kant’s Was ist Aufklärung 
because that essay seemed to be at the temporal fulcrum of a transition to Modernity 
                                                 
10 Charles Taylor, The Secular Age, p. 159. The following is a short explanation of the social 
imaginary. This comes from a book review of Taylor’s Social Imaginary by Steve Crocker in the 
Canadian Journal of Sociology Online January-February 2005 
<http://www.cjsonline.ca/reviews/socialimaginaries.html> [accessed, 25 March, 2011],‘The social 
imaginary […] is a more elusive set of self understandings, background practices, and horizons of 
common expectations that are not always explicitly articulated, but that give a people a sense of a 
shared group life.’ 
11 FOF, p. 3, ‘His work is neither a maze nor does it demand a leap in the dark; the variety of subjects 
he has explored notwithstanding, there is a remarkable coherence to a body of work that spanned thirty 
years.’ 
12 John Rajchman, Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1985), p. 2. 
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within the Enlightenment era. Foucault was not entirely satisfied with Kant’s answer, 
because, in part, Kant didn’t seem to grasp the problems associated with ubiquitous 
power relations. For Kant, rational discourse was the model of adjudication between 
parties in power relations, instead of resistance, rebellion, and counter-conduct which 
established freedom, terms not included in Kant’s exposition. Foucault takes Kant’s 
motto for the Enlightenment (Sapere aude!) seriously. But, Foucault’s reading of that 
motto includes the possibility of transgression against the established order, even 
rebellion against the results of reason when reason restricts self-development. 
‘Foucault’s research and reflection’ led him to discover ‘routes of escape’13 from this 
self-incurred tutelage. Responding to Kant’s motto, Foucault counts the cost of daring 
to reason with a better apprehension of the price that must be paid for one living 
within ubiquitous power relations. 
It appeared Foucault had too narrowly characterized Kant, so I appealed to the 
critique of Kant’s ethic by Christine Korsgaard. She exposes some problems Kant’s 
ethic poses for Foucault. In that critique, she thoroughly justifies from Kant’s wider 
oeuvre, transgression against the Principle of Humanity, when keeping it amounts to a 
conflict of duties.  
From the more nuanced version of Kant offered by Korsgaard, I laid out 
Foucault’s movement of resistance resulting in counter-conduct as a response to 
unbearable power relations. I illustrated this by examining the origins and practices of 
the Society of Friends, the Quakers. I demonstrated the development of a culture 
based on a rule separate and distinct from English law and the Anglican Church. 
From founding principles at odds with authorities, the Quakers in their second 
generation moved toward an egalitarian polity that condensed into a unified entity still 
at odds with English law, but tolerated as another form of life within its borders 
because of the moral insight and upright behaviour of its members. With the 
establishment of William Penn’s colony in North America, the Quaker form of 
Christianity evolved toward what has been called quietism. 
John Woolman emerged within third-generation Quaker society in the quietist 
culture of the American Colonies. Long considered one of the classics of American 
literature, The Journal of John Woolman stands squarely within a number of 
                                                 
13 FF, p. 46. 
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traditions14 that illustrate Foucault’s concept of self-formation. With a sense of right 
and wrong reminiscent of the practical functioning of Socrates’ divine gift,15 
Woolman’s objectification of the problem of self creation within his Journal is 
reminiscent of the writings of Seneca and Aurelius in its focus on self-development. 
In the third chapter I laid out a schema of Foucault’s ethical movements. 
Foucault’s ethical work is in itself too large a project to include merely as an 
illustrative study. I left out of that study any focus on epistemology because the thrust 
of Foucault’s work was more concerned with the ethical techniques of the ancients 
than with their epistemology, and I wanted to discover what Foucault intended doing 
by exposing those techniques. As well, in this ethical study Foucault distinguished 
himself from the stream of thought following the Cartesian constitution of the self as 
objective observer. Foucault wrestled ownership of the traditional frame of Greek 
thinking (as self-knowledge) away from the Cartesian hegemony. Foucault and 
others, such as Pierre Hadot16 and Martha Nussbaum,17 discovered a more consistent 
frame of Greek thought, one which Plato, the Stoics, and the Epicureans considered 
central, that of the care of the self. The command to ‘know thyself,’ then, properly 
becomes an admonition to have a humble estimation of oneself in the face of the 
gods, not as self-knowledge became later, the sole function and goal of the 
philosophical enterprise. Know thyself returns in Foucault’s reading as part of the 
project of self-care, not the drive for self examination and analysis, or the exegesis of 
the self it became in early Christianity. 
The form and content of The History of Sexuality, volume I falls within a 
genealogical discussion of Foucault’s Classical and Modern ages—as does Discipline 
and Punish. The concern of these works is not so much ethical construction of the self 
as it is social construction of the self. The last two volumes of The History of 
Sexuality are works whose core is the examination of external evidence of a 
genealogy of the care of the self, and of writings on the transformation of Greco-
Roman ethical practice. These works are, however, highly refined exposés of 
problematized sexuality, and not centrally focused on techniques of the self. Foucault 
does discuss techniques of the self with respect to diet and sexual practice. But he 
                                                 
14 Both Quaker and Enlightenment. 
15 Plato, Apology. 
16 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life ed. by Arnold I. Davidson, tr. by Michael Chase 
(Cambridge: Blackwell, 1999). 
17 Martha Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1996). 
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wrote about those techniques merely as illustrations for the genealogy. The chief texts 
for examination of the origin and reasons for the techniques precede these books. 
In the lectures, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault examines 
techniques of the self and their deployment in the Hellenistic world as part of the 
theme of self-care. I found models for techniques of the self in this series, but also 
shifts in Foucault’s explicit thinking about the primacy of self-constitution. The 
problems of self-constitution begun in his earlier aesthetic works find their fullest 
expression in this lecture series, the results of which are found in the last two volumes 
of The History of Sexuality. 
I discovered specifiable techniques of the self in Foucault and his ethos, 
which, I believe emerged out of his own practices such as writing. The technique of 
self-constitution by means of writing can be found in many places, and the examples I 
used, including Foucault’s, could be characterized in much the same way Foucault 
characterized the ancient practices. Writing in some cases is a technique of self-
constitution that transforms the individual, often making the individual stronger, and 
more capable of facing the challenges of life through self-mastery. 
In the fourth chapter, I needed to extract some of Foucault’s discovered tools 
for my own project. The first clue for proceeding was found in a general statement by 
Lee Smolin that charted a general trend in Western thought toward a weak ontology 
in the late twentieth century; this is an ontology modelled roughly on the difficulties 
and limitations of human cognition and practice.  
Smolin does not deny the power of the scientific project, and as a practicing 
scientist, the philosophical consideration was a way of putting his own work into 
perspective. He developed a personal ethos of humility as a response to the puzzles of 
his own scientific endeavour. The Italian and American thinkers I drew into the 
discussion outlined features of human rationality that described limitations inherent to 
any human being that could be recognized and compensated for, but never 
transcended. Further, their theories didn’t exclude advancement in human knowledge, 
but forced a realization that perception of the truth is evanescent, and its discovery is 
the result of much work on the self. An ethos appears in this literature, not unlike the 
one I found in Foucault—a posture, an attitude as a response to weak human 
ontology. 
In Foucault’s discussion of Plato’s seventh letter in The Government of Self 
and Others an explicit connection emerges between the acquisition of knowledge and 
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a particular kind of ethos, one that qualified the observer for an unveiling of 
philosophical knowledge, the truth of being. That text is an explanation of Foucault’s 
remarks about spirituality being the qualification for knowledge. Foucault describes 
how Plato refused to sully his contact with the truth by writing or speaking of it as if 
one fully comprehended it, and regarded the relation to truth as sacred. Plato, and 
Foucault with him, did not deny that truth can be known, but rather they claimed that 
the road to truth is arduous and the truth itself is a prize won at great personal cost. 
No transparent, frictionless access to reality is available. 
On this account I rejected reductionism as a method of discerning the whole of 
reality. Reductionism provides access to an abstracted form of truth, which is in 
Plato’s terms, a mathēmata or study. But the truth of a mathēmata is inevitably 
incomplete, even though it might prove useful. The best reductive and formalized 
truths are merely a synecdoche of reality and must be taken as limited and 
provisional. Smolin rejected strong ontologies because their claims to certainty could 
not be supported by the available evidence.18 This is the same reading Plato and 
Foucault give to mathēmata. Because of this, I offered, instead of an impregnable 
fortress of coherent formalisms, a technique that ensured a sense of vulnerability, a 
porosity to experience and thereby eventually to the possibility of truth.  
Examining Miroslav Volf’s The End of Memory served to illustrate first that 
an ethos of vulnerability was suitable for a comprehensive examination of the truth. 
Second, examination of and discovery of the truth required intimate contact with all 
the features of the object under observation. The moral component driving Volf’s 
ethos retained a full-featured concept of respect for other persons, a requirement of 
Rachels’ minimum conception. Volf carried out the examination of his own memories 
under a weak ontology, with the recognition of how easy it is to lose sight of the goal. 
Volf’s arduous project of remembering rightly had as its goal the redemption of 
himself and his persecutors in a spare truth that permits, encourages, and eventually 
requires the return to a conversation. He therefore set up road blocks in the form of 
                                                 
18 Underdetermination in Scientific Theory, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-underdetermination/>, [accessed 25 March, 2011] ‘At the 
heart of the underdetermination of scientific theory by evidence is the simple idea that the evidence 
available to us at a given time may be insufficient to determine what beliefs we should hold in response 
to it.’ Also, ‘W. V. O. Quine suggested that such challenges applied not only to the confirmation of all 
types of scientific theories, but to all knowledge claims whatsoever, and his incorporation and further 
development of these problems as part of a general account of human knowledge was one of the most 
significant developments of 20th Century epistemology.’ 
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moral signposts to prevent himself deviating from his final purpose, so he could 
rightly remember the truth of his tale without corrupting the details. In this way Volf 
could reconcile with Captain G. and find a way to bridge the gap between their 
mutual humanities. Volf’s project required that he find a way to distance himself from 
his role as an interlocutor within the confines of the historical act of interrogation, and 
move toward a relationship with Captain G. as men within the human race. 
5.2.3. Further Research Required 
The focus of this project is constrained to techniques of self-construction. So, 
in the first two chapters a set of problems are posed that are resolved in the third and 
fourth. The specific focus on ethical techniques is a result of research both in 
Foucault’s mature work and ethical problems of responsibility for self-construction. 
The attempt to show a genealogy of Foucault’s own work towards the ethical was a 
way of framing a discussion about human projects in general. Therefore, I treated 
Foucault’s work of the 1960s and early 1970s in a strictly technical fashion to show 
progression and movement in Foucault’s own theorizing that would lend itself to 
supporting the ethical thesis of this dissertation. There is a continuity between my 
work and Foucault’s in relation to weak theory and this dissertation does not exhaust 
the possibility of research in those relations.  
Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age poses the problem of the search for wholeness 
or fullness. There are fruitful connections to explore between the ethical deliberations 
of the ancients and a modern quest for fullness. David Bohm’s Wholeness and the 
Implicate Order19 explores the problem of wholeness in terms of the awakened 
consciousness of the first modern people. Bohm lays out the problem of the human 
condition in terms of the contrast between wholeness and fragmentation, a contrast 
suggesting that modern humans lost their sense of wholeness at the moment they 
realized they were not exclusively part of nature.20 The story Bohm tells bears a 
striking resemblance to the Adam and Eve story without the metaphorical or 
problematic historical trappings of the biblical text. And, despite the difficulties posed 
by the Adam and Eve account, the problem of emergent intelligence is a puzzle that 
remains. Bohm’s story, without answering questions about the origin of people, or 
classifying original sin, nevertheless imagines a world similar to our own, and poses 
                                                 
19 David Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order (New York: Routledge, 2006), first published in 
1980. 
20 Bohm, p. 2. 
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the problem of the search for wholeness that bears a striking resemblance to Taylor’s 
expression of the human desire for fullness. 
A study of the genealogy of ethics in the twentieth century would be an 
interesting search, one that would show an increasing reliance on the persistence of 
data, with a turn toward statistical methods instead of foundational and universalizing 
ones. Using the parameters of my discussion of weak ontology in this dissertation 
would be a good place to begin looking at the various streams of ethical thought.  
A cause for optimism with respect to research on Foucault is that many of his 
Collège de France lectures have not yet come out in English. There will still be plenty 
of work to do on Foucault in the future. The most problematic but desirable 
possibility of future Foucault scholarship is the release of the Christian book, the 
fourth book of the History of Sexuality: Confessions of the Flesh. Though Foucault 
required that nothing not yet published be released from his estate, its publication may 
only be a matter of time because of increased pressure for its release and the 
decreasing concern with Foucault’s worries about his reputation. In addition, because 
so much is already known about Foucault’s released material related to this work,21 
there will be a body of literature already in place to receive it.  
5.3. Conclusion 
The most fruitful insight I found in this research was the discovery of weak 
ontology. As a form of critique, the refreshing honesty it forces on any discussion 
encourages the possibility of dialogue. The megalopsychia (great-souled person) 
becomes the one who can facilitate a conversation between opposing views. In a 
society where often a failure of civility marks the behaviour of both politics and 
religion, a conversation is clearly needed. A weak ontology levels the playing field. 
As a critical instrument, weak ontology challenges political and academic hegemonies 
over territory whose acquisition is problematic at best. As a methodology weak 
ontology promotes tentative and pliant instruments for the exploration of data. This is 
a methodology that will remain sensitive to the persistence and movement of human 
thought and promote research conscious of its limitations within a context that 
enables the growth of knowledge. That is the sort of technique of the self I proposed 
at the end of the fourth chapter. 
                                                 
21 For example, Jeremy Carrette’s volume: Michel Foucault, Religion and Culture, ed. by Jeremy R. 
Carrette (New York: Routledge, 1999), and Michel Foucault and Theology: The Politics of Religious 
Experience, ed. by James Bernauer and Jeremy Carrette (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005). 
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